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2Abstract
This dissertation provides a contribution to the understanding of the interactions 
between the firm’s financial structure and its operating decisions. The main idea 
is that financial structure impacts the payoff to the firm’s decision-maker and that 
this impact on the managerial payoff will in turn affect his optimal response when 
confronted with different possible operating decisions. A particular focus is on the 
case where the manager’s optimisation problem arises in a strategic environment in 
which the firm competes with rival firms in a product market.
The first main chapter reconsiders the strategic effect of debt, as first analysed by 
Brander and Lewis (1986), under the novel assumption that quantity choices are made 
by managers whose objective is to avoid bankruptcy. The basic result is that quantity 
choices, which are strategic substitutes under profit maximisation, may turn into 
strategic complements when the quantity choice is made by managers. This reversal 
in the nature of competition arises under reasonable assumptions on the firm’s profit 
function. It allows debt to be used to sustain more collusive product market outcomes 
than in the benchmark case where firms maximise profits, thereby avoiding, and indeed 
reversing, the pro-competitive limited liability effect of debt, as described by Brander 
and Lewis (1986). Delegation of the quantity choice to a bankruptcy-averse manager 
is shown to occur in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
The next chapter analyses the effect of asymmetric information between a firm 
and its outside investors on the firm’s competitive position in a model where first- 
period competition is followed by a financing stage a la Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Interim profit generated by the competition stage takes the role of financial slack and 
determines the extent to which external equity finance is required for a new investment 
opportunity. The full set of equilibria of the financing game is characterised and 
financial slack is formally analysed as a comparative statics variable. Using this the 
firm’s first period objective is derived from first principles. In contrast to models of 
predatory behaviour, one finds that in the presence of an adverse selection problem 
the need to finance externally may provide a strategic benefit rather than a strategic 
disadvantage. The reason is that the adverse selection problem may induce speculative 
behaviour, which will make the firm more aggressive vis & vis its rival.
The last main chapter analyses a model where the firm’s manager is asked to 
make an informed investment decision after evaluating the prospects of an investment 
project. In this model, which exhibits both moral hazard and hidden information 
on the part of the manager, different remuneration schemes are discussed and the 
optimal contract between financial investor and manager is derived. Assuming the 
manager is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, a benefit from diversification 
is shown to exist, in that the right incentives can be provided more cheaply when the 
manager is supervising more than one project. This occurs even though the projects 
are technologically unrelated and choices made on one project do not constrain the 
choices on any other project.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Traditionally, both Corporate Finance and Industrial Economics have consid­
ered the firm as the unit of analysis. The view was that, when faced with an 
investment opportunity, a firm would take projects with positive net present 
value. When firms compete with each other, again firms maximise profits. Eco­
nomic Theory had nothing to say about how large a firm should be, what the 
consequences of limited liability are, or whether the fact that the firm has to 
raise finance externally can impact its operating decisions. Since then infor­
mation economics, contract theory and game theory have been applied to take 
a view inside the firm and to analyse the interactions between the contractual 
structure inside the firm and the way the firm will behave in its product market. 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the nature of 
these interactions with a particular focus on the links between the firm’s finan­
cial structure and its product market behaviour. My thesis consists of three 
main chapters which are summarised below.
1.1 Managers, D ebt, and Industry Equilibrium
This is the first of two chapters which examine linkages between the firm’s fi­
nancing decisions and the firm’s strategic position in a product market. In
8
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particular, I reconsider the strategic commitment effect of debt in an environ­
ment of imperfect competition, as first analysed by Brander and Lewis (1986), 
under the novel assumption that quantity choices axe made by managers whose 
objective is to avoid bankruptcy.
In their original analysis, Brander and Lewis (1986) study a Cournot game 
of imperfect competition with uncertainty. Firm owners may first issue debt 
against the future profits of the firm, before they move again to choose quantities. 
This introduces a limited liability effect. The idea is that, having issued debt, 
firm owners face an option-type payoff when they choose quantities. They do 
not care about bad states of nature, in which the firm is bankrupt and they 
face a flat payoff of zero, but only about good states of the nature, in which the 
firm is not bankrupt and they axe residual claimants. Since firm owners choose 
quantities to maximise profit given good states of the world, debt will make 
owners more aggressive and will shift reaction functions out. In a symmetric 
equilibrium, both firms issue debt and both firms are more aggressive than they 
would otherwise have been. As a consequence, equilibrium quantities axe larger 
and equilibrium profits are lower than in the Cournot model without a financing 
stage. The possibility of commitment through debt exacerbates the prisoners’ 
dilemma inherent in quantity competition.
My work explores what happens to equilibrium quantities when the quantity 
decision is made by an agent who cares about bad states of the world. It is 
argued that managers have a strong incentive to avoid bankruptcy, since, as 
is well documented in the empirical literature, they face large negative wealth 
effects in the event of bankruptcy and may in addition lose private benefits and 
reputational capital.
The basic result is that, when quantity choices are made by managers who 
are bankruptcy averse, quantity choices, which are strategic substitutes under 
profit maximisation, may turn into strategic complements under reasonable as­
sumptions on the profit function. Then, in contrast with the benchmark case
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of owner control over quantity choices, starting from the benchmark level of the 
single stage competition, owners will want to shift the manager’s reaction func­
tion back, rather than out. As a result, equilibrium quantities will be less and 
equilibrium profits will be higher than in the benchmark case without a financ­
ing stage. The prisoners’ dilemma inherent in quantity competition is softened.
By employing a manager, shareholders not only avoid a limited liability effect of 
debt, but are able to achieve a more collusive outcome than in the simple model "L
» i 4
without a financing stage.
This result is robust when the decision to delegate is endogenised. The intu­
ition is that, given a reversal from strategic substitutes to strategic complements, 
when one firm does not delegate its quantity choice to a manager, it will lose out 
against a very aggressive manager-controlled firm. Thus, delegation to a man­
ager occurs in equilibrium and is associated with a positive ex ante value both on 
and off the equilibrium path. In contrast with Brander and Lewis (1986) and in 
line with the empirical evidence, in the equilibrium of our model positive lever­
age is associated with softer competition than in the standard oligopoly model 
without a financing stage. The model also implies that, given a contract do- 
main including shares, options and bonus schemes, in equilibrium owners would 
choose simple bonus schemes for their managers. This provides some theoretical oT
justification for the kind of managerial preferences assumed. s ?
A  LA -Wf J -#w-L.s~.uU RL  £,y 
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1.2 E quity Finance, A dverse Selection  and P rod­
uct M arket C om petition
This chapter also takes product market competition a la Brander and Lewis
(1986) as a main building block. In contrast with chapter 2, which starts by 
making an assumption about managerial preferences, this chapter takes asym­
metric information between the firm and its outside investors as the starting 
point. Also, this chapter is not primarily concerned with the commitment value
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of financing decisions and has a product market stage which precedes the financ­
ing stage.
Product market competition is as in Brander and Lewis (1986): two firms 
choose quantities in a environment of imperfect competition. The resulting 
interim profit is stochastic. It is a function both of the quantities chosen and 
of a random variable, which can be thought of as representing cost uncertainty 
or demand uncertainty. The financing stage follows Myers and Majluf (1984). 
One of the firms faces an investment opportunity. It may issue equity to finance 
the investment. The amount it needs to raise depends on the interim profit 
(financial slack) generated by the product market competition stage. The crucial 
assumption here is that, at the interim date, there is asymmetric information 
between the firm and its outside investors about the value of the firm. This 
creates an underinvestment problem just as in Myers and Majluf (1984). The 
good firm may not find it in its interest to issue equity, since the market belief 
pools it with the bad firm, so that the good firm faces a dilution cost.
This chapter makes several contributions to the existing literature. In con­
trast to the original article by Myers and Majluf, it recognises that, for a range of 
values of interim profit, the financing stage game has multiple equilibria. With 
respect to the multiplicity of equilibria I formally analyse the role of financial 
slack as a comparative statics variable. I then argue for an equilibrium selection 
criterion which is based on the idea that realised profit may not be known to 
financial investors with certainty. Given this criterion, the equilibrium moves 
from a separating to a pooling equilibrium at some cut-off profit level.
I take this behaviour of the equilibrium in the financing stage and derive 
the firm’s first-period objective from first principles. This improves on the ap­
proach taken in most of the literature, where an adverse selection problem a la 
Myers and Majluf is invoked to justify some ad hoc specification for the cost of 
external tundsTTfrfifowmg my approach, one finds that, in the presence of the 
adverse selection problem, the firm will not simply maximise the expected value
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of profit, but will take into account the implication its quantity choice has on 
the probability that the profit generated exceeds the cut-off, above which both 
types invest in a pooling equilibrium. This will lead the firm to consider not only 
the first moment, but also the second moment of the profit distribution. When 
the cut-off is relatively high there is an incentive to increase the variance of the 
profit distribution by increasing output. The rival anticipates this and responds 
with a lower output, which will benefit the firm. When the cut-off is low there is 
an incentive to reduce the variance of the profit distribution by lowering output. 
The rival will take advantage of this and respond with a higher output, which 
will harm the firm.
One of the main insights of this model is that the fact that a firm has to 
finance externally does not necessarily worsen the firm’s competitive position.
In contrast to models where a financially constrained firm faces predation by a 
deep pocketed rival, in our model a particularly severe financing problem may 
actually help the firm in making it more aggressive vis a vis its rival.
1.3 Optimal Managerial Rem uneration and Firm- 
level Diversification
This chapter addresses and relates two hitherto unrelated issues. In recent years 
managerial remuneration has been the focus of much public and academic de­
bate. Contract theoretical analysis has centred on the case where the manager is 
assigned a single project and has provided justification for performance related 
contracts that are monotone in observed return. From a theoretical perspective, 
also, the observed diversification of firms into several lines of business is a puz­
zle, since standard portfolio theory would suggest that there is no gain to be 
had from firm-level diversification when investors can hold diversified portfolios 
themselves.
I analyse optimal managerial remuneration schemes when the manager su-
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pervises several identical projects. The underlying agency relationship is charac­
terised by a combination of moral hazard and adverse selection. The manager is 
thought of as an insider who, having examined the projects, knows more about 
their likely returns than does the financial investor. Also, re-evaluating projects 
requires effort on the part of the manager. By use of a wage contract, financial 
investors are able to provide the manager with the right incentives to investigate 
project viability and to make investment decisions in their interest. Providing 
these incentives is costly, however. Given that the manager is protected by lim­
ited liability, the wage contract will have to over-compensate for the effort cost 
incurred, so that the manager receives an informational rent.
In this framework, the optimal wage contract is derived both for the case 
where the manager supervises a single project and for the case where he is as­
signed several identical projects. The main result is that assigning more projects 
to the manager will reduce the informational rent, and it is argued that this may 
provide a rationale for firm-level diversification. The optimal contract is such 
that the manager is rewarded highly when none of the projects he supervises 
fails. However, the manager has to take responsibility for project failure and 
optimally receives nothing (is sacked) when a single project in his portfolio fails 
to perform. Our results also suggest that, when managers are to provide effort 
as well as make investment decisions, optimal managerial wage contracts will 
in general not be monotone in aggregate returns when the manager supervises 
several projects and project outcomes are observable.
Chapter 2 
Managers, Debt, and Industry 
Equilibrium
2.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been much interest in the way equilibria in oligopolistic 
markets may be affected when account is taken of the contractual structure 
inside the firm or of contractual ties with outside investors. This is usually 
modelled as a two stage game. In the case of Cournot competition, prior to 
the quantity setting stage, there is a stage in which firm owners can move to 
write contracts which may affect incentives at the later quantity setting stage. 
Examples of this literature are Brander and Lewis (1986), Fershtman and Judd
(1987), Maksimovic (1990) and most recently Clayton and Jorgenson (1997). 
The common theme of all these papers is that, if goods are substitutes, and 
therefore are strategic substitutes when chosen by profit-maximising agents, the 
possibility of moving prior to the quantity setting stage will be used to commit 
the firm to more aggressive product market behaviour.
Brander and Lewis (1986) analyse the case, where firm owners can write debt 
contracts with investors in a perfect capital market, before they move again to 
choose quantities. When there is uncertainty about demand or cost conditions,
14
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debt introduces the possibility that the firm may go bankrupt. A positive debt 
level will therefore make the payoff of shareholders a convex function of the 
operating profit. Given any quantity choice, the shareholders payoff is flat for 
all realisations of the state of nature such that the firm is bankrupt, but is 
increasing linearly with profit for good states of nature. Under the assumptions 
that it is the firm owners who determine quantities and that marginal profit is 
an increasing function of the unobserved state of nature, it is shown by Brander 
and Lewis that a positive debt level will cause the firm’s reaction function to 
move out. The intuition is that firm owners are only concerned with those states 
of nature that leave a positive payoff to them. Since these are the good states, 
and marginal profit is higher for good states, firm owners will choose higher 
quantities than they would if no debt had been issued. Given that quantities 
are strategic substitutes and reaction functions are therefore downward sloping, 
each firm has an incentive to move its reaction function out by issuing debt, in 
order to increase its profits, as its own reaction function slides along the rival’s 
downward sloping reaction function. In equilibrium, debt levels are positive, 
quantities are larger, and profits are smaller than if the firms could not issue 
debt.
Both Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) study the case where 
quantities are chosen by managers and firm owners move first to design incentive 
contracts with their managers. They assume that these contracts can condition 
both on the realised profit and on sales and restrict the set of admissible contracts 
to linear combinations of those two variables, so that contracts have the form 
b [onr + (1 — a) S']. Under these assumptions they find that the optimal a  will be 
less than one. Managerial incentives are distorted away from profit maximisation 
towards sales maximisation. The intuition is that owners want to make their 
manager more aggressive. When positive weight is on sales, managers will take 
account less of the costs of an increase in quantities, than they would if their 
remuneration were based on profit alone. Therefore, reaction functions shift out
CHAPTER 2. MANAGERS AND DEBT FINANCE 16
as (1 — a) increases and each owner has an incentive to choose a < 1, since this 
will increase his profit, given that the other firm’s reaction function slopes down. 
In equilibrium both owners choose a < 1, so that quantities will be larger and 
profits will be smaller than if the owners could choose quantities themselves. The 
commitment available through the possibility of writing an incentive contract 
worsens the situation of the owners.
Maksimovic (1990) studies the strategic use of loan commitments. The as­
sumption is that the production of current output has to be financed by a credit 
institution, which charges the market interest rate on funds used by the firm. 
Alternatively, the firms may strike an agreement with the credit institution prior 
to production, which commits the credit institution to lend out funds on demand 
at some lower interest rate, for which the credit institution is compensated with 
some upfront fixed fee. The idea is that such a loan commitment lowers the 
firm’s marginal cost of production. Therefore, there is a strategic incentive to 
take out a loan commitment, since this will result in an outward shift of the fir­
m’s reaction function, committing the firm to a more aggressive product market 
behaviour. In a symmetric equilibrium both firms will do this, so that both reac­
tion functions are moved out and again industry profits are lower than without 
the possibility of taking out a loan commitment.
Finally, Clayton and Jorgensen analyse a setting, where in a first stage each 
firm can take an equity position in the rival firm. Denoting by ol the share 
acquired in the competitor’s equity firm i will choose its output to maximise 
7Tj + aiij . Clayton and Jorgensen show that, when the firms’ products are substi­
tutes, optimal cross holding involves a short position in the competitor’s equity, 
that is, a  is optimally negative. The intuition is that, when firm i has chosen 
a negative position in firm j, firm i gains when firm j 's  profits are low. In­
creasing one’s own output will now not only affect one’s own profit but depress 
the competitors profit and therefore increase firm i's payoff more than with­
out crossholdings. By choosing a negative a  each firm can give itself additional
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incentives to raise quantities. Again, reaction functions shift out and the equilib­
rium is characterised by larger quantities produced, and lower firm and industry 
profits.
In all of these papers the first stage action is used to commit the firm to 
a more aggressive output stance. However, since this commitment device is 
available to both firms, who take actions simultaneously, firms will end up with 
lower ex ante profits than they would enjoy if first stage actions could not be 
taken. The possibility of taking these first stage actions exacerbates the prison­
er’s dilemma, which is already present in the quantity setting stage, where both 
firms choose higher quantities than would be joint profit maximising.
In this chapter I will go back to the original analysis of Brander and Lewis 
and reconsider the case of commitment through debt. This case has attracted 
considerable interest, partly because the major predictions of the Brander and 
Lewis (1986) analysis have not been validated by the, albeit limited, empirical 
evidence, see e.g. Chevalier (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1995), and Phillips 
(1995). These authors find that leverage increases in the 1980’s led to softer 
product-market competition in the industries under study. Also, in the related 
empirical literature on management buyouts (MBOs), empirical research (Ka­
plan (1989) and Smith (1990)) has found increases in operating profits as well as 
firm value, rather than a decrease of these variables, as the Brander and Lewis 
(1986) analysis would suggest.
The Brander and Lewis (1986) model has been revisited before us by Glazer 
(1994), Showalter (1995), and Faure-Grimaud (1997). In a dynamic setting, 
Glazer (1994) offers some qualification of their basic result. In his model, equi- 
tyholders choose quantities twice, before repayment of ” long-term” debt is due. 
He shows that the behaviour in the first quantity setting stage may be quite 
different from the behaviour in the second stage. In the first stage, there is 
an incentive to reduce quantities, rather than increase quantities, beyond the 
Cournot level. The intuition is that, if the firm reduces its quantity in the first
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stage, this will increase its rival’s first stage profit, and thus reduce the net debt 
burden the rival takes into the second stage. In line with the basic insight of 
Brander and Lewis (1986), this reduction of indebtedness will make the rival 
a less aggressive second-stage competitor. Therefore long-term debt may lead 
to more collusive outcomes in the short-run, while the long-run as well as the 
average is still characterised by quantities above the Cournot-level.
Showalter (1995) replaces the assumption of Cournot competition by one 
of Bertrand Competition. When competition is in prices rather than quanti­
ties, the decision variables are strategic complements when chosen to maximise 
profit. The cross-partial of the profit function is positive, rather than negative, 
as was assumed in Brander and Lewis (1986). By assuming Bertrand compe­
tition, Showalter (1995) reverses yet another crucial assumption on the profit 
function. Linder demand uncertainty, when firms compete in prices, marginal 
profit is lower, rather than higher for good states of nature. For the case of 
demand uncertainty, Showalter (1995) is then able to find positive debt levels 
in equilibrium which are associated with profits that are higher than for pure 
equity firms.
In Faure-Grimaud (1997) the financial investor can observe the quantity 
choice, but neither the realised state of nature nor the resulting profit. The 
terms of the contract are determined after the quantity has been chosen and axe 
made conditional on the owner’s announcement of the state of nature. To induce 
truthtelling the contract specifies a probability of granting a reward to the owner, 
which is increasing in the announced state of nature. When the owner has all the 
bargaining power vis a vis the investor, the investor has to break even ex ante. 
Thus both the truthtelling constraint and the break-even constraint are binding. 
The interplay between these two constraints makes owners choose quantities in 
equilibrium that are lower than if the owners were self-financed.
In all of these papers one major assumption of the Brander and Lewis (1986) 
analysis has been left unquestioned, which is that there is no conflict of interest
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between the owners and the manager who chooses quantities (throughout this 
chapter I will use the words ’’owners” and ’’shareholders” as synonyms). Recall 
that they assume that quantities are chosen by an agent, whose preferences are 
perfectly aligned with the owners or, equivalently, that owners choose quantities 
themselves after having issued debt. Instead, I want to follow up the idea that 
ownership and control over quantity choices may be separated and that there­
fore, quantity choices may be made by a manager whose objective differs from 
that of the owner. Specifically, in this chapter I ask what happens if quantity 
choices are made by a manager whose objective is to avoid bankruptcy. While it 
clearly is an extreme assumption that this is the only objective of managers in 
the real world, the threat of bankruptcy arguably is a real concern for managers, 
who, when their firm goes bankrupt, almost surely lose their job and most likely 
much of their reputation. Indeed, recent empirical studies support the presump­
tion that bankruptcy may cause quite dramatic managerial wealth effects. For 
a sample of Swedish firms, Thorburn (1998) finds that for bankrupt firms the 
CEO turnover rate is 64% and that the median compensation loss is 40% over 
the two years following the filing for bankruptcy. Interestingly, the percentage 
drop in CEO compensation is shown to be independent of whether or not the 
CEO remains with the firm, which is consistent with the idea that bankruptcy 
significantly reduces rents derived from managerial reputation. Similarly, for a 
US sample, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) find that about half of the managers 
of firms facing financial distress are replaced and axe not rehired by compara­
ble exchange-listed firms for the following three years, and that those who are 
retained experience very large salary and bonus reductions. In this chapter it 
is argued, therefore, that having a manager, whose only objective is not to go 
bankrupt is at least as natural a starting point as to assume, as Brander and 
Lewis do, that managers preferences are perfectly aligned with the shareholders. 
Indeed, when the manager is risk-averse, or not sufficiently susceptible to mon­
etary incentives, it may be impossible for the shareholders to write an incentive
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contract that perfectly aligns the manager’s preferences to those of the owner.
In most settings, restrictions on contract design arising from these issues 
will tend to hurt the principal. One of the main results here will be that, in 
contrast, it may actually help the shareholders when quantity choices are made 
by a manager whose objectives differ from their own. A similar result has been 
obtained by Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992). The intuition there is that a man­
ager who cares about his reputation may be more conservative with respect to 
project choices, which will alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and debtholders over the choice of investment portfolios, as described by Myers 
(1977). While in our setting, also, the manager will be more conservative than 
the shareholders, this is not what will eventually be driving the results. What 
is important in our case is the strategic interaction between manager controlled 
firms. To see the basic intuition, recall that, when goods are substitutes the 
choice of quantities is akin to a prisoners’ dilemma situation. Both firms would 
like to reduce their quantities in order to enjoy larger profits. However, when 
the rival’s quantity is low, it pays to increase one’s own quantity since this in­
creases sales, whereas the reduction in price is felt only on one’s own share of 
the market. Consider therefore a standard prisoner’s dilemma game, such as
1\2 c d
c 5,5 0,10
d 10,0 3,3
where (d, d) is the only equilibrium. Assume then that the players (the prisoners) 
can now send agents (their lawyers) to play the game and that the lawyers get 
a private benefit, or a success premium, whenever the outcome is strictly bigger 
than a cut-off of, say 3. When both players send their lawyers, these will play 
the following game ______________
1\2 c d
c 6,6 0,6
d 6,0 0,0
CHAPTER 2. MANAGERS AND DEBT FINANCE 21
In this example, if one lawyer cooperates, the other lawyer does not increase 
his payoff from moving to defect. Thus both are happy to play c, so that (c, c) 
becomes an equilibrium. This illustrates that more collusive and mutually bene­
ficial outcomes can be sustained by delegating play to an agent whose preferences 
differs from one’s own1. Of course, it then also becomes an issue which cut-off 
will be chosen and whether these agents are sent in equilibrium, if it is the play­
er’s choice to either play the game himself or to send an agent. These issues will 
be looked at more carefully in the framework of the model, below.
2.2 The M odel
Consider two identical firms who compete in quantities in an output market. 
Each firms’ profit is given by 7Tl , where 0l is an idiosyncratic shock,
which can be thought of as representing demand or cost uncertainty, ql is the 
quantity chosen by firm i and is the quantity chosen by its rival. Shocks are 
distributed identically across firms2. More specifically, 0Z realises on an interval 
6l E (0,$) according to some distribution function F  (•) with density /  (•).
In line with Brander and Lewis (1986), the profit function is assumed to have 
the following properties.
V (e^q ^q ^  with Ql E (0,6) ,ql > 0,qj > 0
(i) 7Tj (0s, q\ q>) > 0, (ii) n) (0*, q\ (?) < 0 (Al)
(in) n t  (e \ q \ q>) < 0, (iv) 7iA (9\ q', q>) < 0, (v) 7r‘ei (8 \ q \ q>) > 0
1This intuition has recently also been explored by Spagnolo (1998) who looks at the effect
of managerial bankruptcy aversion in the context of a repeated oligopoly with debt 4 la
Maksimovic (1988). He finds that managerial bankruptcy aversion makes it easier to support
tacit collusion by use of trigger strategies.
2 The model can accommodate any assumption on the correlation of the shocks across firms.
For example, a positive correlation may be reasonable for certain types of demand uncertainty,
whereas an independence assumption might be more reasonable for cost uncertainty.
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Assumption (i) says that profit is increasing in the shock. This means that 
high realisations of 6% result in high profits, and thus are ’good’ states of the 
world. According to assumption (ii) profit of firm i is decreasing in the rival’s 
output. Assumption (iii) is a standard concavity assumption while assumption 
(iv) determines the nature of competition between the two firms. It stipulates 
that quantities are strategic substitutes when both firms are maximising profit. 
When firm j  increases its output, firm i has an incentive to decrease its output in 
response. Assumption (v) says that marginal profit is increasing in 0*. According 
to this assumption, good states of the world are associated with higher marginal 
profits.
For future reference let us state here the equilibrium of the simple game in 
which owners move once to simultaneously choose quantities. This is given as 
the solution to
[*1 (»*,«*,«*) /  (»*) — 0
J6_
for firms z, j, and will be referred to as the Cournot equilibrium or the Cournot 
point (qc,qc).
In the model there is a financing stage, which precedes the quantity setting 
stage. In the financing stage, the owner of each firm can issue debt against 
the future earnings of the company. Owners can choose any face value D > 0. 
The choice of face value is made simultaneously. Once chosen, (Dl , D^) becomes 
common knowledge.
After the financing stage, outputs are chosen by the agents who are in charge 
of making these decisions. Output decisions are taken before the realisation of 
is known and are made simultaneously. It is assumed that the output 
decision taken by this agent is his private knowledge, but that realised operating 
profit is verifiable.
For debt to be relevant for the incentives of the decision-maker one needs -   ^  ^    ______
that|=3 0% € ~sT~t\Tj 0 \q \ q j ) ~ D% V Dl > 0 and V (q\qj ) in a7
sufficiently large neighbourhood of (qc,qc) . This guarantees that there is a risk
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of default for all, even small, positive debt levels. It is assumed throughout that 
everybody in the model is risk neutral.
Two cases will be analysed. In the benchmark case, following Brander and 
Lewis (1986), quantities are chosen by the owners of the company. As an al­
ternative I will consider the case, where the manager receives a private benefit 
when the firm is not bankrupt.
2.3 A  Benchmark: Owner Control
Let us first analyse the case where owners choose quantities after having chosen 
debt levels at the financing stage. This case has been analysed by Brander 
and Lewis (1986) and it is reworked here for ease of reference. Consider the 
subgame that ensues after some arbitrary pair of debt face values, (Dx, DJ)has 
been fixed at the financing stage. In this subgame shareholders of firm i and 
firm j  simultaneously choose quantities.
Given debt levels (Dl, DJ) the owner of firm i will choose ql to maximise
.S’! =  /  (tt* (6 \  q \  c?) -  & )  f  ( ? )  d&  (2.1)
Jd
where the lower bound of integration 6 marks the threshold for bankruptcy 
and is defined implicitly by
(2.2)
For given quantity choices the firm defaults for realisations of 6Z such that 
tT < 6. For these realisations the shareholders’ payoff is zero, whereas it is 
7f  (6l, q q i }  — Dl for all realisations such that 6% > 6.
Differentiating one obtains the first-order condition for a maximum as
^ = I  * * qi' ^ ^ d6i ~ % qi,qi)~  Di) f  (?) = 0 (2-3)
However, since
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the second term vanishes and the first-order condition reduces to
St =  l  <  ( 4  9*. ? )  f  (e') dei =  0 (2-4)Jd
which says that the expected or ” average” marginal profit integrated over all 
non-default states must be zero.
The second-order condition for a maximum is
s\i = j  4 (4 4 A) f  (fl*) &  -  (e, A, A)  f ( e ) <  o (2.5)
and is satisfied because of the concavity assumption 7r^  (6x, q1, g-7) < 0 V#1, made 
above and, for all but very large debt values, if one assumes that uncertainty is 
large, so that /  ^#^is small. A Nash equilibrium of this subgame will then be 
characterised by the first-order condition holding both for firm i and for firm 
j. Under the assumptions made, the first-order condition implicitly defines a 
reaction function for the quantity setting stage, which is denoted by ql (qi, Dl\ s), 
where s stands for shareholder control.
Before going on to the financing stage, it is useful to analyse the behaviour 
of the reaction function in more detail.
Consider first the effect of a change of a firm’s indebtedness on its optimal 
quantity choice for any given quantity choice of its rival. In a first step, note 
that by implicitly differentiating 2.2 one finds
d§ 1
> 0dDi 7Tr ( 0,
which is intuitive. With a higher face value, the firm defaults for higher real- 
isations so that the threshold 9 moves up with Dx. Implicitly differentiating 
the first-order condition 2.4 one has
%  s i *
S i
where the denominator is negative by the second-order condition 2.5. The 
numerator is
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When evaluated at the optimum, by TXxQi (#*, ql, qj ) > 0 and the first-order 
condition 2.4 one has that k\ (o, q1, q^j < 0 ; for ’’average” marginal profit to 
be zero, it must be that marginal profits are negative at the lower bound of 
integration. Therefore, SxDi > 0, and > 0. This means that a higher debt
level will shift the firm’s reaction function out. Intuitively, for any quantity 
choice of the rival, with a higher debt level, states of negative marginal profits 
are discarded from the calculus, so that average marginal profits are positive 
and the quantity choice will increase.
Let us next consider the slope of the reaction functions. Firm i's optimal 
response to a change in the quantity of its rival can be found by implicitly 
differentiating the first-order condition 2.4to get
9qi _  S\j 
W  SI
where again the denominator is negative by the second-order condition. The 
overall effect will therefore have the same sign as the numerator, which can be 
evaluated as
One sees that there are two opposing effects. Since IIJ. (0x,ql,q ^  < 0 V0* 
the first part of this expression is negative. It captures the usual intuition that, 
if goods are substitutes, quantity choice will be strategic substitutes. Observe, 
however, that the second part of this expression is positive. This can be estab­
lished by noting again that it] ^0, ql, < 0  and implicitly differentiating 2.2 to
get
dql K ( 6 ,q \ q j )
since 7rJ ^0, q*, qj j^ < 0 and 7xle (o, q%, qj j^ > 0.
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The positive effect captures what goes on at the limit of integration. Note 
that its size depends on the distribution of 0Z. For f  (^ j  small enough over the 
relevant range, one will have a regular downward sloping curve. If there is a lot 
of uncertainty, so that the interval (£, 0) is large and /  (6) is small on average, 
then the positive effect is of second-order importance at least for small levels of 
debt and the first effect is likely to dominate. For these reasons I follow Brander 
and Lewis and assume h^ a < 0 .^ ^  <> ^
P"' Given the behaviour at the quantity stage, one can characterise equilibrium 
j in debt levels. Since the debtholder pays the expected value of his claim to the 
I shareholder, shareholders are concerned with maximising expected overall (debt 
-bequity) value of the firm at the financing stage. One can then analyse the 
equilibrium in debt levels. Let us define
v* {q \  <?) =  [ "  7Tf d$ i
Je
as the ex ante value of the firm. Equilibrium is characterised by a pair (Dl, DJ ) 
such that
max V1 (q\ (f)
Di
s.t. qi = q a)
q i =  q
D' > 0
holds for both firms. Each firm owner chooses its firm’s reaction function taking 
the reaction function of its rival as given. To characterise the equilibrium further 
recall that the Cournot point (qc,qc) is defined as the solution to
7T* (0U W )  /  ( ^  < ^  =  0
for firms i and j. Consider the pair of reaction functions that go through (qc, qc) . 
In the case of owner control the reaction function through (qc, qc) is given im-
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plicitly by
I ( * ,  S .  91) / ( * ) < &  =  0
Jd
and is characterised by a zero level of debt, (Dl, Di) =  (0,0). One can show that 
debt levels of zero do not constitute an equilibrium here, but that, starting with 
the reaction functions going through (qc, ^c)reactions functions will be shifted
out. Given that an increase in its own debt level shifts a firm’s reaction function
out, and that the rival firm’s reaction function slopes down, a unilateral increase 
in debt will increase the firm’s own quantity but decrease the rival’s quantity, 
so that each firm has an incentive to raise its debt level above zero. To show 
this formally one can replace the constraints by the first-order conditions and 
linearise by totally differentiating the system of first -order conditions.
s td q 1 + S fy t f  +  Sf^dD* =  0
+ Si,d<f +  =  0
Note that S3Di =  0. Using Cramer’s rule one can establish that
dqi SlD‘Sh
dD* S ' S3- -  S* S ■t t  33 y  j»
> o
dqj SjDIS l
r < 0dD‘ S ’ S 3- -
i t  33 t3 3*
when S^ST — S\-Sji > 0, which is the usual condition for reaction function 
stability, and assuming that S3^ < 0.
The total value of the firm is
v* =  f  tt4 (0\ <t (D \ D3) , q3 (D \ D3)) f  (F) dQi 
JfL
where (q1 (D1, D i) , qi (Dl: Di)) is the solution to the pair of constraints for 
any pair (Dl, D i) . Differentiating with respect to D% one finds the first-order 
condition
 ^ dqi
VDi = [  tt* (e\ j  (D \ Di) , qi {D \ & ) )  f  (^ ) dff
JQ_ dD*
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+
= 0
Je
dO*
dqi
~dDi
Assume first that D% — D^ =  0 . Then quantities will be set at the Cournot 
level, ql = qi =  qc. At these levels of output the first bracket is zero. The 
second term is positive, however, since 7T*- < 0 and also < 0. Therefore each 
firm wants to unilaterally increase its debt level. In a symmetric equilibrium 
therefore Dl =  > 0, which, looking back at the first-order condition (2.4),
entails that q% =  qi > qc. Equilibrium quantities will be beyond the Cournot 
quantities. Note that this also implies that V % =  V-7 < V c. In equilibrium, 
owners will be worse off than they would if they could not issue debt.
2.4 Manager Control
Let us now consider the case where the output decision is delegated to a manager, 
whose objective is to avoid bankruptcy. I assume that the manager’s quantity 
choice is unobservable to the owner, so that contracts forcing the manager to 
choose a particular quantity are impossible. For the main part of the analysis 
I also disallow any other contract which may condition on ex post profit, by 
assuming that the manager does not respond to monetary incentives. This means 
that, for the quantity decision, the manager’s preferences cannot be driven away 
from the goal of avoiding bankruptcy. This assumption is made mainly to have 
a clear starting point and will be relaxed in a later section. Next, I assume that 
to produce any positive quantity q% > 0 the manager has to spend some fixed, 
but small effort cost e > 0, so that without any other incentives working on the 
manager the manager would choose q% = 0. Once the debt level has been set and 
the strategic variable q1 is to be chosen, the threat of bankruptcy is the only 
thing that motivates the manager. In particular, the manager receives a private 
benefit b whenever the firm is not bankrupt and his payoff in bankrupt states is 
normalised to zero. This is without loss of generality, since one can alternatively
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think of b as a constant pay-off differential between bankrupt states and non­
bankrupt states. I also assume b »  e, so that the manager will choose to spend 
effort if debt has been issued and there is a positive probability of bankruptcy.
The only tool available to shareholders to motivate their managers is to issue 
debt against the profits of the firm. Again the assumption is that shareholders 
choose the debt level so as to maximise the value of the firm. The assumption 
that the capital structure decision is taken by shareholders to discipline man­
agers is in the spirit of Principal-Agent theories debt such as for example Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Hart and Moore (1995). These have recently been ques­
tioned by Zwiebel (1996), who argues that managers may be able to choose the 
capital structure themselves. Against this view one can argue that, unlike most 
operating decisions which are taken by chief executives alone, capital structure 
changes will normally require the approval of the board of directors and often 
also need to be approved by shareholders and other financial investors, such as 
creditors. Essentially, what is required for our model is that the capital structure 
decision is taken in a value maximising way, given the later play of the game. 
To guarantee this one can assume that the capital structure decision is taken 
by shareholders. This may be justifiable in particular for closely held firms, in 
which a venture capitalist plays an active role in designing the firm’s financial 
structure. Alternatively, one can have the manager decide on the capital struc­
ture decision. Since the capital structure decision is observable, one can rely on 
efficient bargaining between the manager and financial investors such as share­
holders to ensure that a the capital structure is chosen in a value-maximizing 
way.
In the subgame following the choice of debt levels the manager’s objective is 
to maximise
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where again 9 is given by
w* (? ,« * ,9 * )-0 *  =  0
This problem has first order condition
3 - - v ( * ) J y - °
Implicitly differentiating 2.7 one finds
86
dq’ **(0,9*, 9*)
and the first-order condition can be written as
B; = bf 9
The second-order condition is
=  0
Again using 2.9 one has
BL = b f
/ - \  *0 (0. <f, qj )  [jt« (0, 9*, qj )  + Kg (0 ,9i>9J)  ^  
l v -------------------- T T T T T l x V ------------------ '
(2.7,:.)
(2 .8)
(2.9)
(2.10)
(2.11)
+ 6 / 0
+ 6 / 0
(*» (0.7s,9i ) )
(?»9s, 9i )  ( 0. 9*i 9*) +  Kg ( 0. 9s, 95)  |jr ]
ttH 0>,9*. 9*)
(*« ( M W ) )
7rl i 9\  Qj )
and since 7r* (9,ql, = 0 by the first-order condition, the second-order
condition reduces to
BL = ~ b f{ 6
7r:i i(0>9i ,9 i )  
9 (0 .9 ' ,9 J)
< 0 (2.12)
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One then sees that because 7r^  ^9i,ql,q^  < 0 and 7rj (oi,q'l,q ^  > 0 by- 
assumption, the required inequality holds. Thus, whenever the first-order con­
dition holds the second-order condition will also be satisfied3. This implies that, 
for any given debt level and any given rival’s output, the first-order condition 
uniquely defines the manager’s optimal choice of ql. The first-order condition 
therefore implicitly defines a function ql (qi, D1] m) which gives the manager’s 
optimal output choice for any given rival’s choice and for any given debt level.
It is useful at this point to compare the manager’s problem with the one 
analysed in the benchmark case. The manager obtains a positive benefit only 
when the firm is not bankrupt. He is therefore interested in widening the interval 
9, (jl'j as much as possible, since this will minimise the probability of bankruptcy.
  xV
The manager’s problem is therefore equivalent to minimising 9 by choice of ql 
for any given debt level Dl and any given choice of qT Looking back at the 
first-order condition, it is worth noting that it implies that
7r;S (?,«*, 9*) = 0
holds at this minimised 9. One can see the intuition for this by assuming 
that 7Tl (^0,q\ qi^ j — Dl = 0 held for a given D%, a given and some choice of 
q\ and that 7i\ (^ 6, q1, qj j^ > 0 for the implied 9. Then the manager can increase 
profit by increasing q which will make it1 (o,q%,q ^  > D% at the old 6. But 
this means that bankruptcy can be avoided for a realisation of 9l below the old 
6. There will therefore be scope to decrease 9 by increasing ql, and the original 
choice of q% can not have been optimal. A reverse argument can be made for 
the case that tx\ (^ 9, qz, q ^  < 0. One therefore must have 7v\ ^9, q1, q ^  = 0. This 
means that the manager’s choice of ql is such that he is maximising profit at
xv _
the minimised level of 9. This is in contrast to the benchmark case where the 
shareholders were maximising profit over the interval 9 ,9^ j .
As a first comparative static exercise, let us analyse how the manager’s be­
haviour is influenced by the debt level chosen. One finds that, just as in the
3 Note that this is true even though the manager’s problem may not be globally concave.
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benchmark case, the reaction function shifts out as the debt level increases. This 
is stated more formally as
Lem m a 1 In the subgame following the choice of debt levels, for given , with 
manager control over quantities, a higher debt level Dl will induce the manager 
to choose a larger output cf.
Proof:
9qi = _ B jBL 
dD' Bft
Since the second-order condition holds, the sign of this will be the same as the 
sign of B liL)i. One easily obtains
K  (f> 9 ‘ . 9J)  £ r - n i  ( ? ,  q \  g J )  7r‘ e ( ? ,  q \  g » )
=  b f V )  -------------------5-------------- ? " a \ 2 ----------------------------------
+bf' (?) — p f
7r;
= b f f e
K  (?. <?, qj )
again using that ir\ \0 ,q ',q^j = 0. All terms in the numerator of this last ex- 
pression are positive. In particular, implicitly differentiating
W* (?. «*.?*) -  D' = 0
gives
d6 1
> 0
dDi 7Tne
Hence
B‘D< = b f [ 6 )  y - A  ~ 2  > 0
(** \ S,q',q^JJ
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so that
d£_ =  -8,'pi
9 D ' B i
K e  ( o .q ^ q ’ )
= ----------   -^-- -L--------  > o
(#> 9 j )  n i i  (®. 9*. 9J)
The intuition for this result starts by recalling that for any debt level the 
manager is minimising 9 by choice of ql. Call this minimised value 9 . It is clear 
that when D%' > Dl, then also 9 > 9 . For both levels of debt, the manager
is maximising profit at the minimised 9. Since marginal profit is increasing in
i . . .9 ■> > 0, when profit is maximised at 9 a higher quantity is called for than
***when profit is maximised at the lower 9 . The quantity chosen will therefore be 
increasing in the debt level.
Since firm i' s output is increasing in its own debt level, both for the case 
where the manager makes decisions and for the benchmark case where quantities 
are chosen by the owners themselves, it may be interesting to compare quantity 
levels for given debt levels across regimes. The following result is easily obtained:
P roposition  1 For given Dl and given rival’s quantity qi firm i’s quantity 
choice will be smaller when taken by a manager than when taken by the firm ’s 
owner, q1 (qi ,D l] m ) < ql (qi, D%\ s)
. . .
Proof: The manager chooses ql at the minimised value 9 =  9 (q% (qi, D x\ m ) , qi, Dl) 
such that
K  ( 0* .q ' (tfy  d *-,m ) . qj )  = 0
is satisfied. Given the same debt level and rival quantity the owner’s choice 
ql would satisfy
{qj , D i - , s ) , < ? ) f ( e i ) d 6 i =  0
Jd
Clearly, in the latter expression 9 > 9 , since under owner control the lower 
bound of integration 9 is not being minimised. Since tt\q (9z, ql (qi, D %\ s ) , qi) > 0  
it then follows that q% (qi, Z)1; s) > ql (qi, Dz\m ) .
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For any given debt level, the manager is less aggressive than the owner. 
The manager’s objective is to avoid bankruptcy, so that he is looking at the 
marginal state, where marginal profit is low, whereas the owner will maximise 
profit over all non-bankrupt states 6l £ 0, o'j where marginal profit is higher. 
This result confirms the intuition that the manager’s output choice will be more 
conservative than the shareholder’s output choice.
Since the analysis has been looking at the subgame only, however, this result 
cannot be taken to say that the overall equilibrium will be characterised by lower 
quantities when the manager is in charge of the quantity choice. The owner can 
choose the debt level before the manager chooses a quantity, so that in principle, 
the owners can counter the manager’s reluctance to choose high quantities by 
pushing up the debt level at the financing stage.
Before one can characterise equilibrium in debt levels and quantities one 
needs to take into account the strategic interaction between managers. Recall 
that, when quantities are chosen by the owners, an increase in qj always induces 
a decrease in q1 along a downward sloping reaction function for appropriate 
assumptions on the density /  (0l). By contrast, under manager control this 
need not be the case. Depending on the exact functional form of the profit 
function the manager’s reaction function may be downward sloping or upward 
sloping. More formally
Lem m a 2 In the subgame following the choice of debt levels, when the manager 
of the rival firm j  chooses a higher quantity q \  manager i's optimal quantity 
choice ql may increase, stay the same, or decrease.
For the proof note that:
d q i B it
which again since B# < 0 will have the same sign as
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dd
d q i
+bf  (e
=  b f l e
0  (0,9*>9*)) 
*e (#, T, 9i )  *e (#> 9% 9*)
0  (0,9*, 9*))
since II’ (#, <jt, 0  =  0.
The sign of this is ambiguous. Note that it will be the same as the numerator, 
which since
dO _  _
TTl
one can write as
*) (0 ,q \q j )
-t-t =  —  e  > odqi 8 (®> 9*> 93)
. / -  . A . / -  . a (  9*7 9^)
*1j \6 ,q \< f) -*1e ( M W )  — 7^------- f
It follows from (A 1) that
< o
but that
■K\ (0,q\qj)
- r f i e  {  8 , 9*i 9’)   f  >  0
As can be seen from this, there are two effects at work.
The first term captures the usual strategic effect. If the other firm increases 
its quantity, manager i has an incentive to reduce his quantity, and vice versa. 
This is because, as pointed out before, the manager is maximising profit at some 
minimised level of 0. At this level, the manager’s response to a change in the 
rival’s quantity will be profit-maximising and will therefore be of the same sign 
as when managers behave as shareholders would. Since 7t\j (o,qt, < 0, when
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the rival firm increases its output qi, manager i has an incentive to reduce his 
choice of q% in response.
On the other hand, and captured by the positive part of the expression, 
a change in qi will move 6. An increase in qi will depress firm i's profit, since 
7r* (o,ql, qi^ j < 0  and therefore move 6 upward. When 6 gets pushed up, this will 
call for a higher q%, since marginal profit is higher at higher Q%, ir\Q > 0 .
Therefore, when qi goes up, the manager’s response will be to increase his choice 
of ql.
When the first effect dominates, quantities are strategic substitutes, as they 
are under profit-maximisation, and reaction functions slope downwards. When 
the second effect dominates, quantities, which are strategic substitutes under 
profit maximisation, become strategic complements when the probability of 
bankruptcy is being minimised, and reaction functions slope upwards. Loosely 
speaking, this is due to profit drain effect. When qi goes up, this will put a 
profit drain on firm i. Under the pressure of this profit drain the manager of 
firm i will have to compete more aggressively, to keep up the odds of keeping 
the company out of bankruptcy. On the other hand, when qi goes down, this 
will bolster firm i's profit and relieve the pressure on the manager of firm i who 
will then respond by competing less aggressively, in order to increase the odds 
of keeping the company afloat.
Note that the direction of the overall effect no longer depends on the distrib­
ution of 9% over its support. The density no longer enters the expression, and the 
sign of the expression will be the same for high and low degrees of uncertainty. 
Which of the two effects will dominate will solely depend on the exact shape of 
the profit function. From the expression one sees that quantities are more likely 
to become strategic complements when 7rJ- ($*, q1, qi) and qi) are rela­
tively small, but 7r*- (9t,qt,qi) and 7t\q (6%, q1, qi)axe relatively large in absolute
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value. Another way of looking at this is to note that
K j ( 0, «*, 9*) -  (e, q \ g*) > 0
translates into the following condition on the elasticities of the marginal effects 
of 9% and qi on firm profit
A (0 , q1, qj) ^i(f,qi,q:’)
Reaction functions will slope upwards whenever the marginal effect of 6l on 
firm profit is more elastic with respect to changes in q% than the marginal effect 
of qi. The intuition is that when the rival firm increases its quantity this will
/s
increase both q3 and 9. When the manager increases his quantity in response 
this will enlarge the adverse effect on 7r* (o,ql, q ^  On the other hand it will 
have a positive impact on 7rJ qi j^ . If the positive effect is stronger than
the negative effect, the manager will optimally increase his quantity.
Whether reaction functions slope upwards or downwards will impact deci­
sions at the financing stage. Equilibrium at the financing stage is given by
max V* (q\ qj )
D i
s.t. ql =  q* (qiyDt\rri) 
qi =  qi (cf^Di^Tn)
Dl > 0
Again replacing the constraints by the first-order conditions and linearising.
B W  + B^dqi + B ^d D *  = 0 
B j idqi +  B P d q i  +  B ^ i d D 1 =  0
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Note that BjDi = 0. Using Cramer’s rule one can establish that
d<t Bw-Bh
dDi -  B l B l%l j j  i j  j t
r >  0
r0 > (=) (<)0
dDi B iB 3,, -  B lB ltt 33 %3 3*
Assuming that the regularity condition B ^B 3-- — B ^B ^  > 0 holds, one can 
sign the first derivative since B zDi > 0, as shown above and B 3-- < 0 by the 
second-order condition.
Again under regularity condition B ^B 3-- — B \ j B > 0, the sign of the second 
derivative will be the same as the sign of B jf. This in turn will be of the same 
sign as
. . a / -  a  d
I*3#  [9,q',q3) -r fje  ( — A  (■
As explained above, the sign of this expression is ambiguous.
Consider again the total value of the firm
-I
v= [ **(#,({,<?)/(&)<&
J&
Differentiating with respect to Dx one finds the first-order condition
+ 
= 0
[  vri j  (D \ D3) , q3 (D \ D3)) f  (0) d6l 
Jd.
f  7rj {e\ qi (D \ D3) , q3 (D \ D3)) f  (^ ) dQ1 
Je
dql
I d *
dqi
dDi
There will be positive debt levels Dz — D^ > 0 such that the managers’ 
reaction functions intersect at the Cournot point (qc, q° ) . At the Cournot-level 
of output, the term in the first bracket is zero. Since 7r*. (0,ql ,q3) < 0 the term in 
the second bracket is negative. The overall sign of the derivative will therefore 
depend on
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If < 0, the rival’s reaction function is downward sloping and one will 
have < 0. Just as in the benchmark case there is an incentive to increase Dl,a u % 1
since this will lead the rival to reduce its quantity along its reaction curve. This 
incentive exists for both firms, so that in equilibrium quantities will be higher 
than Cournot, (q%,qi) =  (q* >?*) > (qc, qc), implying ex ante firm values less than 
Cournot, V i =  V j < V c. 4
If = 0 , the rival’s reaction function is horizontal. The rival will produce 
qc for any quantity firm i produces. Then also =  0, and there is no incentive 
to change the debt level for strategic reasons. The equilibrium quantities will be 
the Cournot quantities, (q%, qi) =  (q* ,q*) = (qc, qc) . There is no limited liability 
effect and ex ante firm values will be the Cournot values, V 1 — =  V° .
If B > 0, the rival’s reaction function will be upward sloping and —^  > 0. 
There now is an incentive to decrease D1, that is to move the own reaction 
function in, rather than out. This will imply that quantities will be lower than 
Cournot in equilibrium, (q‘l,qj ) = < (qc,qc)• One can also show that
quantities will not be smaller than the joint profit maximising quantities5, so 
that here, quantities will lie in between the joint profit maximising and the 
Cournot quantities. This implies that ex ante firm values will be higher than 
Cournot, =  V j > V c.
These results are summarised in the following
P roposition  2 In a symmetric equilibrium in debt levels and quantities, when 
quantities are chosen by managers, equilibrium quantities may be less than,
4 Note that one may still have a more collusive quantity choice under manager control as 
compared with owner control. As shown in Appendix 2.1 at the end of this chapter, this will 
be the case whenever along the line [qx, qi ) =  (q, q) with (q, q) >  (qc,qc) one has
Dt Ctb > _2iL 
Bf. Si-IX XX
5T his is a consequence of the assumed reaction function stability and is proven in Appendix 
2.2 at the end of this chapter.
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greater than, or equal to Cournot quantities.
The case where equilibrium quantities axe (weakly) less than Cournot is 
intriguing, since it highlights the possibility of sustaining a (weakly) more collu­
sive outcome than would obtain in the simple one-shot game with straight equity 
value maximisation. The intuition for this case is that, at the Cournot levels 
of output, both firms want to decrease their debt levels in order to decrease 
the pressure on the rival firm’s manager to generate profits. Less pressure on 
the rival firm will result in lower rival output and thus benefits the firm which 
decreases its debt level away from the Cournot level.
2.5 Examples
Under manager control, equilibrium quantities will be equal or below (qc, gc)when 
Bjt > 0. By symmetry this will be the case whenever the profit function satisfies
K i  ( e >q' ,q)  ( s , q \ q ’ )  — W f  > o
V !  V J K { e ,q \ q ^
To illustrate that this may well be satisfied take the standard example of a linear 
demand function and weakly convex costs,
^  ( ^ , qj ) =  [ a -  bqi -  / V ]  qi ~  ^
where 0 < (3 < b  and 7  >  1 . In the demand function I allow for the possibility 
that goods may not be perfect substitutes, in which case ft < b. Costs are strictly 
convex when 7  >  1, whereas they are linear when 7  =  1. As it is, the profit 
function is deterministic. One can make it stochastic by letting its parameters 
be functions of 6%. Let us start by looking at cost uncertainty. Replacing c by 
c (0*) with c (0*) > 0 and d (04) < 0 one arrives at a function
7r* ( 0 \  q1, q°) =  [a -  bqi -  (3qj ] qi -  c (0*) ^
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which satisfies A 1. One finds
\  . / -  . a ^  ( M W )  (  , .. . , -Bqi
(0,  q \ «») -  7T'e (O, q \  q>) ’ )  '  =  - 0  -  l - d  ( P )  ^  f *
K 1 V J ^e[d ,< f,q^  \  - d { 6 ) q r
-  D 2 0
For the linear cost case, 7 =  1, the two opposing effects exactly cancel. For 
any given debt level firm i's response to any output of its rival will be the same 
fixed quantity, and likewise for firm j. As we have seen, in equilibrium then 
=  (qc, q c) and V 1 — V-7 =  V c. When costs are strictly convex in output, 
7  > 1, the second effect dominates. Firm i's response to a movement in the 
rival’s quantity will go in the same direction as the rival firm’s movement. In 
equilibrium this will lead to ( q \ q J) =  (q*,q*) < (qc,q c) and V % =  V * > V °
For demand uncertainty one gets similar results. Let us start by analysing 
intercept uncertainty. Then a will be a function of Q% and one will have
^  «*, qi) =  [a («*) -  bqi -  B<?\ q‘ ~  cq*>
which satisfies A 1 when o' > 0. For this function one finds
=  0
so that again the two opposing effects exactly cancel. The net effect of a rival’s 
move in quantities on the marginal benefit of a change in quantity is zero, so 
that when the rival’s quantity changes this has no effect on manager i's choice of 
quantity. Also, when firm i changes its debt level to move its reaction function, 
this will have no effect on the quantity chosen by the rival firm, so that, in 
equilibrium, debt levels will be chosen such that (ql, g-7) =  (gc, qc) and V % =
Vj =  V c.
It remains to analyse slope uncertainty. One can think of 0% entering 6, 
the slope of firm i's residual demand curve, or /?, the degree of substitutability
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between the products. If b — (5 one can analyse a mix of these two types of
uncertainty. It turns out that the result is the same for all these cases and I
present the analysis for the last of these possibilities only. In this case one has
** («*, 9*) =  [« "  6 («*) (fl* +  5s')] 9‘ -  o f
where br < 0 to fit assumption A 1. One easily finds
4  (0 ,  q \  qj )  ~  4  (? , q \  q>) ’ g |
=  _ 6 (e ‘)_ (_ 6 '( f l* )[2 9‘ +  g<])
- V  (0‘) [q< +  qi] qi 
=  - b p ) + b W ) ? £ ± £ > 0v / / qi _|_ q3
For slope uncertainty a change in the rival’s quantity has a positive net effect 
on marginal profit. As in the case of cost uncertainty with convex costs this will 
result in equilibrium quantities that are less than Cournot, (ql ,q-*) =  (q* ,9*) < 
(qc, qc) and V % — > V c.
2.6 Endogenous Control
So far it was assumed that owners of the firms have to rely on a manager 
to choose the firm’s quantity and cannot choose quantities themselves. One 
traditional way of justifying such an assumption would be that ownership is 
dispersed and that free-rider problems lead to the need to employ an outsider to 
make business decisions on behalf of the shareholders. One could also assume 
that managers have special skills and expertise for making business decisions 
and that a manager has to be employed for this reason. Both these explanations 
are outside the realm of the model that is analysed here. In this section I want 
to drop the assumption that shareholders have to employ a manager. Instead 
I allow the owner a choice, as to whether he wants to employ a manager, or 
make the quantity decision himself. These decisions will again be taken in a
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non-cooperative fashion. They are modelled as a first stage which precedes the 
financing and quantity setting stages. At this first stage, owners simultaneously 
decide on whether they want to employ a manager to make the quantity decision 
for them, or whether they want to choose quantities themselves. After this first 
stage, as before, the owner can choose a debt level. Finally, quantities will then 
be chosen by the manager or the shareholder, depending on which decision was 
taken at the first stage of the game.
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the later play of the game can be collapsed 
into the values associated with the equilibrium payoffs, resulting from the debt 
and quantity stages, for any pair of first-stage decisions. One therefore needs to 
analyse the following game
A j 771 s
m V % (771, 771) , Vi (771, 771) Vx (771, s) , Vj (771, s)
s V* (s, m),V* (s,m) V i (5, s) , V* (s, s)
where m  denotes sending a manager and s means that quantities will be chosen 
by the owner (a shareholder) himself.
In order to characterise the equilibrium of this game one needs to make a 
further assumption. Given the results in the last section for the main part of 
this section I want to assume
. a . . a h
 ( > 0  (A 2)
This ensures that, as in the examples given in the last section, the manager’s 
reaction function is (weakly) upward sloping. One then has the following result.
Proposition 3 When assumptions A l and A2 hold, so that
B l.
 % >  0
B l. ~it
m is a dominant strategy and (m ,m ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
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To see the intuition for this result, recall that under A2 profits are higher than 
Cournot if both firms send a manager, and lower than Cournot if both firms send 
a shareholder. It turns out that, if a manager-controlled firm is paired with a 
shareholder-controlled firm, it is the manager-controlled firm which will become 
more aggressive and will push its reaction function out and the shareholder- 
controlled firm which loses out against a more aggressive rival. In fact, one 
can show that in this case under A2 the manager-controlled firm becomes a 
Stackelberg leader and therefore has higher profits than Cournot, whereas the 
shareholder-controlled firm becomes a Stackelberg follower and will end up with 
lower profits than Cournot. Thus, when the other firm is sending a shareholder, 
the best response is to send a manager and become a Stackelberg leader, in 
order to enjoy higher than Cournot profits. When the other firm is sending 
the manager, the best response is again to send a manager, in order not to 
become a Stackelberg follower, but again to enjoy higher than Cournot profits. 
Given the choice between sending a manager and choosing quantities themselves 
shareholders will therefore want to send the manager, whatever choice is made by 
the rival firm. In equilibrium both firm owners will therefore employ managers. 
This will ensure a more collusive outcome in equilibrium than if they made 
the quantity choice themselves. Intuitively, a more collusive outcome is made 
possible here, since a manager-controlled firm is soft, when paired with another 
manager-controlled firm, but highly aggressive when paired with a shareholder- 
controlled firm. This allows the manager-controlled firm to credibly threaten to 
punish a deviation to shareholder-control. As a result both firms will use an 
agent and thus sustain a more collusive outcome in equilibrium. A graphical 
representation of the equilibria of the various subgames is provided in Figure 
2 . 1 .
For the proof, note first that for any pair of decisions made at the first 
stage, (a1, aJ) , ale {m, s} , aJe {m, s} the equilibrium of the financing stage can
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be characterized by
max V% (qx, g-7)
D i
s.t. q‘ = q‘ (g*, £>*;<!*)
<? = <? (ft, D)\ aJ)
£>' > 0
holding for both firms. At the financing stage, each firm chooses its own re­
action function taking the rival’s debt level and thus the rival’s reaction function 
as given. Given the other firm’s reaction function and the firm’s choice of its 
own debt level, a pair of quantities (g \gJ) results and determines the expected 
value of the firm.
Notice also that there is an alternative and more intuitive way of character­
ising the equilibrium. Whenever D% > 0 is not binding, equilibrium quantities 
are solutions to
max V x (a1, g-7)
s.t. qj =  gJ (gl, Dj ; oJ)
for firms i and j. In equilibrium, each firm’s quantity is value-maximising given 
the rival’s reaction function. To see that this must hold, let the solution to this 
problem be ql*. Recall also that firm i's quantity is continuously increasing in 
its debt level. It is then immediate that if firm i's choice of debt level were to 
result in a quantity other than q1* given firm j 's  reaction function, it would have 
an incentive to change its debt level in order to move its quantity closer to ql*. 
This means that one can characterise the equilibrium by a tangency condition 
of the firm’s isovalue curve with the other firm’s reaction function. If the rival’s 
reaction function slopes downwards, the tangency will occur at the downward 
sloping part of the isovalue curve, so that Cournot quantities can no longer be
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an equilibrium. If the rival’s reaction function slopes upwards, then Cournot 
quantities again are no longer an equilibrium, since the tangency must occur 
at the upward sloping branch of an isovalue curve. This implies that, as we 
have seen already, for (a1, aJ) =  (m ,m ) equilibrium quantities will be less than 
Cournot, and profits will be higher than Cournot and that for (a1, oJ) =  (s, s) 
equilibrium quantities are higher than Cournot and profits will be lower than 
Cournot6.
Let us now go on to characterise the equilibrium in the subgame following 
(a*, a-7’) =  (m,5). The claim is that this equilibrium is characterised by the 
Stackelberg quantities. To show this, look at the financing stage and assume 
that the shareholder controlled firm chooses a debt level such that its reaction 
function goes through the Cournot-level of output. This involves setting Di =  0 
in qi (gl, Di; s) so that qi (qc, Di; s) = qc. Given this reaction function of firm j  
firm i will choose its reaction function to
max V 1 (ql, qi)
Di
s.t. q% = q%(qi,D l;m)
q> = q>{q\Q-,s)
D ' > 0
6The observation that the equilibrium is characterised by a tangency condition between 
the firm’s isovalue curve and the rival firm’s reaction function also provides a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. This feature is shared by 
models which have a commitment stage which precedes the quantity setting stage. In all of 
Brander and Lewis (1986) Sklivas (1987), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Maksimovic (1990), as 
well as Showalter (1995) existence is predicated on such a condition, even though this is rarely 
discussed. For the case of Brander and Lewis (1986), as well as for the manager-control case 
here, the condition is that, along the line {ql , qi) =  (q, q ) , there is a point such that
V f W , * )  _  d q i { q \ D i { q i , ( ? ) - a )
V j ( q \ q i )  dq{
where {qi ,q l) is the inverse of qi {ql , D i ; a )  with respect to D 3.
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Replacing reaction functions by the first-order conditions and linearising one
has
from which one finds
B W  +  B^dq* +  B ^d D *
s y r f + W  +  s iD<dDi
dqi
I d 1
dq3 
dD<
B fS T  -  B IS 3,,n  jj  %j j i
— a = a _ < o
B IB 3,, -  B l,B ’:%l j j  %j j t
since S3^ < 0. Differentiating the value of firm i with respect to D  ^ one has
Vd» —
+ 
=  0
[  Trj ( D \  0 ) , qi ( D \  0)) /  (0*) d F
J q
f  7T* ( P ,  qi ( D i ,  0)  , qi ( D i ,  0) )  /  (ffi) d e  
Je
dq1 
dD«
dqi
dDi
Start with a debt level Dl, such that firm i's reaction function goes through 
(iqc, q°). Given this reaction function the first term is zero and the second term 
is positive, since
dq3 
dD r < 0
and 7rj (0l,qt,q3) < 0. Firm i ’s best response to firm j 's  reaction curve will 
therefore involve a larger than the hypothesised debt level. Therefore, starting
from the Cournot reaction function, firm i will have an incentive to move its
reaction function out.
Next one needs to check that firm j ’s choice of reaction function, D3 =  0, is a 
best response to firm i's reaction function. Linearising the system of first-order 
conditions and differentiating with respect to firm j 's  debt level one has
S^dqi + S^dqi + SijDidDi =  0
B^dqi + Bidqi + B\DidDi = 0
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from which one finds
dqj
dDi
dq1 
dDi
s ’jDM > 0
V i i
S I M  -  S I B j ,33 i t  31 13
> 0
since B\- > 0 under A2. Differentiating the value of firm j  with respect to 
its debt level one finds
VDj =
+ 
=  0
[  TTj (fl#, qi  ( D \  D i )  , q, ( D \  D i ) )  f  ( 0 )  d8i  
Je,
[  wj (0 i , qi ( £ > \  D i)  , q' ( D \  D i ) )  f  ( P )  d P  
Je
dqi
dDi
dq%
dDi
If firm j  has chosen its reaction curve to go through (qc,qc) , and firm i has 
chosen any reaction curve, it must be that ql (Dl, DJ) , qi (Dl, Di) is a point on 
firm j 's  reaction curve. By definition for any such point the first term in brackets 
is zero. One therefore has
v !Di < 0
since 7T- (6 ,^ qi, q1) < 0 and > 0. Because firm i's reaction function is 
upward sloping, an increase in the debt level of firm j  would decrease, rather 
than increase, firm j 's  profits. Firm j  therefore has no incentive to move its 
reaction function out. Setting Di =  0 is indeed a best response of firm j  to firm 
i's reaction curve.
It remains to characterise the resulting equilibrium quantities and values. 
One needs to show that for firm i one finds q% > qc and V 1 > V c, whereas for 
firm j  one has qi < qc and VJ > Vi.
Start with firm i. Firm i has a positive level of debt, so that the constraint 
D% > 0 is not binding. Equilibrium quantities can therefore be characterised by
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s.t. qj = qj (q\Q\s) 
which is the programme for a Stackelberg leader. Substituting one has
mg?X V i  f t ' qj ( ^ ’ 0; S) )
This problem has first-order condition 
Vqi(q*,qj (q^O^s)) =
Je_
dqi (q\ 0; a) 
dq1
= 0
which implies the well-known tangency condition. Looking at the derivative it 
is easy to see that when evaluated at ql =  q° one has Vqi (ql,qJ (5*,0;s)) > 0, 
since then the first term in brackets is zero and the second term is positive since 
7rJ (Q1,, ql, q^) < 0 and < 0. One therefore has Vqi (q (gc,0;s)) > 0,
which implies ql > qc and V1 > V c.
Moving on to firm j, recall that its quantity cp is the solution to (p = 
qi (qx, 0; s) , which is a downward sloping function. Taking this together with 
qJ (qc» s) =  q° and q% > qc, one concludes that qi < qc. Also, since q1 > qc one 
has
max V* (q \ q%) <max V-7 (g-7, qc)
q j q i
which implies V* < V c.
This shows that V 1 (m, s) > V° > (m, s ) . To prove that m  is a dominant
strategy, it remains to invoke symmetry to get (m, s) = V % (s, m ) , so that 
Vl (m,s) > V c > V 1 (s, m ) . Taking this together with V % (ra, m) > V c and 
V* (s, s) < V c, one arrives at V% (m,m) > V % (s ,m ) , and V % (m, 5) > V x (5, s ) , 
q.e.d.
Intuitively, since a shareholder-controlled firm has downward sloping reaction 
functions, starting from the pair of reaction functions going through (qc, qc) , it
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pays the firm who has sent a manager for the quantity choice to increase its debt 
level, since this will lead the shareholder-controlled firm to decrease its quantity. 
On the other hand, it does not pay the firm who has sent a shareholder to 
increase its debt level, since this would lead to an increase rather than a decrease 
in the rival’s quantity given that the rival is manager-controlled and has upward 
sloping reaction functions. Therefore only the manager-controlled firm will move 
its debt level, and it will move it up to the point where its reaction function cuts 
the reaction function of the shareholder-controlled rival in the Stackelberg point, 
which is value-maximising for the manager-controlled firm.
To complete the analysis, let us also briefly look at the case where A2 does not 
hold and reaction functions are downward sloping both under manager control 
and under shareholder control. In this case one may still find that delegation to 
a manager occurs in a dominant strategy equilibrium. As an intuitive extension 
to the case where the manager’s reaction functions are upward sloping, when 
they are downward sloping, delegation can be shown to be dominant whenever 
under manager control reaction functions slope downwards less steeply than 
under shareholder control. More formally one has
P roposition  4 Under assumption A 1, when
Bi.
^  < 0 
B'u
m is a dominant strategy and (m,m) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, 
whenever along = (q,q) > (<7C3<7C) one has
J & > _ ^
Bti ^
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the condition on the relative 
slopes. Notice that it implies that, for any given increase in the rival’s quantity, 
under manager control the firm will reduce its quantity by less than it would 
under shareholder control. When faced with a manager controlled firm the 
rival firm will therefore have less of an incentive to compete aggressively than
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when faced with a shareholder controlled firm. As a consequence, a manager- 
controlled firm will be better off than a shareholder controlled firm. Intuitively, 
since under manager control the firm’s response to a rival’s increase in quantity is 
’’less elastic”, there is less of strategic substitutability, and it pays the rival firm 
less to increase its quantity, either directly, or via an increase in its debt level.
Note that in this case the equilibrium is less collusive than Cournot, but more 
collusive than it would be under shareholder control. For a proof see Appendix 
2.3 at the end of this chapter.
2.7 D iscussion
2 .7 .1  T h e  n a tu r e  o f  c o m p e t it io n
One of the important underlying results of our analysis is that the quantity 
variables, which are strategic substitutes under shareholder control may under 
natural assumptions turn into strategic complements, when viewed from the 
manager’s point of view. Under shareholder control, if the rival firm decreases 
its quantity this has a positive impact on the firm’s marginal profit, so that 
shareholders will respond by increasing their output. The decision variables are 
therefore strategic substitutes in the terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos and 
Klemperer (1985). Under manager control the effect on marginal profit may 
be dominated by the effect on total firm profit. If the rival firm decreases its 
output, this will raise total profit for all realisations of the state of the world.
This will lower the probability of bankruptcy and allow the manager to compete 
less aggressively and to reduce the quantity produced. Thus, quantity variables
may become strategic complements. The observation that agency problems can ^  ^
A
turn decision variables that are strategic substitutes under profit maximisation 
into strategic complements has recently also been made by Aghion, Dewatripont * 
and Rey (1997). In their model of R&D competition, R&D effort decisions
,' yN?
of two firms are strategic substitutes under profit maximisation. If one firm ^
i/>
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increases its research effort, this will make it more likely that both firms find 
the innovation, in which case the gain from the innovation will be competed 
away. Since this will reduce the marginal payoff to research effort, an increase 
in research effort of one firm will lead the other firm to respond by reducing 
effort. If, however, running the firm requires a large initial investment which 
is financed by an outside investor, the effort response may go the other way. 
The rival firm’s increase in research effort will lower total expected profit. The 
agent running the firm may then have to commit contractually to a higher effort 
level, in order to increase total expected profit and to ensure that the outside 
investor still breaks even. Both here and in our model the reversal in the nature 
of competition stems from the impact the rival’s decision has on total, rather 
than marginal profit. In Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997) total expected 
profit matters since the outside investor will want to be paid back his investment 
in expected terms. In our case total profit matters, due to the threshold in the 
manager’s preferences that is drawn in by the bankruptcy level. In both cases 
the effect on total profit leads to a reversal of the strategic quality of the decision 
variables and turns strategic substitutes into strategic complements. Note that 
these results are possibly more general than they might seem at first glance. In 
our case, all one needs for the reversal to occur is that the pay-off to a variation 
in the decision variables varies as in A l and A2. While quantity competition 
with linear demand and weakly convex costs is an example which fits these 
assumptions on the profit function, these assumptions may be taken as a reduced 
form description for a variety of other underlying games. For example, one could 
reinterpret the decision variable q as investment into plant and equipment, or 
indeed any other activity which exhibits strategic substitutability and model 
a subsequent stage of competition in prices or quantity. Whenever the payoff 
structure of such a game maps into the reduced form assumption made, the 
analysis will apply.
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2 .7 .2  T h e  v a lu e  o f  d e le g a t io n
The results also point toward the value of delegation in certain noncooperative 
environments. Here, in equilibrium, firm owners delegate strategic decisions to 
an agent whose objectives differ from their own. This alleviates the prisoners’ 
dilemma quality of quantity competition and helps to sustain a more collusive 
equilibrium outcome. The idea that employing an agent with preferences differ­
ent from the principal’s can be valuable ex ante has been investigated in other 
contexts. In Schils (1996) delegated bargaining helps to alleviate a hold-up prob­
lem that arises when a firm undertakes a relationship with an outside research 
unit. When the price for an innovation can not be stipulated ex ante, there is 
an incentive for the firm owner to drive a tough bargain ex post and to extract 
as much of the surplus from the innovation as possible. Anticipating this, the 
research unit has less of an incentive to invest in innovation generating activity, 
so that research effort will be inefficiently low. When the firm owner employs 
a manager whose preferences differ from his own, this inefficiency is reduced. 
Similarly, in Dessi (1997) the firm-owner has an incentive to breach implicit 
(nonenforceable) agreements with the workforce to reward high effort whenever 
the short term gain of doing so exceeds the long term loss of reputation. Em­
ploying a manager who is incentivised by issuing short- and long term debt, this 
problem is reduced, because the marginal gain to the manager of breaching the 
implicit contract may be zero in situations in which the manager has enough 
cash to repay the short term debt. Related ideas can also be found in the litera­
ture on macroeconomic policy games, where it is suggested that pareto-superior 
outcomes can be sustained by delegating monetary policy to a conservative and 
independent central banker, cf. Rogoff (1985) and Walsh (1995). In all of these 
models it is valuable ex ante to employ an agent whose objectives will ex post 
be different from the principal’s. The contribution of our results is to extend 
this idea to a symmetric setting with two competing vertical structures. In all of 
the cited papers there is a single vertical structure, with sequential moves along
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the structure. Here there are two rival structures that compete with each other 
in an output market. Delegation is shown to arise in an equilibrium of a simul­
taneous move game. Both firms would like to delegate play to a manager, since 
this is valuable ex ante in ensuring softer competition and a more collusive out­
come. This can be sustained in equilibrium here, because in an off-equilibrium 
situation in which one of the firms did not employ a manager, it is the manager- 
controlled firm who will be aggressive and the shareholder-controlled firm who 
will lose out. Since deviations away from delegated play will be punished by 
more aggressive behaviour, delegation becomes sustainable as an equilibrium of 
a noncooperative simultaneous move game.
2 .7 .3  C o n tra ctu a l co m m itm en t and  ren eg o tia tio n
We have seen that with manager control, ex post the principal would choose a 
different quantity than the agent chooses. This feature is shared with most of 
the literature on contractual commitment in oligopoly. For example, in Brander 
and Lewis (1986) the investor, as a debtholder, would choose a different quantity 
than the shareholder. Likewise, in Sklivas (1987), ex post the owner would 
choose a different quantity than the manager who was incentivised to focus on 
sales. In each case contractual commitment prevents the principal from letting 
his preferences govern the quantity choice. The main difference here is that the 
ability to commit through contractual arrangements is actually valuable ex ante, 
in that it permits more collusive equilibrium outcomes, rather than less collusive 
outcomes.
One may still ask whether contracts are a good commitment device in our 
setting. Clearly, the shareholder would, after the manager is sent and the debt 
levels are chosen, seem to have an incentive to oust his manager and make the 
quantity choice himself. It is easy to see, however, that when the manager is 
ousted a conflict of interest will arise between debtholder and shareholder. The 
shareholder will want to increase the quantity, making the debt more risky. If
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before the firm had all the bargaining power vis a vis debtholders, then under 
manager control the debtholders would have broken even. Once the manager 
is ousted, debtholders will have a negative expected payoff. Anticipating the 
possibility that the shareholders will have an incentive to take over control from 
the manager, it is natural to assume that the original debt contract will have 
offered protection against this. Thus the debt contract will have contained a 
covenant that made it a condition that the manager would make the quantity 
decision. It may, of course be possible to renegotiate this debt contract. In a 
symmetric situation, however, this possibility should be open to both firms. Let 
us therefore consider an augmented game in which it is possible for both firms 
to oust their manager after the debt selection stage and then renegotiate the 
debt contract by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the debtholders. It is clear 
that in the equilibrium of this augmented game, none of the firms would want 
to oust their manager, since, just as before, this would be dominated, given 
the later play of the game. Thus, even though each principal would choose a 
different quantity than the agent chooses, given the choices of the other firm, the 
equilibrium obtained above clearly is renegotiation-proof when renegotiation is 
open to both firms and is modelled as a simultaneous move game.
2 .7 .4  M anageria l en tren ch m en t
In this model shareholders use capital structure to incentivise their manager and 
guide his quantity choice. If one thinks of the manager as having control over the 
company after the capital structure has been set, one might wonder whether the 
manager may not be able to change the capital structure and reduce the debt 
level in order to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. While he obviously has 
an incentive to reduce the debt level, it is easy to see that unless he uses his own 
personal wealth he will be unable to do so. This is because the capital structure 
that is in place is value maximising, given that a manager has been employed 
and given the reaction function of the rival firm. If the manager does not have
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any personal wealth, then, in order to buy back debt, the manager will have 
to raise the necessary funds by issuing equity. Since such a restructuring will 
change the manager’s subsequent quantity choice this must diminish the value 
of the firm. It will therefore be impossible for the manager to raise sufficient 
funds for the purpose of buying back debt.
2 .7 .5  W age co n tra cts
So far I have thought of the manager as an agent who derives a private benefit 
from not going bankrupt, and who would not depart from the implied behav­
iour when offered a monetary incentive scheme. In the literature, by contrast, 
managers are often modelled as risk-neutral and highly susceptible to monetary 
incentives. One may ask therefore, whether our findings are robust to a switch 
to such an assumption. To examine this, consider a modified game in which as 
a first stage a managerial compensation scheme is chosen by the owner of each 
firm, after which, in a second stage, managers choose quantities. Let us restrict 
attention to contracts that condition on the firm’s own profits, that is, let us as­
sume that quantities, as well as rival profit are unobservable to the owner. I also 
want to restrict wage contracts to be either a profit share, an option contract 
with a weakly positive exercise profit, or a flat wage contract which conditions 
on some weakly positive cut-off profit level, i.e. a bonus contract.
w (7Tl) e {a7rl , am ax |V  — 7f, 0] , w l  (^,71-)}
where a > 0, where W > 0, and I  (7Tl , 7f) is an indicator function with 
I  (7^ , 7f) =  1 if ir% > 7r and /  (7rl ,7f) =  0 otherwise. Note that if the reserva­
tion utility of the manager is not zero, one can always amend these schemes by 
paying the manager some fixed base wage, which can be adjusted to give the 
expected wage the manager requires. When (A l) and (A2) hold with respect to 
the earlier game and contracts are chosen simultaneously, it follows directly from 
our earlier analysis that in equilibrium owners will choose a bonus scheme. To
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see why, note that a bonus scheme is the only contract that will lead the man­
ager’s reaction function to slope upwards. Which cut-off is chosen will again be 
determined by the condition of tangency of the isovalue line of the owner and 
the reaction function chosen by the rival. When this condition is met, none of 
the owners has an incentive to switch to a different cut-off, or indeed to any 
other contract in the feasible set. This result suggests that low-powered incen­
tive schemes, which are not as sensitive to the principal’s pay-off, as they could, 
may be optimal when the manager’s task is primarily to make strategic deci­
sions. Note also that a bonus scheme is outside the contract domain considered 
in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), which casts some doubt on 
the robustness of their results.
2.8 C onclusion
This chapter has reconsidered the strategic effect of debt under the assumption 
that quantity choices are made by managers whose objective is to avoid bank­
ruptcy. The basic result is that quantity choices, which are strategic substitutes 
under profit maximisation, may turn into strategic complements under reason­
able assumptions on the profit function. Then, in contrast with the benchmark 
case of owner control over quantity choices, starting from the Cournot level, 
shareholders will want to shift the manager’s reaction function back, rather than 
out. As a result, equilibrium quantities will be less than the Cournot quanti­
ties. The prisoners’ dilemma inherent in quantity competition is softened. By^  
employing a manager, shareholders not only avoid a limited liability-effect of 
debt, but are able to support a more collusive equilibrium than in the simply 
model without a financing stage. We have seen that this result is robust when 
the decision to delegate is endogenised. Thus, delegation to a manager is not 
only valuable, but also supportable in equilibrium. The intuition is that, when 
one firm does not delegate its quantity choice, it will lose out against a rival 
who has delegated the quantity choice, but can credibly threaten to use a very
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aggressive debt policy when faced with a shareholder-controlled firm. In con­
trast with Brander and Lewis (1986) and in line with the empirical evidence, 
in the symmetric equilibrium of our model, in which both firms delegate the 
strategic decision, positive leverage is associated with softer competition and 
larger profits than in the standard oligopoly model without a financing stage. 
The model also implies that, given a contract domain including shares, options 
and bonus schemes, in equilibrium owners would choose simple bonus schemes 
for their managers, giving a theoretical justification for the kind of managerial 
preferences assumed.
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Appendix 2.1
In this appendix I want to prove that, as claimed in section 2.4, the equilib­
rium under manager control is more collusive than the equilibrium under owner 
control whenever along (ql, qi) = (q,q)  >  (qc,q c) one has
f>i q i
ij >  ij
B 1.. Si.% n
One can make use of the fact that, as discussed in section 2.5, both un­
der manager control, and under shareholder control, equilibrium quantities are 
characterised by
max V1 (q1, qj )
Ql
s.t. qi =  qi (<?*, Z)-7; a-7)
holding for both firms. Here a = m  for the case of manager control and a =  s 
for the case of owner-control. Substituting the constraint one has
max V"L (q%, qj Dj ; oJ))
qi
from which one finds the first-order condition
—  = V? 4. a i l  =  n
dqi ' j dq'
which can be rearranged to imply the tangency condition
_Y[_ =  dqi (q \ P i ; aj )
Vj dqi
Take the equilibrium quantities resulting from owner control and denote them 
by (gs, qs) . They will satisfy
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Since
- 4<o
s h
one has
V;(q\q’) <  0
which implies that (q3, q 3) > (qc,q c) •
If the same point (q3, qs) were to result in the equilibrium under manager 
control, one would need
V i , V i 
* ’ dq'
^  + V ? ( - | )  -  0
satisfied when evaluated at (q3, qs) .
If however at any point (ql, qj ) =  (q, q) with (q, q) > (qc, qc)
4 > _ 5
then this is true at (qs, q‘) . This implies
v i + v l \ - ^ r )  < 0'  V BhJ
at (q3, q3) and one needs a reduction in the common quantity to make this hold 
as an equality, q.e.d.
Appendix 2.2
Here I want to show that, as claimed in section 2.4, under manager control 
equilibrium quantities axe always strictly larger than the joint profit maximising 
quantities. Recall that, as discussed in section 2.5, equilibrium quantities are 
characterised by
max V% (ql, q^)qi
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s.t. q3 = q3 (q*, D3\ m) 
holding for both firms. Substituting the constraint one has
max V 1 (a1, q3 (ql , D3] m))
qi
from which one finds the first-order condition
dV* V i ■ v i dqnq\D *-,m )  
dq1 1 3 dqi
which can be rearranged to imply the tangency condition
_ Y l_  =  dqj  ( q \  D j ;ro)
Vj dq1
Since along ( q \ q j ) =  (q,q)
- j k  < 0 i f  (9, 9) > (qc,<ic)
3
- S  =  0 {f  (?>9) =  (9C.9C)
3
- § > 0  i f  (q,q)<(qc,q<:)
3
the tangency will occur at some (q , q ) <  (qc,q c) only if reaction functions are 
upward sloping,
dqj (q \D j \m ) =
dq1 B lr- >  033
Recall also that the intersection of the reaction functions is required to be stable, 
that is
B*.Bj. . - B i .B j.. > 0 t% 33 13 31
This is always satisfied for the case of vertical reaction curves with B\j =  Bj{ 
=  0. If reaction curves are upward sloping, B J. =  B 3^ > 0, this implies
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which says that in (ql, qi) — space at the intersection of the reaction curves the 
reaction curve of firm i is steeper than the reaction curve of firm j.
Next, note that the joint value maximizing output (qp ,qp)is given as the 
solution to
with first-order conditions
max V i +  Vi
Qx,Qj
v ;  +  v?  =  o
v ;  +  v j  =  o
These imply the tangency condition
YL
vi
yl
v j
If the intersection of the reaction functions were to occur at this joint value 
maximising output one would have
v i dqi 1
oqi s i dqi
vi dq1 qj (qi ,D j ;m) B i<33 Bh d(f
YL
v*
The joint value maximising point is characterised by the tangency of the two 
isovalue functions. For this to be an equilibrium, reaction functions must be 
tangent to each other. However, since it is required that
s i
Bh*3
> B u__Bi33
this would contradict stability.
Next, consider a point (ql , q j ) =  (q, q) < (qp , qp) . At such a point one will 
have
v ;  +  v?  >  o
v }  +  v*  >  o
which implies
v ? .  ^
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which means that the isovalue curve of firm i is steeper than the isovalue curve 
of firm j  in (q1, qi) — space. If the intersection of the reaction functions were to 
occur at such a point one would have
V?v i dqj A11 b i dqi
vi dq%qj (qi ,D3-,m) B3..33 dq1 qi (qj ,D i ,m )  V j
so that the reaction function of firm j  would need to be steeper than the reaction 
function of firm i. This would again contradict
- B k  >
Bi.*3
B 3.j*
BL33
which is required for reaction function stability, q.e.d.
Appendix 2.3
P r o o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  4:
According to Proposition 4, when
B  
^ < 0
B l
m  is a dominant strategy and (m, m) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the 
game, whenever along (q%,qj) — (q,q) > (qc, qc) one has
D i  qi
ij  ^
B i  s i
To prove V 1 (s ,m ) < V x (m , m) consider the equilibrium under (m, m ) . This 
is characterised by
and
V? +  V?i j
V! + V?3 t B iB i.
=  o
=  0
holding at the equilibrium quantities (qm, qm) . Now consider firm i deviating 
to shareholder control. Since
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at the old equilibrium point (gm, qm) one will have
Vi+V- ( ~ ^ t  ) = 0V Bh )
and
This implies that firm i has no incentive to move its reaction function, 
whereas firm j, which is now facing a shareholder controlled firm, has an in­
centive to move its reaction function out. Firm j  can do this by moving its debt 
level up. It follows that in the equilibrium under (s,m) , firm i will have to be 
optimising along a reaction function of firm j  which specifies a higher output for 
any quantity firm i chooses. Firm i must be worse off in the new equilibrium. 
This proves V% (s, m) < V1 (m, m ) .
To prove V1 (m , s) > V1 (s, s) start with the equilibrium under (5, 5). At the 
equilibrium quantities (qs,q3)
v i + V } f -  J | )  = 0
and
v? +  i?(-§)-0
hold. Consider a deviation of firm i to manager control. Given
B 1.. Sh i± - *7
D i  qi
ii ^ii
at  (qB,q‘) one now has
Vi+V} ( - - I = 0
3 \  S ’J
and VI + Vi ( - f )  < 0
which implies that firm i has no incentive to move its reaction function and 
firm j  has an incentive to move its reaction function in. Firm j  can do this by 
reducing its debt level. It follows that in the equilibrium under (m,s) , firm i will
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be optimising along a reaction function of firm j  that specifies a lower output 
for any quantity firm i chooses. Firm i must be better off in the equilibrium 
under (m, s). This proves V % (m, 5) < V 1 (s , s) and completes the proof.
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*
(m, s)(m , m )Q2
Qc Qc
Qc
Figure 2.1: Endogenous Control, Subgames
Chapter 3 
Equity Finance, Adverse 
Selection, and Product Market 
Com petition
3.1 Introduction
Whereas the last chapter focused on the use of debt as a commitment device, 
this chapter analyses the implications of asymmetric information between a firm 
and its outside investors on the firm’s strategic position in its product market. 
The model abstracts from issues of precommitment and has a financing stage 
which occurs after the product market stage. This captures the idea that the 
firm continuously interacts with its product market competitor, but then at some 
point in time may have to take recourse to the financial market. The financing 
stage is a version of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model of equity finance, in 
which the firm’s management is assumed to have superior information on the 
value of the firm’s assets in place. This gives rise to a lemons problem, in that 
there may be equilibria in which only bad firms may issue and invest. In their 
paper, Myers and Majluf stress the importance of financial slack to mitigate the 
adverse selection problem. They do not formally analyse the role of financial
67
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slack, however. Also, as has been pointed out by Giammarino and Lewis (1988) 
as well as Cadsby, Frank, and Maksimovic (1990), they do not formally analyse 
the full set of equilibria of their model. This chapter provides an analysis of 
both these issues for the particular version of the model. I then argue for an 
equilibrium selection such that the probability of the good firm investing is 
increasing in the amount of financial slack available and analyse the implications 
of this equilibrium play on the first-period competition. The idea is that first- 
period profit takes the role of financial slack and determines the amount the 
firm needs to raise externally. Under the assumption that first period profit 
is stochastic, I show that the firm will no longer maximise the expected value 
of first-period profit. In addition, it will care about the variance of the profit 
distribution and will seek to influence it by its output choice1. Depending on 
the severity of the adverse selection problem, this may make the firm a more 
aggressive or a less aggressive competitor. I identify situations in which the fact 
that the firm has to finance externally actually confers a strategic benefit on the 
firm, since it will have an incentive to compete more aggressively in order to 
increase the probability of investment.
A large part of the literature on adverse selection and product market rivalry 
has focused on formalising the idea that, if a firm has to finance externally 
under conditions of asymmetric information, this will make it vulnerable to 
predatory behaviour by rivals. This issue is explored in Poitevin (1989), Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990) and Phillips (1993).
Poitevin (1989) argues that uncertainty about the value of an entrant may 
be larger than that of the incumbent firm. To signal its quality, the entrant 
may have to issue debt, whereas the incumbent can finance with equity. Debt 
financing renders the entrant vulnerable to predation through the possibility of
1In a set-up similar to our own, Raposo (1998) analyses the implications of an adverse 
selection problem on the firm’s optimal risk-management. She does not, however, explore the 
incentives effects for a firm which competes in a strategic environment, which is the focus of 
the analysis here.
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bankruptcy. This can be exploited by the incumbent predator, who may engage 
in a price war that decreases the entrants cash flow and increases his probability 
of bankruptcy.
In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) the underlying agency problem is that first 
period profit is nonverifiable. To induce the entrant firm to truthfully reveal its 
profit there is a threat to terminate funding when reported profit is low. This, 
however, will encourage rivals to ensure that the firm’s first period performance 
is poor. Bolton and Scharfstein model this by assuming that the rival has the 
option to increase the probability of low firm profit by taking an action that 
costs the rival some fixed amount. They derive the optimal contract, which, 
because of the trade-off between deterring predation and mitigating incentive 
problems, may or may not be designed to deter predation.
In a model set-up close to our own, Phillips (1993) analyses the case of 
two-period competition between two firms. Firms must make an investment at 
the end of the first period in order to stay in business in the second period. 
One of the firms has a deep pocket, whereas the other firm has to finance the 
investment through debt. There is asymmetric information regarding the firm’s 
second period prospects, which under the assumption of debt financing creates 
an incentive to invest, even if the investment has negative net present value. 
To resolve this problem, some portion of the investment has to be financed by 
internal cash. This again creates incentives for the rival firm to compete more 
aggressively in the first period to reduce the firm’s cash reserves and to force it to 
forgo the investment. Just as in our set-up, in the Phillips (1993) model internal 
cash is at the heart of the analysis. In contrast to our analysis, Phillips focuses 
on the rival’s predatory incentives, from which I abstract. Another key difference 
to the model of this chapter is that the incentive problem which underlies the 
Phillips analysis comes about only because the firm is restricted to issue debt 
and would disappear if the firm could issue equity, as is assumed here.
There are two more articles which are related to our analysis. In Rotemberg
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and Scharfstein (1990) managers maximise a weighted average of expected profits 
and the stock price. While the authors do not provide a formal argument, 
they argue that such behaviour may come out of a model in which the firm 
anticipates to issue equity in the future. They analyse a two period model in 
which demand and cost conditions are uncertain, but correlated across periods 
and the stock market tries to infer these from the firm’s and its rivals’ realised 
profits. Kovenock and Phillips (1995) invoke the pecking order theory of finance 
to argue that external finance is more costly than internal finance. In a model in 
which capacity has to be financed before revenues are earned, they analyse the 
incentive to reduce financial slack by issuing debt for both price and quantity 
competition. They find such an incentive to increase financing costs for price 
competition, but not for quantity competition. Their result can be viewed as 
complementary to the result obtained by Maksimovic (1990), who has found a 
strategic value in reducing the variable cost of borrowing, and thus an incentive 
to decrease financing costs, for the case of quantity competition2. In contrast 
to both Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) and Kovenock and Phillips (1995), 
who argue informally that the objective function they assume may be justified 
by costs of external funds, I derive the firm’s first period objective function 
from first principles, taking asymmetric information between the manager and 
the financial investor as a starting point. In some ways this can be viewed 
as complementary to the approach taken in chapter 2, where the driving force 
of the model is an assumption on the manager’s preferences. The other main 
difference to the previous chapter is that I consider an asymmetric setting in 
which only one of the firms, firm i, faces an investment opportunity which needs 
to be funded externally. This can be justified by saying that firm j  either does 
not happen to have a positive NPV project, or that it has sufficient internal 
cash to finance it without recourse to the capital market has a deep pocket. 
Yet another way of justifying this is to say that there is less uncertainty on
2 See the discussion of this paper in the introduction to chapter 2.
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firm j, perhaps because it is better known by financial investors. In terms of 
modelling strategy, the main implication of the assumption is that one can be 
sure that firm j  is a straight expected profit maximiser. Thus, issues arising 
from a possible reversal of the nature of competition, which have been the focus 
of the previous chapter, will not arise here, since firm j  has a standard downward 
sloping reaction function.
3.2 The M odel
The model has two periods. At the start of the first period, at t =  0, a firm, 
which is called firm i, competes with another firm, which is labelled firm j, as one 
of two duopolists in a product market. Each firm has to choose some strategic 
variable which affects both its own profit and the profit of the rival. As in the
previous chapter, this variable can be thought of as the firm’s output choice. In
addition, profits are affected by a random variable z , which may in general be a 
vector and has positive support on some set Z. The profit function is identical 
for both firms. For firm i it is given by 7p =  7rl (z1, ql, qi) . The profit function is 
assumed to satisfy3:
V (z‘l,qtJqj ) with zeZ , q% > 0,qj > 0 
(*) Ki (**> 1i ) < °> (**) A  (**> l ‘, 9*) < 0, (in) 7Ty ( z \  q \ qj ) < 0 (Al*)
(iv ) z' > z => 7Tl [z’, q q i )  > 7Tl (z, ql, qj )
(«) z' > z => ir\ (z', q \ q>) > ir\ (z, q \ qi)
The random variables z 1 and P  realise, and become pubhcly known at t =  1, 
after ql and qi have been chosen.
3 This assumption is slightly more general than A 1 of the previous chapter and will enable 
me to analyse both the specification of Brander and Lewis (1988), as well as an alternative 
profit function, which combines demand uncertainty with some additional additive uncertainty.
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At t = 1 a second random variable realises, which affects the value of firm i's 
assets in place. These assets are thought of as unrelated to the product market 
in which the firm competes in the first period. The value of the assets in place is 
best thought of as the liquidation value of the firm. Firm i can be of two types. 
If the firm is of type # ,  the value of its assets in place is s# . If the firm is of 
type L, its assets in place are worth Sl , where sH > s^. Ex ante (at t =  0) the 
firm is of the high type H  with probability r and it is of the low type L with 
probability 1 — r. I assume that the firm’s type is privately revealed to the firm’s 
owner at t =  1. At this stage outside investors only know the ex ante probability 
r.
At t = 1 an investment opportunity opens up to the firm which requires an 
initial outlay of I  and returns an expected payoff of x. Both these values are 
publicly known. Again, I want to assume that the investment opportunity is 
unrelated to the product market in which the firm competes in the first period. 
One can think of it as an investment into some new line of business or as funds 
required for a diversifying acquisition. It is assumed that this investment is 
profitable, so that x > I. Therefore when 7Tl > I  the firm will always invest, 
since in this case it need not (and will not) raise any external funds. When first 
period profits fall short of the required outlay, the firm can raise I —7rz externally. 
Following the original analysis of Myers and Majluf (1984), I assume that the 
firm is constrained to issue outside equity4. Therefore, for any realisation of first 
period profit 7rl such that 7rl < I  a continuation game ensues. In this game the
4 It is well known that financing via rights issued to existing shareholders solves the adverse 
selection problem. To rule out rights issues, one can think of the firm as being owner-managed 
and that the owner does not have any funds other than 7r. Allowing the firm to issue risky debt 
rather than equity would make the financing problem less severe, but would not change the 
main conclusions of the model, as long as some adverse selection remains and is reflected in 
the default premium that has to be paid by the firm. Since the focus here is not on solving the 
financial adverse selection problem, but on the implications of an adverse selection problem for 
a firm which competes in a product market, I have chosen to consider the market for equity, 
just as in the original paper by Myers and Majluf (1984).
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firm can either raise I  — 7rl from outside investors by selling off a fraction a  of 
the firm’s equity and invest, or forgo the investment opportunity. For the main 
part of the analysis it is assumed that financial investors are able to observe the 
realised profit and thus the financing need of the firm with certainty. Also, the 
market for outside equity is assumed to be competitive. Thus, in the spirit of 
Myers and Majluf (1984), it is assumed that there is an auction for the firm’s 
equity, which ensures that the price for the firm’s equity is bid down to the point 
where financial investors just break even.
At t =  2 the investment pays off, the value of the assets in place become 
publicly known, the firm is liquidated and all claims are settled5.
As in the previous chapter, everybody in the model is risk neutral.
3.3 Second-Stage Equilibria
I solve the game backwards and start at the beginning of the second period, 
t = 1. For any realisation of first period profit 7r such that 7r < /  the firm may 
either decide to raise I  — 7r from an outside investor by selling off a fraction a  of 
the firm’s equity and invest, or forgo the investment opportunity6. Denote the 
firm’s decision by de {1,0}, where d =  1 when the firm decides to raise I  — ir 
and invests and d =  0 when the firm does not invest. In order to capture that 
the firm can make this decision conditional on its type let <5# =  Pr [d =  1 | H] 
and 6l = Pr [d =  1 | L]. Outside investors can expect to break even, given their 
beliefs about the firm. Let p be the probability attached to the possibility that 
the firm is of the high type.
5The timing of the model has been chosen to disentangle the financing stage from the 
product market stage as much as possible. If one had the firm know its value from the start, 
for example, the main conclusions of the model would be preserved. One would have an 
additional issue, however, in that high type and low type firms would behave differently at 
the product market stage, so that the financial market could try and draw inferences from 
observed profit.
6 In both this and the next section I focus on firm i and drop the superscript throughout.
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An equilibrium of this game is defined as follows.  ^ ^
  -
Definition 1 For any realized tt such that j7r < I  an equilibrium of the game is 
a quadruple 8L,p, a) such that
1. Beliefs are updated using Bayes * rule
_  rdH
P rS H +  (1 -  r )
2. a. is defined by the equation
I  -  tt =  a [psH +  (1 -  p) sL 4- x)
ensuring that the financial investors just break even, given equilibrium beliefs.
3. For any he {H , L }i \
, , W  * V -
{A<jr —
X -
6k = l i f  sk 4 tt < (1 -  a) [sk + x]
6ke [ 0 , 1] i f  sk + tt =  (1  -  a) [ s fc + x]
6k = 0 i f  sk 4  7T > (1 -  a) [sk + x]
Analysing the set of equilibria of this game, one arrives at the following
Lemma 3 There is a cut-off level of realised first period profits tf, such that
a) for 7T < 7r the unique equilibrium of the continuation game is a separating
equilibrium in which 6H = 0, SL = 1, p = 0, and A vs*r
I  — TTa = sL + x
b) for 7r > tt there exists a pooling equilibrium in which 8H = 1, SL = 1 ,p = r, 
and
I  — TTa = [rsH 4 (1 -  r) sL 4- x\
The cut-off tt is implicitly defined as the solution to
s h  +  tt —  ( 1  — 7 - r j z  x-------;— t  ) [s h  +  x \\  [rsH + ( l - r ) s L + x]J
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A proof is provided in Appendix 3.1 at the end of this chapter.
It is useful at this point to analyse the cut-off profit level t t .  One can find 
an explicit expression for it by rearranging the condition under which the high 
type will invest.
Sh  +  tt <  ( 1  “  7------ ~~T,-------:-— - r ) [sh  +  x ]\  [r8H + ( l - r ) 8 L + x]J
I  — TT .
S h  +  TT <  S H  +  X  — t ----------- — 7------ r------ ------7 S H  +  X \
[rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x\
I  — TT r .
TT <  X  —  t ----------- T ----------------- r---r IS H  +  X \+  (1 ~ r ) s L + x]
 x  <  tt (  +   i
[rsH +  (1 ~  r) sL +  x] V [r5tf +  (1 -  r) sL +  x]
j  Ish +  x] \  /  [sH +  x]________ - \  1 <
[rsH +  (1 - r ) s L + x] J  V[rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x]
[Stf 4- x] \  [rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x]
— X  7----------- ;----- ?------------TL------- ;------------ 7 <  TT[rs# +  (1 -  r) sL 4- x] J  Is# + x ] ~  [rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x\
I-(X-D t™* + (1 ~ ^  ^  + ^ ___  < 7r
 ^ ' [«*  +  * ] - [ « *  + ( 1  -  r) *L +  *] -
/ _ ( * _ / )  ( - ---------------------  r — <  7T
\[ r sH + { l - r ) s L + x] J 
For tt =  tt this holds as an equality and one has
-1
[ SH+X]  - I I  = 7?
[rsH 4- (1 ~ r ) s L + x]
By inspection, one sees that the profit level required for a pooling equilibrium to 
exist is increasing in the required investment outlay I. One also finds that it is
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decreasing in the net present value of the project7. For lower net present value, 
a higher amount of internal funds is required for it to be optimal to go ahead 
with the project. This is because in the pooling equilibrium the high type faces 
a dilution cost. Since the firm receives (I — 7r), but pays
a  [sH +  x] =  ------ — ----- ----- — — [sH +  x]
[rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x\
this cost is equal to the difference which can be written as
The dilution cost is decreasing in 7r. Therefore, for low net present value projects
to be acceptable, the dilution cost has to be low, which requires a higher 7r. 
Finally, the required profit level is increasing in the dilution factor
/ ____________ [»h +  A___ \
\  \t»h +  (1 -  *•) sL + x] J
The larger is this factor, the higher is the level of internal funds needed to make 
investment attractive.
It is worth pointing out that, as long as the project has a strictly positive net
present value, 7f < /. Recall also that for 7t > I  both types of firm will invest,
since then there is no need to raise external funds, Therefore, given that the 
pooling equilibrium is played whenever it exists, one has that for 7T < 7r only the 
low type invests and for 7T > 7r both types will invest.
For the main part of the analysis I am going to assume that the pooling 
equilibrium is played whenever it exists. Before doing so, let us explore how 
much generality is lost by such an assumption8. One finds
7This result is derived algebraically in the later section 3.5.
8 Myers and Majluf (1984) do not provide a formal characterisation of the full set of equi­
libria of their model. In a model set-up similar to ours the issue of multiple equilibria has first 
been addressed by Cadsby, Frank, and Maksimovic (1990). The main difference between their 
analysis and the analysis here is that they assume financial slack to be zero, whereas I focus 
on first-period profit as the main variable of interest.
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Lem m a 4 There is a cut-off level of realised first period profits tt such that
a) for tt <  tt a separating equilibrium exists in which SH = 0, <5L =  l,/9 =  0, 
and
I  — TT
a  =
s L +  x
/■s
b) fo r  tt >  tt the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which SH =  1 ,  
8 l  =  1 ,  p  =  r, and
I  — TT
a  = [rstf +  (1 -  r) sL 4- x]
The cut-off tt is implicitly defined as the solution to
sH + t t  = ( 1 -  1 [sH +  x\\  sL + x J
For a proof see the Appendix 3.1.
Putting Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 together it is immediate that tt >  tt. In fact 
one can show that tt is strictly larger than tt. This can be easily established by 
deriving an explicit expression for tt. The condition for the separating equilibrium 
to exist is
Sh +  7T > (1 -  M  [sH +  X]\  sL + x J
This can be rearranged to give
/  — 7T . n
S h  +  TT >  SH +  X ---------;  +  X\
SL + X
I  — TT r n
TT >  X  I Sh +  x\
SL +  X
1 [sH +  x} -  X > H  --- [sH +  x\ -  TT
s L +  x  SL +  X
I  r i i \  (  sh x ;—  [Sh  +  X  -  X >  TT [ -----  —
S L +  X  \ S L +  X
- 1
/ f £ ± £ _ x >)
S L + X J \ s L +  x  J
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j SH + X 
sL + x
S L  +  X
sH + x -  [sL + x] > 7r
sL + x
sH +  x  -  [sL +  x] >  7r
For 7r this holds as an equality and one has
-1
>  7r
- l
=  7T
To see that 7r < 7r note that 
/  [stf +  a?] - l
[rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x\
-  1 > sH +  £sL +  a?
-  1
- l
[rs# +  (1 -  r ) s L + :r] )  \ s L + x
It remains to characterise semiseparating equilibria. These equilibria are 
such that the low type always invests, whereas the high type is just indifferent 
between investing and not investing, given beliefs. The high type randomises 
and beliefs are consistent with the probability of the high type investing. One 
finds
Lem m a 5 A semiseparating equilibrium exists if  and only if  7T6 
semiseparating equilibrium 6l = 1, Sh€ [0,1], and
fx \ _  rSH 
9 H r6H + ( l -  r)
For given parameters Sh is the solution to
1  —  71
7T, 7T In a
Sh P  71" — I 1 —
[P ( $ h )  s H  +  (1 — P (£ H ))  S L  +  .
[sH +  x]
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For a proof see the appendix.
Across the semiseparating equilibria one finds that
— ^  <  0dm
That is, as the high type has more cash on hand, the probability of the high type 
investing falls. This may seem counterintuitive, in particular since, as one moves 
from separating equilibria to pooling equilibria, an increase in profit is associated 
with an increase in Sh- The intuition for the case of the semiseparating equilibria 
is that for these an indifference condition has to hold. As one lets SH increase 
p increases, so that dilution costs decrease. Dilution cost are decreasing in n. 
To keep the high type indifferent between investing and not investing, dilution 
costs have to increase through a decrease in tt.
One can summarise Lemmas 3-5 in the following
Corollary 1 For tt < tt the unique equilibrium is a separating equilibrium. For
7re TT, TT separating, semiseparating and pooling equilibria exist. For tt <  tt the
unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
For 7re TT, TT one has multiple equilibria9. Figure 3.1. gives a graphical rep­
resentation of the equilibrium correspondence. Which equilibrium is played for
9Standard equilibrium refinements like the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps(1987)) do 
not help to reduce the number of equilibria here. These refinements are based on the notion 
that players should have reasonable beliefs on off-equilibrium behaviour. The idea is that in 
a given equilibrium some off-equilibrium action may not be undertaken because it is assigned 
an unreasonable belief. There are two reasons, why such arguments do not work in the Myers 
and Majluf model. First, the action space is not rich enough: there are only two possible 
actions, to issue equity, and not to issue equity. Second, the belief assigned to not issuing 
equity is not payoff- relevant, precisely because no equity is being issued. In the separating 
and the semiseparating equilibria both possible actions are on the equilibrium path. In the 
pooling equilibrium, the profitability of an off-equilibrium move to not issuing equity does not 
vary with the belief that is assigned to this action. Standard refinements therefore do not 
have any bite.
CHAPTER 3. EQUITY FINANCE AND THE PRODUCT M ARK ET 80
each 7r will affect the first period objective of firm i and will therefore affect 
our conclusions on the outcome of the first period competition. I would like 
to motivate an equilibrium selection such that p (7r) is weakly increasing in 7r.
It alsoThis condition rules out semiseparating equilibria being played on | r^, t t  
rules out an equilibrium selection such that the equilibrium moves from a pool­
ing equilibrium to a separating equilibrium as 7T increases. The condition has 
some intuitive appeal since one can view lack of internal funding as the source 
of the inefficiency that arises as the high type forgoes investment. Intuitively, 
this problem should become less severe and the market should place a higher 
probability on the firm being of the high type as the amount of external funding 
which the firm asks for becomes smaller.
In deriving the set of equilibria for the financing game, it was assumed that 
the value of the assets in place is the only source of asymmetric information and 
that the financial investor knows all other variables including the realisation of 
first-period profit with certainty. As one moves away from this assumption and 
introduces some uncertainty as regards the first-period profit, one would expect 
financial investors to take a larger equity issue as a sign of the firm being more 
likely of the bad type. The reason is that the bad type has a dilution gain which 
is increasing in the issue size, whereas the high type has a dilution cost which 
is increasing in the issue size. Bad firms will therefore have a stronger incentive 
to overstate their financing needs and should therefore be thought of as more 
likely to issue larger amounts.
For a continuous distribution of first-period profit it is difficult to state these 
ideas formally. To motivate the equilibrium selection condition that p  ( t t )  is 
weakly increasing in 7r, I move to a situation where first period profit can be 
either high or low. Consider a profit distribution such that 7re {ir, 7f} , where the 
probability of the high realisation is Pr ]jt = If] =  p, independent of the firm’s 
type. I want both profit realisations to be in the region of multiple equilibria, 
that is7T > 7 f > 7 T > 7 r .  I assume now that financial markets are unable to
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observe profits. When the profit realisation is W, the firm has three possibilities. 
It can issue I  — W worth of equity, or it can understate its profit realisation 
and issue a larger amount of equity equalling issue size I  — 7T, or it can forgo 
investment. When the firm issues the larger amount, it is assumed that it is able 
to pay the original owners a dividend equalling the surplus cash. Equivalently 
one can assume that when 7f realises the owners are able to eat up the amount 
7f — 7T =  e without the financial investors being able to observe this. When the 
profit realisation is 7r, the firm has two possibilities, as before: it can either issue 
I —7r or forgo the investment10. Denote by 6H (7f) the probability that the high 
type issues I  — 7f, given a profit realisation of 7f and by fiH (7f) the probability 
that the high type issues the larger amount I  — 7r, given a profit realisation of 
7T. Likewise, denote by 6^ (7f) the probability that the low type issues I  — 7f, 
given a profit realisation of 7f and by fiL (7f) the probability that the low type
understates its profit and issues the larger amount I —7r, given a profit realisation
of 7r. Finally, let SH (7r) and SL (7r)be the probabilities that the high type and the 
low type issue I  — 7r, respectively, given that the profit realisation is 7r. These 
probabilities satisfy
<5H (7f) +  IJ-H iW) ^  1
<5l (tt) + Ml W < 1
and
<Mil) < 1 
M il)  < 1
For any action the firm takes, financial investors have a belief on the type of 
the firm. Let p  (7T) be the probability that the firm is of the high type when the
10There is no point in assuming that the firm has a third possibility of issuing a smaller 
amount than it needs for investment since financial investors are able to observe whether the 
investment is undertaken or not, and would be able to demand their money back if the firm 
did not invest after having issued equity.
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issue size I  — TT is observed and p (7r) be the probability attached to the firm 
being of the high type, given that the larger issue size of I  — 7r is observed. In 
an equilibrium in which the amount I  — 7r is issued with positive probability one 
will have
, . = _______________r [ ( l - p ) _S „ { tl) + p i i h ( W) }_______________
r  [(1  -  p)  SH ( t t )  +  p p H ( i f ) ]  +  (1  -  r )  [(1  -  p )  SL (jr )  +  p p L ( i f ) ]
In an equilibrium in which the amount of I —W is issued with positive probability 
one will have
= ________ rpSH (W)_________ = ________ r 8H (W)________
P rp6H (7r) +  (1 -  r) p8L (W) r d H (Tr) +  (1 -  r)  8L (W)
While destroying some equilibria, the introduction of additional asymmetric 
information regarding the realisation of first period profit will in general generate 
further equilibria that are supportable by particular choices of out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs. To justify the equilibrium selection criterion I want to focus on equilibria 
in which, as in the case of symmetric information with respect to profit, both 
issue sizes occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path. To illustrate 
how the introduction of uncertainty changes the set of equilibria of the game, 
let us first ask whether the semiseparating equilibrium on both 7T and W survives 
the introduction of uncertainty. This would be so if for neither type it pays to 
understate its profit, given the equilibrium beliefs. Let us first check the high 
type. Given W the high type would want to deviate to p H (W) =  1, if
(1 ~ r / x-----  r “xx---------T ~ t \ I5# + x \+ e
\  \p {e ) sh +  D - P  W )  sL +  x\J
( 1 \p{n)sH + { l - p { n ) ) s L + x])  +
But
( 1 [p(z)sH + ( l - p ( z ) ) s L + x \ )  [Sh + X\ +£
(1 \p (zl) sh + ( 1 - p ( t t ) )  sl +  x]) + x \ + £
=  s h  +  7L +  £
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— SH +  ^
_  O ’ K7f)SH +  (l-/5 (^))® i- +  a:] )  ^
so that for the high type, understating its profit does not increase its payoff, 
given equilibrium beliefs. The high type is just indifferent els to whether to play 
its equilibrium strategy or to deviate to a larger issue size. Intuitively, the high 
type gains from issuing a larger amount, since this will lead to a more favourable 
belief. This is so since p (7r) > p (7T) in the semiseparating equilibrium. On the 
other hand, the dilution cost incurred by the high type is larger for larger issue 
sizes. These two effects exactly cancel out. The high type therefore does not 
have an incentive to deviate to larger issue size, but is just as happy playing 
the equilibrium strategy. For the low type, on the other hand, a deviation to 
pL (tt) = 1 is profitable, since
( X \p{z)sH + { l -p { lL ) ) sL + x \ )  \-Sl + x \ + e
> 0  \p(n)sH 4 - ( l-p (W ))s L +  a;]) +
£  L  Is  l  +  s ] ______________
V  [P  f a d  s H  +  ( 1  -  P  ( t t ) )  s l  +  x]
> ______ [/ -  7f] [sL + x]_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [I ~  7f] [sL + x]______
\P (z) Sff +  (1 ~ P (ZL)) sl +  x]  \p ( t t )  sh +  (1 -  p ( t t ) )  sl +  x] 
which is satisfied since p (7r) > p (7T) so that the LHS is strictly positive and 
the RHS is strictly negative. Intuitively, again the low type gains from more 
favourable equilibrium beliefs associated with the larger issue size. In addition, 
its dilution gain is increasing in the issue size. Both effects work in the same 
direction here and make it profitable for the low type to choose the larger issue 
size. The low type, therefore, does have an incentive to understate its profit. 
The semiseparating equilibrium does not survive the introduction of additional 
uncertainty since beliefs are such that p (7r) > p (if) . In fact, one can show
Lem m a 6 In any equilibrium in which both issue sizes occur with positive prob­
ability, p ( t v )  < p (7f) .
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Proof: Assume p ( t t )  > p (n) . Then p,L (7r) = 1, since
(  ^~~ r ( \ ZTi  Z—])  £V IP (7L) sH +  (1 -  P (H)) sL + x\J
>(* [p (ff) sH + ( l -  p (tt)) s t  +  x])  + ^
as shown above. /xL (W) = 1 implies 6L (W) = 0, so that one has
/  ^  r8H (Tf)_____=
P ~ r8H (?f) + (1 -  r )  6l ( t t )
This completes the proof.
Notice that the set of equilibria in which both issue sizes occur with positive 
probability includes all those equilibria in which there is no incentive to under­
state, i.e. in which pL (7T) =  pH (Tf) = 0. The latter set of equilibria is a subset 
of all possible combinations of the equilibria with perfect information regarding 
profit. One can easily show that of these combinations, only four survive the 
introduction of uncertainty. These are separating on both 7r and 7f, separat­
ing on 7r and semiseparating on 7f ,  semiseparating on 7T and pooling on 7f ,  and 
separating on 7r and pooling on 7f .  As we have seen, semiseparating on both 7T 
and 7f  does not survive since under the equilibrium beliefs the low type has an 
incentive to pL (w) = 1, whereas the high type has no such incentive.
3.4 T he F irst-P eriod  O bjective
Let us now go on to  construct the objective of firm i  in the first-period com­
petition. This will depend on which equilibrium is played for given first-period 
profit. In line with the arguments in the last section, I will assume th a t the 
equilibrium selection is such th a t p  (7r) is weakly increasing in 7r. This implies 
that the equilibrium moves from the separating equilibrium to  the pooling equi­
librium at some cut-off. For concreteness, let us s tart with the assumption th a t 
a pooling equilibrium is played whenever it exists. This means th a t for 7r <  7T 
the equilibrium will be separating and for 7r >  7? the equilibrium will be pooling 
as in Lemma 3.
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With probability r the firm is type H.
In this case it will not invest for realisation of t t ,  such that t t  <  t t  and its 
payoff will be
s H  +  TT
For realisations of 7r, such that i  >  t t  >  t t  the firm invests and has payoff
( 1 “  7-----------77— "\----------- f l  [sh +\  [rsH +  0 - - r ) s L +  x]J
—  S H  +  X  —   --------- — -------- r-------- -----T [ S h  +  A
[rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x\
i ( T  \  [5 h + ® ]=  s H  +  x  -  (I -  t t )
+ (1 - r ) s L +  x]
= sH +  x  — (I — t t )  ( J ^ ~ ~~ T  T — 1^) +  [— ( ^  — t t ) ]
V K z  +  U - r K  +  x] J
=  s h  +  tt +  x -  I - ( I - tt) ^ [ s h  +  x ]
[rsH 4- (1 -  r) sL +  x\ J
The firm receives s# +7T. It also receives the net present value of the project, 
but loses the dilution cost of
Finally, for realisation of t t  such that t t  > I  the firm’s payoff is
S j j  +  TT +  X  — I
With probability 1 — r  the firm is the low type L.
In this case the firm always invests.
For realisations such that t t  <  t t  its payoff will be
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=  S L  +  7T +  X  -  I
For realisations such that I  > 7r > n  its payoff will be
I  — tt
1 -
+ (1 ~ r ) s L +  x]
sL +  x
 ^ [sl +  x]
S L  +  x  -  (I -  7r) rsH +  (1 - r ) s L + x  
S L  + X — (I — 7r) ( --------------f r  ~   — ( /  — 7r)+ ( l - r ) s L +  Z J
8L +  7T +  X - I  -  ( I - I T )  ( -------- , L +  ^ -----   l )\ r s H +  (1 -  r) sL +  x  J
S L  +  7T +  X  - / + ( / -  7r) ^1 - S L  +  X
r s H +  (1 - r ) s L +  x J  
It gets s l  +  7T and the net present value of the project. In addition, it gets a 
dilution gain of
</_*) (i  ----- )>o
V r s H +  (1 -  r) sL +  x j  
Finally, for realisations of 7r such that 7t > i the firm’s payoff is
S L  +  7T +  x  -  I
It is important to realise that for any realisation of 7r the expected dilution 
cost is zero. This follows directly from the fact that the financial investor breaks 
even in equilibrium. It can be verified algebraically by noting that
- r ( I - i r )  ( . ------------------ r - l )
\ [ r s H +  ( l - r ) s L +  x] J
+  (1 -  r) (I -  7r) ^1 - sL +  x
r s H +  (1 -  r) sL 4- x  
=  r  (I  — 7r) +  (1 — r) ( /  — 7r)
-  (I -  tt) 
0
[ S t f + x ]  S L  +  X4- (1 -  r)
[rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x\ r s H +  (1 -  r) sL +  x_
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For g iv en  7r th e  e x p e c te d  p ayoff is th erefo re
(1 — r) [sL +  7r 4- x — I] 4- r [ s #  +  7r] i f  i t  <  i t
~T) +(J -  r f  )
and
(1 -  r)  [sL +  7r +  x  -  I] +  r  [stf +  7T +  x  -  I] i f  i r >  it  7 r
+  X  -  T  '
Across realisations of t t  the expected payoff can then be written down as ,
r* ^  ^
/  {(1 -  r ) [5l  +  t t  + s  -  I) + r  Is# + n]} f  ( t t )  dir <— t 'X I
./-oo  l 7 ^
roo * ——
+ / {(1 -  r) [sL + 7T 4- X  -  I] + r [s# 4- i t  + x -  /]} /  ( i t )  dir
J  7T
= f  {(1 - r ) s L + rsH + 7T + (1 - r )  (x -  I)} f  {it) dir
J  — OOroc
+ /  {(1 -  r) sL -j- rsH +  it + (1 -  r) (x -  I) + r (x -  I)} f  (it) dir
J  7T
/OO /'O O7T/ (7r) dir I r (x — I) f  (it)
OO J  7T
d7T
/OO 7r/ (7t) d7T + (1 — F (7r)) r (x  — I)
■oo
/ OO 7r f  ( i t )  dir — F  (7r) r (x — I)
-oo
=  £  [3] +  Or -  J) +  £  [if] -  ( tt)  r (x -  / )
Discarding constants, the firm’s first period objective is therefore
E [ n \ - F ( n ) r ( x -
In addition to  the expected value of profit, there is a second term. It is the 
loss in net present value, which occurs when the firm is of the high type and 
the profit realisation is too low for the pooling equilibrium to exist, so th a t the
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h igh  ty p e  w ill n o t in v est. T h is  is m u ltip lied  b y  th e  p r o b a b ility  th a t  th e  profit  
rea lisa tio n  is b e lo w  th e  c u t-o ff  7f , a b o v e  w h ich  th e  p o o lin g  eq u ilib r iu m  is p layed . 
It is e a sy  to  se e  th a t  for an y  o th er  a ssu m p tio n  o n  eq u ilib r iu m  se le c t io n  sa tis -
su ch  th a t  th e  h ig h  ty p efy in g  p (7r) <  p (W) th ere  w ill ag a in  b e  a  c u t-o ff  7re |tf , 7?" 
in v ests  for profit r e a lisa tio n s  larger th a n  th e  cu t-o ff. T h e  first p e r io d  o b je c t iv e  
can  th e n  b e  fo u n d  b y  r ep la c in g  7r w ith  th e  c u t-o ff  ch osen .
3.5 F irst-P eriod  C om petition
L et u s  n o w  g o  o n  t o  a n a ly se  th e  f ir s t-s ta g e  g a m e  in  w h ich  ea ch  o f  th e  tw o  firm s  
ch o o ses  a  s tr a te g ic  v a r iab le  to  m a x im ise  it s  first p e r io d  o b je c t iv e . In  th e  g en era l 
fram ew ork p ro fits  are  g iv en  b y
tP =  tt (z, Qi, qj)
I w an t to  m a k e  th is  m ore  sp ec ific  in  tw o  d ifferen t w ays.
3 .5 .1  P r o f it  fu n c t io n  a  la  B r a n d e r  a n d  L e w is
In lin e  w ith  B ra n d er  a n d  L ew is (1 9 8 6 ) an d  a d o p tin g  th e  fram ew ork  o f  ch a p ter  
2, le t u s first a ssu m e  th a t  u n c e r ta in ty  ca n  b e  rep resen ted  b y  a  sca la r  var iab le , 
i.e.
tt* =  7r* ( ? ,  q\ q3) =  tt1 (l)\ q \ q
w here 9 e (6_, 9) . T h e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  6 is  g iv en  b y  F  (6) w h ich  is  a ssu m e d  t o  h a v e  
a d e n s ity  /  (9). F u rth er , th e  fo llo w in g  a ssu m p tio n s  h o ld
V ( 9 \q \q 3) with 9i 6  (9,9) ,q * >  0 ,qj >  0
( * )  4  ( ® * .  Q * , ? )  <0 ,  ( * * )  7T*. ( 9 \  q \  q  0 ,  (Hi) ^  0  ( A l )
(iv) nl (0\ q\  q j ) >0 ,  7 r ^  q\  0 ,
H ere a ssu m p tio n s  (iv) a n d  (v) are v ersio n s o f  th e  m ore g en era l a ssu m p tio n s  
in  A l* ,  for th e  ca se  o f  a  profit fu n c tio n  w h ich  is d ifferen tia b le  w ith  re sp e c t t o  a
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scalar random variable z1 =  9 . I also make two additional assumptions. First, I 
assume that 6 is uniformly distributed. This guarantees that / '  (6) = 0 . Second, 
I want to assume that 7T^  = 011.
Consider first the benchmark of single stage competition. Equivalently, as­
sume that x — I  is negative, so that neither the low type nor the high type will 
invest in the second stage. Then firm i's objective is to maximise
E  [r] = (  7r* {O' ,q' ,q‘) }  (O') dd1 
Jq_
The equilibrium is given by the unique intersection of the firms’ reaction func­
tions. These are implicitly defined by
r w M H * ) *  =  o
a
[ ^ ( e j ^ ) f ( e j ) d e j  =  o
Je
/l v*7 >  ^  ^ ) J V17) uu =  /r°r£
Now assume that
The intersection will yield equilibrium quantities (gl, g-7) =  (gc, qc)which will give 
equilibrium profit
r f i e 1)< 16' =  *
positive. Then firm i's objertive is
V { =  E[tt*] -  F(5?)
= f 7T* ( e \ q \  qi) f  (0‘)d* (?) r  (* -
where 6 is implicitly defined by ^  L .> ) 4 4
$ *  © 3 - t  T
7r‘ (e ,q \q j^ =  0
11 These assumptions, as well as the formal analysis in this section, are similar to Brander 
and Lewis (1988). They assume an objective function which is similar to the one we derive by 
speculating that the firm has debt in its capital structure and that the firm maximises profits 
minus a fixed exogenous bankruptcy cost, which is incurred whenever profits fall short of the 
debt obligation.
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By assumption, only firm i faces an investment opportunity. Firm j ' s  objective 
therefore is
Vj = E  [Irj] =  [  7rj (6j , q\  qj ) f  (0j ) dQjJq_
as before.
Differentiating firm i's objective with respect to q* now yields the first-order 
condition
The second term of the derivative can be analyzed further. Using the implicit 
function theorem one finds
dqi
ae tt;
>
~ f  (e)  j r r r ( x - I )  =  f ( e) - .—Yr (x — I)
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. I t  will be positive when ( o , q ' ,  q i j  
0 and negative when ( o ,  q', q*J <  0. Notice however, th a t the  sign of ir\ ( o ,  q', q* j  
will depend on the  position of tt. For higher tt it is more likely to  be positive. 
To see this note th a t tt\q (j), q1, q ^  >  0 and th a t
—  -  1 Q
Therefore the  sign of n] will be positive for high 7? and negative for
low tt. Moreover, when, as assumed f  (6) =  0 and tt%qq =  0, one can show a 
monotone relationship between the size of the  second term  of the  derivative and 
the position of tt.
-  a l b I f  ,
/  (e )  i )  **  qi> qj  ^ ^  qi’q^  ~ *** qi’ ^  qi’ ^
TT
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Ke § 4
> 0
(y,g\Qj))
Thus under the assumptions made, the size of the second term is increasing 
in 7f.
The second order condition is 
-0
f8.
f) i f6 / \
N z A  A  («*. qj ) f  (<r) <0 +  f  (?) \ r (* -  I)
d(t \ J L K ' ir'Je.aKaA
fJo
M  f  {*)<& + - I f  \ f i e
7t;
7r
(?, 9*>9J)
“(? ,9* ,95)
^ (? ,9 i ,9 i )
( i  - 1)  ^ < o
The first term is negative since 7r^  < 0. Given that / '  [9] = 0  the second term 
is equal to
4  (?> q\ qj) + I?] 4  (?> 9*. qj)
f i e ( x - I )
9 (?.9*.9i )
4i (?. 9% 9s)  + 4e (?. 9*. 9*) ! ? ]  *1 (? . 9*i 93')
r ( x  — I)
Assume that/7^  (0, ql, qj ) > 0)at the point at which the first order condition 
holds. This implies That ^  < 0 so that given Ti%ee = 0 this expression has a 
negative sign and the second-order condition holds. When Tf\ q^j < 0, so
that > 0 at the point at which the first order condition holds, this expression 
cannot be signed. In order for the second-order condition to hold, one has to 
make appropriate assumptions on the relative sizes of the first and the second 
term. One can guarantee that the second order condition holds, by assuming 
that /  ^0^ is small.
Next consider equilibrium quantities. When 7r is high enough, such that
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Provided that the intersection of the reaction functions is stable, which re­
quires that V W j- V t)V>i > 0, this implies that q% > qc and qi < qc in equilibrium. 
On the other hand, when 9  is low, such that ir\ (o,qc,qc^  < 0  one will have
r9 /~\ ni iO’t f ’Q0)
Vi =  / K(«*. f ,  9C) f(«*) de' + f ( o ) r ( x -  — V -(
J t  w
< 0
so that given reaction function stability one has ql <  q° and qi  > q c in 
equilibrium.
For a proof assume first that t t  is such that t t \  ( q ,  qc , q c j^ = 0 and then con­
sider a variation in t t . Totally differentiating the system of first-order conditions 
one has
Vidqi + Vtjdqj + VtctfT =  0 
Vidqt + V^dq, + V^dn  0
Note that = 0. Then one can solve for comparative statics effects by 
using Cramer’s rule to get
dQi _  VI Vjj
r >  0d9 V'.V3. -  Vi.VI
r  i t  r  j j  t j  j t
dji _  v
dn vivi. -  v iv j-
n  3 3  i j  J t
using
1/1 =  , , , „ ,
89  \ V J dq,
as sh o w n  ab ove. /
L et us su m m a r ize  th e s e  fin d in g s in  th e  fo llo w in g  ' ^  ^ V's* \
P ro p o s itio n  5 When t t  is high enough such that Qc, > 0 on& wdl have
q% >  qc and q i <  qc in equilibrium. When 9  is such that t t \  (o ,q°,qc J^ = 0 one 
will have (q‘l,qi) =  (qc,qc) • When 9  is low enough such that t t ]  (o ,q c,qc J^ <  0 
one will have ql < qc and q i > qc in equilibrium.
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This is the main result of this chapter and is shown graphically in Figure 
3.2. The intuition for this result is the following. First, observe that, when 
K  {&, ? , ¥ )  > o and Ki  (6i ,qi,qj ) > 0, an increase in qi induces an increase 
in the spread or variance of 7p. For larger q%, a given swing in 61 will translate 
into a larger swing in 7p. This is true under the assumptions made on the way 
uncertainty enters the profit function, and is plausible. It says that, as the 
firm increases output, it exposes itself more to the underlying demand or cost 
uncertainty. To see how this follows from the assumptions, note that
var pp] =  E  
=  E
{ r - E [ * } ) 2 
(5F*)2] - [ £ [ * ] ]
so that
=  2 E  [5f*5r{] — 2 B  pr’] E  [5rj]
=  2cov pP, 7rV]
Both 7p ^0, ql, q^j and ir\ (d, ql, q ^  are increasing in 6 since by assumption 
7rJ (0t ,ql,qj ) > 0 and 7Tzid (d%, qz, qj ) > 0. Therefore cov > 0, which im­
plies that the variance of 7P is increasing in q1.
The firm’s objective function can be written as
E  pp] - F { 9 ) r ( x - I )
or equivalently as
(1 -  r) [E [5P] +  x -  I] +  r [E pp] +  (1 -  F  pr)) (x -  /)]
The firm obtains the benefit of being able to invest as a high type for reali­
sations of 7P such that 7p > 7r.
When 7r is in the right tail of the distribution of 7p, the firm can increase 
the probability of investment by increasing the variance of ?P. This creates an 
incentive to increase ql.
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On the other hand, when 7r is low enough to be in left tail of the distribution 
of 7?*, the firm benefits from reducing the variance of 7p, since in this case it is 
a reduction in variance that will increase the probability of realisations larger 
than 7r. Therefore, in this case there is an incentive to reduce ql
C om parative sta tic s
In our setup 7r is an endogenous variable. It is therefore interesting to explore 
how the product market equilibrium is influenced by the factors determining 7r. 
Recall that
-1
[ S H + : r l  - I I  =  7?
[rStf +  (1 -  r) sL + x]
It was pointed out before that 7f is increasing in the dilution factor
( _______! f » ± f ! _________ i  ) = t
V[rs// +  ( l - r ) 5 L +  rr] J
Note that the size of the dilution factor depends on the uncertainty associated 
with the value of the assets in place. Consider subjecting the distribution of s to a 
mean preserving spread such that sH is increased by some e and sL is decreased 
by (TI7)£- This will leave E  [s] =  r  (sH +  e) +  (1 -  r) ( sL -  +  % un­
changed but will increase the numerator to [s# -f x] -f e. Larger uncertainty in 
the sense of a mean preserving spread will therefore increase 7f. The cut-off will 
move towards the right tail of the profit distribution, creating a stronger incen­
tive to increase the variance. This will cause firm i to compete more aggressively 
and will result in a larger ql and a smaller qK Thus one can see that larger un­
certainty may actually benefit firm i, in that it leads to a lower rival quantity. 
Whether this competitive benefit of increased uncertainty is outweighed by the 
reduction in the probability of investment will depend on the exact parameter 
specification of the model.
Next consider an increase in the net present value of the project. The net 
present value is x  — I. It can increase through an increase in x  or a decrease in
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I. These effects are best analysed separately. Consider first an increase in x.
^ - i l - i x - I )  ( -    i ')  \  =
dx  |  \ [ r s H +  (1 - r ) s L +  x] J  j  dx  1
-  - T ( x ) - ‘ + xT ( x) - * A t (x)
[rsH +  (1 - r ) s L +  x\
Next
- l
—  (  [*g  +  *1 1
d l \  K ; l ,[rSH +  ( l - r ) S i  +  x] \
.  1+f.— — T_1y 1>o
\  [rsH +  (1 -  r) sL +  x] J
Therefore
A (x — I)  > 0  = >  A tv < 0
which is intuitive. When the net present value of the project is larger, it will 
exceed the dilution cost for a smaller cut-off. Whether an increase in the net 
present value of the project will lead firm i to compete more or less aggressively 
will not only depend on the effect on the cut-off. Recall that the term causing 
deviations from the Cournot equilibrium is
~ f  ( ? )  § r (* -  
There will therefore be a direct and an indirect effect.
i i - f ( o ) ^ - I ) \  =  - f ( e ) ^ r r - f ( e ) r ( x - I )  99 99dx  1 \ /  dqi J \ / dql \  J dq{dn dx
We know that
0 d6
r { x - I ) d j d z > 0
Hence
When
r  I n  \ / r\ d9 dir
do
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which will be the case when ql < qc both effects go in the same direction. An 
increase in x  will cause a further reduction in q%. Intuitively, the cut-off moves 
further into the left tail of the profit distribution and the benefit from being 
above the cut-off is greater. Both give an incentive to reduce the variance at 
the expense of expected profit so that firm i will compete less aggressively in 
equilibrium.
When
- ' W g —
which will be the case when ql > qc the net effect is ambiguous. Start from a 
situation where the cut-off is in the right tail of the distribution. AlS the net 
present value of the project increases, the benefit from being above the cut-off 
increases, which will give an incentive to increase the variance and cause firm 
i to compete more aggressively. On the other hand, as x  increases the cut-off 
moves in and there is a reduced incentive to increase the variance so that firm i 
will have an incentive to compete less aggressively.
Finally, let us look at an increase in r. One finds
[sh +  ^ -1
[rs# +  (1 -  r) sL +  x]
= /_   J\ ( _____[s# +  x \__________ -t\ * ( ____________ Ish +  x \__«\
V [r s H + ( l - r ) s L + x] J dr \  [rs# +  (1 -  r) sL +  x] J
which says th a t an increase in r  causes the  cut-off 7T to  shift in. Again, 
however, there is a competing direct effect, so th a t the  comparative static  results 
are qualitatively the  same as for an increase in x.
I have derived comparative statics results under the  assum ption th a t the 
pooling equilibrium is played whenever it exists. Let us briefly move to  the 
assumption th a t the  separating equilibrium is played whenever it exists. This 
means th a t up to  a  profit level of t t , only the  bad type invests. Recall th a t
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Since we know that 7r > 7T it is clear that firm i's equilibrium quantity will be 
larger and firm j ' s  equilibrium quantity will be smaller than under the original 
assumption. Notice that this effect will work against the usual notion that the 
pooling equilibrium is superior to the separating equilibrium. In our framework, 
lost investment efficiency will be partly recovered by more aggressive product 
market behaviour, causing a reduction in rival output and thus benefiting firm 
i.
The comparative static effects with respect to an increase in the uncertainty 
regarding s and with respect to an increase in the net present value are quali­
tatively unchanged. Notice that 7r is not a function of r. Intuitively this comes 
about since 7r is the profit level such that the high type would invest, even if the 
market believed that the firm was low type with probability one. An increase in 
r would therefore only have a direct effect, which would reinforce the deviation 
of firm i's quantity from the Cournot level.
3 .5 .2  A n  a ltern a tiv e  profit fu n ctio n
To explore further the intuition that the cut-off profit level creates incentives to 
manipulate the variance of the profit distribution, I want to explore a different 
specification for the profit function of both firms. In particular, I want to assume 
that profit is represented by
ir‘ ( ? ,  q \  qj ) =  ^  ( o , ? ,  q \  =  (3  -  6 (5* +  qj ) )  q‘ ~  cqi + W
There is demand uncertainty, which is assumed to have a two-point distribution. 
Demand can be high or low, ae {a , a} and the probability that it is high is 
denoted by Pr [a =  a] =  p. In addition, there is some additive noise which I 
assume to have a zero mean normal distribution, 6 ~  N  (0, a ) 12.
Firm i's objective is to maximise
V i = E [r] -  F  (tt) r (x -  I)
12It is easiliy seen that this specification satisfies A l*.
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Denote the conditional means of the profit distribution given a high demand 
and a low demand realisation, respectively by
7f =  ( a - b ( q t + qj )) ql -  cq% 
t t  —  ( a  -  b (q1 4 -  qj )) q% -  cql
One can then write down F (if) explicitly as
\/27r
F  (7?) =  pF  (7r | 7r) +  (1 — p) F  ( tt I 7r)
f* 1 r(vr”)2 , / v F* 1 -(y-a)-
=  p  I — — =e 2^ 2 rfti 4- ( l  — p j  I — — e 2^ dv
J - 0 0  c r y  27T y _ o o  o V
The first-order condition for firm i's problem is
which can be written as
/  <9F(7f|7T) . \  &k (  d F ( 7T | 7r) . dn
d(f
One finds
dF  (7r I 7r) /*7r 1 (i> — 7r) -(v-5)2— 1 V -e 2<r2- fJ  “ Idlf ay/27T o’2
  .
Since 7f* =  7f + 6 one can change the variable of integration to 0 =  v — 7f to get
dF  (7? | 7r) 
dW
_ n - *  1 e
7 - 0 0  C 7\/27r
0 -02 '.el'Pad 
2
r * 1 - 4 ^-  / — - = — e ^ d d
J- oo CTV27T O'2
I 1 0^?
e 2<r
rV27T
e 2<72 =  —/  (7T | 7T)
—00 
2
rV^ 7T
Similarly, one finds
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so that one has
/  1 -(fr-j)2 , _A dWVI =  p H  = e  a*2 r ( x  — I) ) —
(  1 -(tt—k)2 \  (97T
+ ( 1 - p ) ( 1 + ^ e ^ r ( I - / ) ) ^
=  P (1 +  /  (5f I w) r {x -  I)) 0  +  (1 -  p) (1 +  /  (5f 17r) r  (s -  I)) | =
Similarly, one can show that second-order condition can be written as
Vii = P ( l  +  / ( 5Fl ’f) r (a;- - f ) ) | ^  +  ( l - P ) ( l  +  / ( ’f \ t i r (x ~ 1) ) ^
- p f ( n \ W ) r ( x - I ) ^ Y j  - ( 1 - P ) f ( * \ l $ r ( x - I ) ( 2 = \  < 0
Again, it is assumed that this is satisfied.
Let us go back to the first-order condition and consider equilibrium quanti­
ties. Start by evaluating 7f and 7r at the Cournot-point (qc, qc) . Then note that 
(iqc, q°) is such that
d i f  . d]i_ ^
pW  + {1~ p ) w = 0
Therefore V? > 0 and firm i will have an incentive to increase its quantity beyond 
the Cournot level when /  (7r | 7f) > /  pr | 7r) at the Cournot-point. There will 
be no incentive to deviate from the Cournot level, =  0, when /  (7? | 7f) = 
/  (tt I 7r) and it will have an incentive to reduce its quantity, V? < 0, when
/  ( 7? | 7f) <  /  ( 7? | 7 r ) . Rearranging the condition one finds
/  (7T | 7f) > /  (7T | 7T)
CT\/27T CFy/%K
— (7? — 7f)2 — (7T — 7r)
>
2o"2 2 c r2
(n — 7r ) 2 <  ( 7? — 7 r)2
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|7T — 7r| < 17T — 7r|
When 7T =  1 (¥ +  7T) one has |7r — 7f| =  \n — 7r| , so that /  (7T | 7f) =  /  (7? | 7[). 
Thus when the cut-off is exactly halfway between 7T and 7f, conditional densities 
are the same and there is no incentive to change the quantity.
When 7? > |  (7T + 7r) one has |7T — 7f| < |7r — 7r| and /  (7T | W) > /  (n \ 7r). The 
density conditional on a realization of 7f is larger than the density conditional on 
a realization of 7r. An increase in output will therefore increase the probability 
of the profit realization being above the cut-off.
Finally, when 7r < 1 (7T +  7r) one has |7r — W\ > |7T — 7r| and /  (7? | 7f) < 
/  (7r | 7r), so that in this case there is an incentive to reduce the quantity. One 
therefore has
P roposition  6 Evaluate 7f and 7r at the Cournot-point (qc,qc). When n > 
1 (7T + 7[) one will have q% > qc and qj < q° in equilibrium. When n = I (if +  7r)
one will have (gl, q*) =  (gc, gc) . When 7r < 1 (W4- 7r) one rfZ  have < qc and
qj > q° in equilibrium.
To complete the proof, one only needs to reemploy Cramer’s Rule for the 
system of first-order conditions, just as we did in the last section.
The intuition is that when 7r > |  (7T +  7r ) , it pays to increase the spread or 
variance of the profit distribution. Since at (q°, qc) one has < 0 and > 0 
moving ql up will decrease 7T and increase 7f, which will make it more likely that 
7r > 7r. Thus the key property of the profit function under study is again that 
the variance of the profit distribution is increasing in q%. This is clear from the 
fact that the profit distribution satisfies
z' >  z  =» 7r* (z!, ql , qj ) >  1f  (z, qj )
z' >  z  => q \  qj ) >  it] (z, q‘, q>)
so that
dvar [ttI ^
dq> = 2cov b  .^*3 ^ 0
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as was argued above. I t  can also be seen more directly by noting th a t
5P =  (a* -  b (gs +  <?)) q' - c q ' + ?
implies
var [7P] =  var [a1] q%2 + var
so th a t the  variance of 7P is increasing in q1. W hen the  cut-off is in th e  right ta il of 
the  distribution, it will pay the firm to  increase the  variance of the  distribution 
in a  speculative a ttem pt to  increase the  probability of the  profit realisation 
exceeding the  cut-off. This speculative behaviour has two effects. F irst, it will 
make it more likely th a t the  firm invests in the  second stage. Second, it will let 
the  rival firm decrease its quantity in response to  the  more aggressive behaviour 
of firm i.
C om parative s ta tics
As for the comparative statics with respect to  7f one finds unambiguous results 
when 7f > 7r > 7r. In this case one finds
8 2
dqid 7r
{E  (7r) — F (n)r (x — I)}
1 — Ok — 7r) -(»-f)2 <9tT
=  p— 7=  o----e 2<r» r ( x  — I) 7—
o-2 d(f
. rt \ 1 — (5P — tt) , T, &Lr
+ { l ~ P) O* e^ r  {X~ I ] W
= p f ( n  I w) r (x ~ T) ^  + ( 1 - p ) / '  (’f lu )  r (a : - / ) 0  > 0
It is easy to see that the first-order condition implies that J J  > 0 and Jjj < 0. 
Therefore when 7f > n > n both terms are positive since the density /  (• | 7f) has 
positive slope at 7r, whereas the density /  (• | 7r) has negative slope at 7T. The 
overall comparative static effect is therefore positive. Just as in the last section 
it will therefore again be the case that more severe asymmetric information will 
lead firm i to compete more aggressively and firm j  to respond by competing 
less aggressively.
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3.6 Dividends
So fax I have analysed a model where the firm did not actively seek to commit 
itself to a particular output strategy. The equilibrium outputs differ from the 
Cournot output simply because both firms anticipate firm i to face a financing 
problem in the future13. It should be pointed out, however, that an ex ante 
commitment to reduce financial slack may be valuable to firm i. Such a commit­
ment could be brought about by the firm entering into a debt contract at t =  0, 
before it chooses its quantity. It could also be brought about by a commitment 
to a certain dividend policy. Thus imagine that the firm can, before it chooses 
its quantity, commit to pay out an amount d to existing shareholders at t =  1. 
Let us assume that the pooling equilibrium is played whenever it exists. Then, 
when the firm is of the high type, it will invest only if 7T — d > 7r, i.e. when 
7r > 7t — d. A dividend payout of d increases the cut-off by that same amount. 
This will have two effects. First, it will reduce the probability that the invest­
ment is taken. This negative effect has to be traded off against a positive effect. 
This comes about since with a higher cut-off, the firm has more of an incentive 
to increase the variance of the profit distribution by increasing its output. The 
dividend commits firm i to a more aggressive product market stance, which will 
lead its rival firm to reduce its quantity and thus benefit firm i. This trade-off 
may or may not lead to a strictly positive choice of d, depending on the exact 
parameter specification of the model.
3.7 Conclusion
I have analysed a two-period model where firms first compete in a product 
market and one of the firms then finances an investment opportunity under con­
ditions of asymmetric information. Special care has been taken to analyse the
13This is in contrast to Brander and Lewis (1988) where debt financing precedes the product 
market competition stage and debt is issued for its commitment value only.
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full set of equilibria of the financing game and to motivate an equilibrium selec­
tion such that the probability that the firm invests is increasing in the amount 
of financial slack it has on hand. This introduces a cut-off into the firm’s ob­
jective function, since it is only for profit realisations above the cut-off that the 
high type firm will issue and invest. Under these conditions, the firm will not 
simply maximise the expected value of profit. Rather, it will take into account 
the consequences its choice of the strategic variable has on the probability that 
the profit generated exceeds the cut-off. This will lead the firm to consider not 
only the first moment, but also the second moment of the profit distribution. 
When the cut-off 7r is high, there is an incentive to speculate and to increase the N 
variance of the profit distribution by increasing its output. The rival anticipates 
this and responds with a lower output, which will benefit the firm. When the 
cut-off 7T is low, there is an incentive to hedge and to reduce the variance of 
the profit distribution by lowering output. The rival will take advantage of this 
and respond with a higher output, which will harm the firm. One of the main 
insights of this model is that the fact that a firm has to finance externally does 
not necessarily worsen the firm’s competitive position. In contrast to models 
where a financially constrained firm faces predation by a deep pocketed rival, 
in our model a particularly severe financing problem may actually help the firm 
in making it more aggressive vis a vis its rival. This is an implication of the 
main comparative statics result of the model, which says that a larger degree 
of uncertainty, and thus a more severe adverse selection problem, will make the 
firm a more aggressive competitor as the firm strives to increase the probabil­
ity of investment. This result may also lend itself to empirical testing. To the 
extent that smaller firms are surrounded by a larger degree of uncertainty than 
larger firms, so that size can be taken as a proxy for uncertainty, the model 
suggests that smaller firms should be more aggressive competitors than larger, 
more established firms. The results also suggest that smaller firms may be able 
to survive in an environment in which they are competing against larger firms,
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precisely because they face a more severe adverse selection problem. Finally, the 
implications of the model seem consistent with the empirical finding that con­
glomerates are trading at a discount when measured against ’’focused” firms14. 
One could argue that in contrast to conglomerates, focused firms have to face the 
external capital market more often, as there is less scope for cross-subsidisation. 
In addition, there may be a larger degree of uncertainty surrounding the smaller, 
focused firm than there is surrounding an established conglomerate. This would 
imply that more focused firms are the more aggressive competitors and may be 
one reason why they are more valuable.
14See for example Lang and Stulz (1994).
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Appendix 3.1
P r o o f o f  L em m a 3:
For part a) note first that for all beliefs pe [0,1] it is optimal for the low type 
L to set d = 1 and invest. To see this, note that the low type will set d =  1 
whenever
sL + 7T < (1 --------- -----------------— ) [sL + x]
\ PSH + (1 — P) SL + x )
By inspection the RHS of this condition is increasing in p. For p — 0 the 
condition reduces to
St+7r< (* “ It A )  [Si+*]
S L  4 *  7T <  S L  +  X  -  ( /  -  7 r )
0 < x — I
and is satisfied because the investment opportunity has positive net present 
value by assumption. Hence 8L =  1 for all beliefs pe [0,1]. In any equilibrium 
the low type will invest.
Next note that this implies an upper bound on equilibrium belief p.
= t6h = r6n <
P rSH + (1 -  r) 8l rSH + (1 -  r) ~ T
Finally, consider the high type H. It is optimal for the high type to invest 
only if
Sh +  7T < ( 1 -  7------ —^ ---- —r-----;--7 ) +  x]
\  \PSH + (1 — p) SL + /
Given the upper bound on p, and employing the fact that the RHS of this 
condition is increasing in p one has
[psH +  ( l - p ) s L +  x ] )  ^ H +  X\ ~  ( 1 [rsff + ( l - r ) s L + a:]) + ^
for all possible equilibrium beliefs pe [0, r \ . For 7T < 7T one also has
SH + 7T > ( 1 — 7-------7--------r-------r ) [sH + x]
\  [rsH +  ( l - r ) s L +  x]J
CHAPTER 3. EQUITY FINANCE AND THE PRODUCT M ARK ET  106
so that
Sh +  7T > (1 -   ------ - — —----- - r j [sH +  x\
\ [PSH + (1 — P) SL +  %\J
for all possible equilibrium beliefs pe [0, r ] . This implies that whenever 7r < 
t t  it will not be optimal for the high type to invest. Hence 8 H  = 0 in any 
equilibrium with t t  < t t .  Hence the unique equilibrium has 8 ^  = 0 and 8l = 1, 
which implies p = 0 and a  as shown.
For part b) note first that the argument regarding the equilibrium behaviour 
of the low type given for part a) goes through regardless of t t .  When i t  > t t ,  
therefore, again the low type will set 8^ = 1 for all pe [0,1]. In the proposed 
pooling equilibrium the high type also always invests, so that 8jj = 1. Given 
SL =  1 and SH =  1, the equilibrium belief must be p — r. When t t  > t t  one has
S h  +  TT <  ( 1 — t   7 - r   r ] [sH +  X ]\  [rsH + { l - r ) s L + x]J
so that it is indeed optimal for the high type to invest given beliefs. This 
completes the proof.
P r o o f o f  L em m a 4:
For part a) recall that 8L =  1 is optimal for any beliefs. It therefore suffices 
to show that SH =  0 is optimal given p = 0 and t t  < t t .  To see this, one needs
/s
to note only that when t t  < t t  one has
sh +  tt > (1 -  -1- ■7r- ) [sH +  x\\  sL + x J
For part b) I need to show that the pooling equilibrium is unique. Given that 
8L = 1 is uniquely optimal for all beliefs and all profit levels, one needs to show 
only that whenever t t  >  t t  holds 8 H  = 1 is the only optimal choice for the high 
type for any belief pe [0,1] .
8h — 1 is uniquely optimal when
S H  +  TT <  ( 1 — f-------- — 7Z-----s----------------T ) [s h  +
\  [PSH + (1 — p) SL + x] j
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When p — 0 this reduces to
S h  + TT < ( 1 -  1 n ) [sH +  x] V S L  + x J
which is satisfied since 7T > t t .  When p  > 0
\psH +  (1 -  p) S L  +  x])  \  S L  + x )
and the condition for unique optimality is again satisfied. Therefore Sh = 1 
whenever 7T > 7T which then implies that p =  r and a  as shown. This completes 
the proof.
P r o o f o f  L em m a 5:
The equation which determines SH will deliver a solution 8H£ [0,1] if and
only if 7T6 7r, 7T . To see this, note first that with Sh =  0 one has 
S H + * =  ( l - | ^ j )  [»*+*]
whereas with SH =  1 one has
S H  +  TT =  ( 1 -  7------------------  —r------ — -T ) [S tf  +  X ][rsH +  (1 - r ) s L + x]J
We know
P (Sh) =
rSH
rSH +  (1 -  r) 
Hence
, r  [rSH +  (1 ~ r)] -  rSHr _  r(l - r )
P H [rSH +  (1 -  r)]2 [rSH +  (1 -  r )]2
Totally differentiating the indifference condition with respect to 7r and Sh one 
has
( l -  —  [; f  +  t  u ---------TV
\  [p ($h) sh +  (1 — P ($h )) sl +  x]J
- ( / - * )  [,* +  * ]---------- (*g ~  Sl) p' (Sh) -M6h = 0
\p H ) SH +  (1  — P  ( 3 { f ) )  &L +  %]
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This implies
d7r
d8H ( i ________ faH+sc]______
\  [p(^ h)sh+(1-p(^ h))sl+*]
Since the denominator is negative one has
dm
dSH
This completes the proof.
< 0
CHAPTER 3. EQUITY FINANCE AND THE PRODUCT M ARK ET
1
71" 7T
P
r
ir 7r 7T
p  =
_  r5H
Figure 3.1: Second-Stage Equilibria
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Chapter 4
Optimal Managerial 
Remuneration and Firm -level 
Diversification
4.1 Introduction
The main motivation for this chapter is to identify a set of circumstances under 
which firm-level diversification may be beneficial. It is well known that, in a 
world of risk-averse investors, diversification as such creates benefits by reduc­
ing portfolio variance. It is less clear, however, why diversification should be 
observed at the firm level. After all, if investors are able to hold well - diversi­
fied portfolios themselves, why should firm-level diversification add any further 
value. Traditional arguments which come to mind rely on economies of scope be­
tween projects (synergies), a benefit of an internal capital market (Williamson 
(1975), pp. 147-148), or a reduced probability of incurring bankruptcy costs 
(Lewellen (1971)).
I will analyse a model which abstracts from all of these arguments and in­
stead takes a contracting problem between financial investors and managers as 
the starting point. This contracting problem arises from an agency problem
111
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which involves both moral hazard and hidden information on the part of the 
manager. As in the previous chapter, asymmetric information between the firm 
manager and financial investors is thought of as an important feature of the 
relationship between financial investor and manager. In the model of this chap­
ter, the manager is able to obtain private information on the profitability of 
the investment1. Financial investors will therefore want the manager to spend 
effort to investigate the project and then make an informed investment decision 
in their interest. By designing an appropriate wage contract, financial investors 
may be able to provide the right incentives for both these managerial decisions. 
Providing these incentives will, however, be costly; the manager will receive an 
informational rent over and above the compensation for his effort. I will be able 
to show that, if the manager is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, 
this informational rent will be driven down as one assigns more projects to the 
manager. This provides a rationale for firm-level diversification which is distinct 
from the arguments that have traditionally been put forward.
The second motivation for this chapter is to characterize the structure of the 
optimal incentive scheme for a manager who is in charge of several projects, and 
whose task is to decide which, if any, of the available projects should be invested 
in. This is an interesting question in its own right, in that managers may be in 
charge of several projects for reasons other than the rent-reduction effect iden­
tified in this chapter. Thus, for example, one of the main tasks of the CEO 
of a large company is to decide which projects should be pursued further and 
which projects should be terminated. The optimal incentive scheme for such a 
manager is of interest, even if the company is diversified for reasons unrelated 
to rent reduction. Another example is a fund managers, who necessarily makes
lrThe presence of this kind of hidden information will make the model relevant especially 
for R&D- intensive industries, such as chemicals and drugs. In these industries managers 
typically gain private information about the likely return of a project in the course of product 
development. This information will often be ’’soft” , in the sense that it cannot be verifiably 
communicated to investors.
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joint decisions on a number of assets. In recent years, much research has been 
devoted to the shape of optimal managerial remuneration schemes in the pres­
ence of agency problems. Most of the results give a justification for contracts 
that are monotone in the return of the project and have led theorists to argue 
that contracts which involve awarding shares or options, may be taken as ap­
proximations of the contracts which are derived as optimal. However, there is 
an issue of whether these contracts are incentive compatible if manager’s task is 
to make investment decisions on the basis of his private information and when 
the manager supervises more than one project at the same time2.
The arguments in this chapter contribute to two strands of literature, one 
concerned with optimal managerial remuneration schemes and the other con­
cerned with explaining firm-level diversification in a Principal-Agent context. 
Some authors (e.g. Haubrich (1994)), have taken the simple moral hazard prob­
lem with a risk-averse agent, as analysed for example in Grossman and Hart 
(1983), to be informative on optimal managerial remuneration. In this model, 
there is a single-dimensional effort choice to be made by the agent, which is sto­
chastically related to observed output. If more effort is put in, output is more 
likely to be higher in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Since the 
principal wants to elicit effort, the contract will reward high profit outcomes and 
will therefore typically be monotone in observed returns. When the principal is 
risk-neutral but the agent is risk-averse, there is scope for insurance. Provid­
ing wage insurance will, however, blunt incentives and is therefore costly, which 
creates the main trade-off in this model.
Holmstrom and Ricart-i-Costa (1986) were one of the first to argue that 
this model might not fully capture the incentive problems between manager and
2Most of the existing Principal-Agent literature assumes that the agent has a single project. 
Notable exceptions are Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) on multi-task Principal-Agent analysis, 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) on real and formal authority, and Diamond (1984), and Williamson 
(1986) on diversified financial intermediaries.
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financial investor. Financial investors, they argue, may be more worried about 
how effective managers are at making decisions. Stochastic managerial ability is 
introduced and the focus of the analysis is on managerial career concerns. In a 
similar spirit, Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) analyse a model of delegated 
portfolio management. Financial investor employ a manager for an investment 
decision in order to make use of the manager’s ability to forecast returns. Again, 
the focus is on unobserved heterogeneity in managerial abilities and optimal 
screening devices are derived.
Lambert (1988) abstracts from managerial heterogeneity and instead intro­
duces more-dimensional decisions. As in the model of this chapter, the manager 
first expends effort on gathering information and then makes an investment de­
cision based on his private information. A similar set-up is analysed by Huang 
and Suarez (1996), who derive a contract which can be interpreted as an option 
contract assuming risk-neutrality and limited liability, rather than risk-aversion 
on the part of the manager, as does Lambert (1988). In this chapter, I follow 
Lambert (1988) and Huang and Suarez (1996) and argue that the relationship 
between manager and financial investor is not adequately captured by a simple 
moral hazard problem with a monotone stochastic relationship between an un­
observable effort variable and the observable project return. Instead, I analyse 
a model where hidden information on the part of the manager is a crucial ingre­
dient. The manager is thought of as an insider who, by expending effort, may 
acquire superior information on the likely return of the project. Then, financial 
investors want the manager to make an investment decision in the light of this 
information. The main contribution to the existing literature is that I extend 
the analysis to the case, where the manager is in charge of several investment 
projects, rather than a single project, and the manager’s task is to make deci­
sions simultaneously on a all of the projects he supervises. This will make the 
analysis relevant in particular for the manager of a large corporation.
There are two papers which provide a rationale for firm-level diversification
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in a Principal-Agent context: Aron (1988) and Hermalin and Katz (1996). Aron 
(1988) analyses a moral hazard problem with a risk-averse manager. The man­
ager is asked to choose an effort variable, which has a noisy, but positive impact 
on the returns of a production process. Financial investors use realised return 
as a signal for the effort level chosen. When there are two projects, the man­
ager still chooses a single effort variable which now becomes an input into both 
processes. This enables financial investors to observe two independent signals of 
the manager’s effort choice, so that the precision of their inference is improved. 
Aron obtains an optimal extent of diversification by diseconomies of scale in 
production. Hermalin and Katz (1996) also analyse a pure moral hazard prob­
lem, where again the manager is asked to choose an effort level. Diversification 
is thought of as splitting this effort variable and letting the fractions enter two 
activities. Again this will under certain conditions improve the informativeness 
of the observed returns. In both Aron (1988) and Hermalin and Katz (1996), 
diversification is driven by the fact that projects axe technologically related. In 
Aron (1988) the single effort choice becomes a common input into two different 
processes, whereas in Hermalin and Katz (1996) it is split in a known ratio and 
then enters both projects. In contrast to both these papers, in the model of this 
chapter the projects which the manager is asked to investigate are technologi­
cally unrelated. The manager’s choices concerning one project do not constrain 
his choices on any other project. Also, I abstract from insurance issues and 
assume that both financial investors and manager are risk-neutral. As in Huang 
and Suarez (1996) the main impediment to first-best contracting here is the fact 
that the manager is protected by limited liability, so that one cannot impose 
arbitrarily large punishments to provide incentives.
4.2 The General Framework, N  projects
There is one manager who becomes associated with some number N  of indivisible 
projects, indexed by i =  1, ..,1V. Each project requires a financial outlay of I.
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There is one financial investor who is endowed with funds sufficient to finance 
the projects, whereas both the manager’s initial wealth and his reservation wage 
are normalised to zero. Both the financial investor and the manager are assumed 
to be risk-neutral. The manager is, however, protected by limited liability, so 
that his wage can never be negative.
The information structure is as follows. The ex ante distribution of the 
project returns is known to all parties. I assume that returns are distributed 
independently and identically across projects. For each project the manager can 
privately choose to expend some nonpecuniary effort to investigate the project. 
If he spends effort on a project he becomes privately informed whether the 
project investigated is good or bad. Since this information remains private, 
the manager will at an interim stage have more information than the financial 
investor, if he chooses to investigate the project. Thus there will be interim 
adverse selection or ’’hidden information”. There is moral hazard as well, in 
that the manager’s effort choice is assumed to be unobservable to investors. It 
turns out to be immaterial, whether the subsequent investment decision itself is 
assumed to be observable to the financial investor, since for each project he can 
infer it perfectly from the realised project return, which is both observable and 
verifiable.
Let us come to the timing of the model. When time starts, the financial 
investor offers at take-it-or-leave-it contract to the manager, which the manager 
can accept or reject. If he accepts, the financial investor hands over sums of N I  
to the manager.
Then the manager privately chooses a vector of effort levels e =  (e1..., ,
where it is assumed that for each project the effort level can only take two values, 
e* 6 {0,1}; either the manager investigates a given project, el =  1 , or he does 
not, el =  0. The effort cost associated with e is given by C (e) and it is assumed 
that costs rise linearly with effort, C (e) =  ce*> where c 6 R + is the cost of 
investigating one project.
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Next, a random vector of the projects’ prospects n = (n1, 7r^) realises. I
assume that 7f* is independently and identically distributed across projects and 
can take two realisations, 7r* E  {7T, 7t}, where 7f > 7r. I also define Pr (n1 = W) = p 
and Pr (7Tl =  7r) =  (1 — p). The reahsed 7r% has the interpretation of a success 
probability for project i. With probability p the project is good and has a high 
probability of success, t t 1 = 7r, with probability 1 — p the project the project is 
bad and has a low probability of success, 7T* =  7r .
The manager then privately receives a signal s (e) =  (s1, of the success
probabilities realised. Its precision depends on the effort expended. In partic­
ular, it is assumed that sz =  7rl if el =  1 and sl =  0 if ez =  0, that is, the 
manager receives a perfect signal on project i if he has expended effort on it, 
whereas he receives no information pertaining to z, if he did not spend effort on 
investigating it.
Having observed the signal, the manager makes an investment decision on 
each project, which is summarised by d = (d1, ...jd^). I want to restrict atten­
tion to dl E  {0,1} , the manager either invests, d% = 1, or he does not invest, 
d1 = 0 into a given project. Note that investment involves spending a financial 
outlay of / ,  but does not cause further nonpecuniary costs to the manager. Also, 
it is assumed that the effort choice does not constrain the investment decision, 
so that ’’blind” investment is possible3.
Finally, and observable to both the financial investor and the manager, the 
vector of project (gross) returns x  =  (a?1, ...,xN} realizes. I assume x % E  {0, R} 
if dz = 1 and xz =  I  if dz = 0. In accordance with the earlier interpretation for 
7r, let Pr [xz =  R  | dz = 1] =  7Tl and Pr [xl = 0 | d% =  1] =  (1 — 7T*), where, recall, 
i x l  E { t t , 7f}. Realised project returns x  are handed over from the manager to the 
investor, who in turn pays the manager a wage w , the size of which can depend 
on the observed vector x  of project returns. Note that if the manager did not
3 Under the alternative assumption that effort spent is necessary for investment the qual­
itative results remain the same. The main difference is that some (ICd)  constraints become 
binding.
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invest in a project, he will just return I  to the investor, so that the investment 
decision on any project can be perfectly inferred from its observed return.
As for the profitability of the projects, I assume that 1fR > I  , but 7rR  < / , 
so that it is efficient to invest at the interim stage, if and only if the project is 
good. It is also assumed that pifR + (1 — p) I  — c > max {I,p7rR +  (1 — p) IlR}
, so that, given the interim investment decision is made efficiently, it is also 
efficient to investigate each project. One can then distinguish two cases. If 
pWR 4- (1 — p) nR  > /, the project could profitably be undertaken without the 
manager re-evaluating the project at the interim stage. On the other hand, 
if pifR 4- (1 — p) nR  < / ,  the manager’s job of re-evaluating the project and 
aborting it, if it turns out to be bad, is necessary for the project to be profitable 
ex ante.
Resulting from this set-up, given any contract between the financial investor 
and the manager, the manager has a number of strategies available to him. 
Let us denote these by (e,d(-)). He can choose which, if any, projects to look 
at, e 6 {0,1}N, and choose any function mapping the set of possible signals 
received into the set of investment decisions, d (•) : {0,7T,7f}^ —> {0,1}^. Since 
the financial investor is assumed to have all the bargaining power, he will be 
interested in implementing the efficient strategy (e*,d* (•)). This is defined by 
ez = 1 Vz and dl* = 1 if sl = 7f and dl* = 0 if s% = 7r Vi , i.e. investigate all 
projects and invest only if the signal is favourable. Let us assume for now that 
the investor wants to give the manager incentives to choose this strategy and 
that he wants to do this as cheaply as possible. The investor’s problem is then to 
choose a wage schedule w (•) to maximise return net of wages, making sure that 
the manager’s expected wage compensates for the effort costs incurred, that the 
wage schedule induces the manager to voluntarily choose the efficient strategy, 
and finally, that the manager never receives a negative wage.
One can write down the investor’s problem as follows:
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s.t.
(ICd) :
E [w (x) | S =  7T, d = d* (7r)] >
E[w(x)  | S =  7T, d = d (7r)] V7T, Vd (•)
(K7.) :
E  [w (x) \ s  = 7r,d = d* (7r)] — iVc >
E  [w (x) | s' =  s (e), d =  d (5)] — 1ce* ^ e> ^  (*)
(.IK) :
E [w (x) | 5 =  7r,d =  d* (yf)] — iVc > 0
( NNW)  :
w (rc) > 0 Vx
If the manager chooses the efficient strategy, so that s" =  tt and d =  d* ( t t )  , 
this will induce a certain ex ante distribution over returns and thus over wages. 
Taking this distribution as given, the financial investor maximises his payoff by 
minimising the expected wage to be paid to the manager. This distribution will, 
however, only obtain, if the manager voluntarily chooses the efficient strategy. 
This is what is ensured by the (ICd) and (ICe) constraints. The (ICd) constraint 
ensures that, given the manager has investigated all projects, he makes efficient 
interim investment decisions, whereas the (ICe) constraint ensures that, ex ante, 
investigating all projects and then choosing d* (•) is superior to any other strategy 
in terms of expected wage net of effort costs. (IR)  then makes sure that, again ex 
ante, the manager gets compensated for his effort cost if he chooses the efficient 
strategy. Lastly, the non-negative wage (NNW)constraint is a limited liability 
constraint that forces all wages to be non-negative.
Rather than proceeding directly to a derivation of the general solution to this 
problem, it seems interesting to see what can be learned from the basic case, 
where the manager is given a single project.
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4.3 One Project per Manager, N = 1
In this case there is a single indivisible project which requires a financial invest­
ment I  and yields a gross return x  £ {0,-ft}. With probability p the project is 
good, i.e. Pr [a; =  R] =  7f and Pr [x =  0] =  (1 — 7f), and with probability (1 — p) 
the project is bad , i.e. Pr [x =  i? ]  =  7r and Pr [x =  0] =  1 — 7r, where If >  tv . The 
project is profitable, if it is good, WR > / ,  but unprofitable, if it is bad, 7vR < I. 
It is worthwhile ex ante to investigate the project, given that investment effi­
ciently conditions on the signal, pWR+(l —  p) I —c >  max {I,pWR +  (1 — p) tv_.R}.
The financial investor is interested in implementing the efficient strategy. 
That is, he would like the manager to first investigate the project, e* = 1, and 
that, if he sees the favourable signal, to go ahead with the investment, d* (if) = 1, 
whereas if sees a bad signal, to abort the project, d* (7r) =  0, and to return the 
outlay I  back to the financial investor. To implement this behaviour the investor 
solves the following problem:
P (R ~ w + (1 ~ ^ )  (~W (°))1 + (1 -  p) [J -  W (I)] -  Iw(0i),w(I),w(R)
S.t.
(ICd) (d (if) =  1) 7fw (R ) +  (1 — 7f) W  (0) > W  (I)
(ICd) (d (7r) =  0) W  (I) > 7TW (R) +  (1 — 7l )w  (0)
(ICe)
(1) p \ffw (R) +  (1 — 7f )w (0)] +  (1 —p)w( I )  — c > w  (I)
(2) p \Ww (R) +  (1 — 7f)w (0)] +  (1 — p) w (I) — c >
p [7fu; (R) +  (1 —lf)w (0)] +  (1 — p) [mv (R) +  (1 — 7r) w (0)]
(IR) p \Ww (R) +  (1 — 7f) w (0)] +  (1 — p) w (I) — c > 0
( NNW )  w (0) > 0, w (I) > 0,w (R) > 0
In this basic problem, the manager has two possible investment decisions 
available to him. The (ICd) constraints ensure that, given that the manager has 
spent effort and thus received a signal s e {7f, 7r} , he makes the right investment 
decision in response to the signal. Next, if the manager does not spend effort,
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and accordingly receives s = 0, he again has two possible options. He can either 
abstain from investing and return I  to the investor, or invest blindly. (ICe) (1)
and (2) ensure that both these options axe less worthwhile to the manager than
following the efficient strategy. Next, (IR) makes sure that the expected wage 
induced by the efficient strategy is larger than the effort cost c. Finally, all wages 
have to be non-negative (NNW).
The optimal contract is
w (R) =  — — . ° . . jpn +  (1 — p) A — A
tr\ AcW  [1  ) =  ---- ;---------— -------- --------
P'K +  (1 — p) A — A  
w (0) — 0
where A — pW -f (1 — p) 7r is the expected success probability.
The proof of this is straightforward and outlined here. Since there are three 
variables, three constraints will be binding First of all, note that w (0) =  0 will 
be one of the binding constraints. To see why, assume w (0) > 0. Then one can 
decrease w (0) by some e < w (0) and increase w (R) by ^Z ^g. This will leave 
all constraints satisfied, can be done costlessly and relaxes (ICd) (d (lL) =  0), as 
well as (ICe) (2) since
£ -  (1 _  7f) g <  0
7T
which is true, since 7f > 7r . Also, one sees that (IR)  will not be binding, 
since it is implied by (ICe) (1) and w (I) > 0 . In fact w (I) > 0  necessarily, 
because otherwise w (R) =  w (0) =  0 from (ICd) (d (tt) =  0) and ( N N W ) . One 
also sees that (ICd) (d (tt) =  1) must be slack, since if it were binding (ICe) (1) 
would be violated. Likewise (ICd) (d (k) = 0) will not be binding, since if it 
were, (ICe) (2) would be violated. Next, w(R)  > 0, since otherwise one would 
have (1 — 7f) u; (0) > w (I) > (1 —7[)u;(0), combining(ICd) (d(W) — l) and 
(ICd) (d (tt) =  0). This could be true only if w (I) =  w (0) =  0, contradicting 
w (I) > 0. This leaves (ICe) (1) and (2) as the only possible further binding 
constraints. Substituting w (0) =  0 into these two constraints one finds
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pnw (R ) +  (1 — p) w (I) — c 
=  w ( I )
=  \pW +  (1 — p )'e \ w { R )
which is easily solved for the remaining two wages.
As a first observation, notice that the optimal wage schedule is monotone in 
return,
0 =  w (0) < w (/) < w (R) .
Observe also that, under the optimal contract, the manager’s expected wage 
payment exceeds his effort cost c. This excess payment can be interpreted as his 
informational rent and it can be read off from the RHS of the binding (ICe) (1) 
constraint as being equal to w (I) . Thus,
/ tn Acr e n t  =  w  ( I )  =  — — 7-------— --------
w  p 7 f+ (l - p ) A - A
The rent arises because of the interplay between the moral hazard and the 
hidden information components of the agency problem. Notice in particular, 
that the financial investor has to reward a gross return of I  with a positive 
wage. Otherwise the manager would always invest, and never spend any effort.
The informational rent would not arise in the benchmark case, where s is 
publicly observable. One could then pay the manager a wage w (x, s) . Clearly 
then, w (/, 7r) =  w (R,T) =  u; (0, TT) =  c, w(1 ,7f) =  w (R, 7r) =  w (0,7r) =  0, 
and w (x, 0) =  0 Vrc would implement the efficient strategy and would involve a 
zero rent. One may ask, however, whether the wage contract derived above can 
be improved upon by letting the manager make explicit and verifiable claims 
about the signal he received. The contract could then condition both on the 
return x  and the announced signal s', resulting in a wage schedule w (x, s) . It 
is shown in the appendix (Appendix 4.1) that this is not the case. The wage 
contract derived above remains optimal, when one allows the manager to make
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those explicit claims to the financial investor and d is viewed as an observable 
and hence contractible variable. This result establishes that the wage contract 
derived above is equivalent to a direct revelation mechanism and hence is optimal 
in the class of all possible mechanisms implementing the efficient effort and 
investment choice.
Note that when the optimal contract is used to implement the efficient strat­
egy, the rent accruing to the manager may be so large that the financial investor 
will not want to implement the efficient strategy. This will be the case if and 
only if
A c
p i f R  +  (1 — p) I  — c ------------ 7--------— ------7 <  max { I . p W R  +  (1 — p)  7rR}v pW + (1 - p )  A -  A
where the LHS is the expected return net of wage costs from implementing the
efficient strategy. To understand the RHS, note first that since n R  < I  implies
pnR + (1 — p) I  < / ,  it does not make sense to implement inefficient investment,
d (7r) =  1 and d (Tf) =  0, even if this could be implemented at zero wage costs.
One is therefore left with implementing either no investment, d(s)  =  0 Vs, or
blind investment, d (s) = 1 Vs. Observe that none of d (s) =  0 Vs and d (s) =  1
Vs can be implemented in conjunction with e =  1, since there is no way of
telling whether the manager has chosen e =  1 or e =  0. Since neither d =  1
nor d =  0 involves any cost to the manager, both of these two possibilities are
optimally implemented by offering the manager a flat wage of zero. Therefore, if
pWR 4- (1 — p) nR > I  and implementing the efficient strategy is not viable, the
financial investor will implement blind investment, e =  0 and d =  1, whereas if
pWR +  (1 — p) 7rR < I  the financial investor will implement no investment e =  0
and d =  0. Therefore, when the above inequality holds, the financial investor will
not implement the efficient strategy, since he is better off implementing either
no investment or blind investment. Conversely, if the inequality is reversed, the
financial investor will implement the efficient strategy, rather than no investment
or blind investment.
Note that the RHS can also be interpreted as what the financial investor
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can guarantee himself without employing a manager. Therefore, another way of 
viewing the result is that, if the financial investor does employ a manager, he 
will never implement anything other than the efficient strategy.
Before going on to the case of more than one project, let us briefly analyse the 
possibility of approximating the efficient contract with some of the incentive tools 
which are used in practice, such as bonus schemes, options and shares. It seems 
interesting, in particular, which of these mechanisms are incentive compatible 
and will therefore be able to implement the efficient strategy.
Consider first offering the manager a flat wage w and a bonus b for a return 
of R. Then the wage schedule will be w (0) = w , w  (I) = w , w  (R ) = w p b  . One 
sees immediately, that under such a contract 7xw (R) +  (1 — t t ) w  (0) > w ( I ) , 
so that both (ICd) (d(ir) = 0) and (ICe) (2) are violated. The manager will 
invest even after observing that the project is bad. What is more, the manager 
will always prefer to invest blindly, rather than spending effort on becoming 
informed. The bonus scheme is therefore not incentive compatible and can be 
seen to induce excessive risk-taking by the manager. The reason is that it does 
not adequately reward no investment for a return of I.
Next, consider an option contract. In practice, managers are often awarded 
options with a strike equal to the expected return of the firm. If the option is 
made exercisable when x  has realised, one would have w (x) =  6 (x — E* [x])+, 
where E* [x] = pWR +  (1 — p) I. Since E* [x] > I  > 0, the manager will only 
exercise his option when x  =  R, so that the wage is again flat for realisations 
other than R. Since w (I) = w ( 0) =  0, but w (R ) > 0 one again finds both 
ICd d (7r) =  0 and ICe (2) violated. Again, under such a contract, one would 
expect to see excessive risk-taking by the manager. Note that both the option 
contract and the bonus scheme would be incentive compatible in a model where 
there is a simple increasing relationship between the manager’s effort choice 
and the expected project return, as would be the case in a pure moral hazard 
model. One should note, therefore, that such a model might be misleading if
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the manager’s task is to make an informed investment decision in the interest 
of the financial investor, as it is assumed here.
Finally, consider the possibility to promise the manager a certain fraction 
a of the ex post return, that is, to award the manager shares in the company. 
Then the return contingent payment to the manager is just w (x) =  ax  . Given 
that 7fR > I  and that 7iR  < / ,  one sees immediately that both {ICd) constraints 
are satisfied for any a € [0,1] . The (ICe) constraints reduce to
(1) a \plfR +  (1 — p) 7] — c > a l
(2) a \pWR +  (1 — p) I] — c > a [pWR +  (1 — p) 7tR]
implying a lower bounds on a , which is given by
c
a ~  min {p (7FR — I ) , (1 — p) {I — 7ri?)}
If a  is larger than this lower bound, the share contract will be incentive 
compatible, so that, in principle, it is possible to implement the efficient strat­
egy using a share contract. Observe, however, that under a share contract the 
financial investor can expect a net return of at most (1 — a) E* [x] — I. This 
expression may well be negative, in which case the efficient strategy cannot 
be profitably implemented using a share contract, whereas it could possibly be 
profitably implemented using the optimal contract.
4.4 Two Projects per Manager, N = 2
Let us now examine the case where the manager is assigned two identical 
projects. The contract can then condition on the vector of observable returns, 
so that the following matrix of wages needs to be determined:
tu(0,0) w(Q,I) w(Q,R) 
w(1 ,0) w{I , I )  w ( I ,R )  
w (R , 0) w (R , I) w (R , R)
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However, since the projects axe iid, it is clear that the optimal wage schedule
will exhibit symmetry, in that w (x,y) =  w(y,x)  = w(x  -\-y) so that only the
following six wages need to be found4:
w (0), w ( I ) , w (R ) , w (27), w (I -f R ) , w (2R)
.If the manager chooses the efficient strategy, this will induce a probability dis­
tribution over returns and thus over wages. The financial investor will receive 
an expected return and will have to pay an expected wage which is given by
E * [w] =
p2 [(1 — 7f)2 w  (0) -I- 2W (1 — 7f) w (R) +  7f2w (272)]
+2p (1 -  p) [(1 - 7 f ) w  (I) +  Ww (7 4- 72)]
+  (1 - p ) 2 w (21)
The financial investor’s problem is to minimise this expression by choice of 
{w (0) , w (272)} . This minimisation is subject to a number of constraints, 
which will be introduced as we go along.
A first subset of constraints is given by the (ICd) constraints. Given that 
the manager has spent effort on both projects, these constraints make sure that 
the manager makes the right investment decision for each possible vector of 
signals received, (tt, 7f) (7F, 7r) (7r, 7f) (7T, 7r ) . Given any of these vectors of signals, 
exactly one of the possible four strategies (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1) is efficient. 
To ensure efficient investment, one must have that, for each signal, the expected 
wage under the efficient investment strategy is weakly larger than under any 
other strategy 5:
4This notation can be used for the two-project case, as long as R  ^  21. An alternative is
to count the number of I's  and the number of R's,  which is the convention used for general
case. Then w  (0), w  ( I ) , w  (R ) ,  w  ( 2 1 ) , w  (I  4- R ) , w  (2R) translates into w  (0,0) , w  (0,1),
w  (1,0),  w  (0,2),  w  (1,1) ,  w  (2,0), where the first argument gives the number of R's  and the
second argument gives the number of I 's  in the return vector.
5It is easily checked that the constraint for (7r,7f) is exactly the same as for (7f, 7r) and it
is therefore omitted. As for the notation, inequality signs are understood to  relate to the top
line.
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(ICd)
( d ( W , W )  =  (1, 1)) :
( 1  — 7r)2 w ( 0 , 0 )  4 -  2 f f  ( 1  — 7f)  w ( 0 ,  R )  +  W2w  ( R ,  R )
(1) > w (21)
(2) > (1 — 7f) W  (0, 7) +  TTW (7, R)
{d (tt, 7r) =  (1,0)) :
(1 — 7f) w (0,7) +  7fw (/, R)
(1) > u, (27)
( 2 )  > ( 1  — 7r) w (I) + 7rw (I 4 -  R)
( 3 )  >  ( 1  — 7r) ( 1  — 7f) W  ( 0 )  +  [ ( 1  — 7r) 7f +  ( 1  — 7f) 7f] W (R )  +  7Y7TW (2R)
(d(7T,7r) =  ( 0 , 0 ) )  : 
w (27)
(1) (I — 7T_)w (7) +  TTW (7 +  i?)
(2) > (1 — 7r)2 w (0) +  2 (1 — 7r) 7tk; (i?) +  7r2^  (2i?)
Let us now come to the set of (ICe) constraints. These ensure that the 
wage net of effort costs the manager can expect when he chooses to spend effort 
on both projects, e =  (1,1), and then invests efficiently, is larger than the 
wage net of effort costs the manager can expect under any other effort choice 
( 0 , 0 ) ,  ( 0 , 1 ) ,  ( 1 , 0 )  and all possible subsequent investment strategies. Let us start 
with the set of constraints that discourage e =  ( 0 , 0 ) .  Given this effort choice, 
the manager does not receive any information on the projects, s = (0,0), and 
may choose among
(d(0,0)) e {(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)}
Since the wage contract is symmetric d ( 0 , 0 )  =  ( 0 , 1 )  and d( 0 , 0 )  =  ( 1 , 0 )  will 
result in the same expected payoff, so that one can write down the following 
three constraints:
(IC.) ( e ^ (0 ,0 ) ) :
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E* [w] — 2c
(1) >  w  {21)
(2) > p  [(1 — 7f) w (I) +  7fW (I 4- R)] 4- (1 — p) [(1 — Hi) W (I) + 7TW (I + #)]
(3) > p2 [(1 — 7f)2 W (0) +  27f (1 — 7f) w (R ) +  lf2w (2i?)]
+ 2 p  (1 — p)  [(1 — 7[) (1 — 7f) W (0) +  [(1 — 7[) 7f 4- (1 — 7r) 7[] It; (R)  +  7T7TW ( 2 R)]
4- (1 — p )2 [(1 — 7r)2 w  (0) +  2 (1 — 7r) 7rit; (i^) +  7r2it; (2i?)]
One will also have to discourage strategies that involve the manager becoming 
informed on one of the two projects only, that is, the manager being lazy on one 
project. By symmetry, the constraints discouraging e =  (0,1) and e =  (1,0) 
will be identical and one can focus on e =  (1,0). Given this effort choice, the 
manager will receive a signal s e {(7T, 0) (7f, 0)} and can therefore condition his 
investment decision on the signal received. Thus, if e =  ( 1 , 0 ) , say, the following 
strategies are possible : ( ^ o j ) e
/ 0 , 0 \  / 0 , 0 \  / 1 , 0 \  / 1 , 0 \
Vo,oy’ \ i , o ) ' \ Q , o j *  Vi,o;
© ' ( u M m M m )
This matrix of possible investment strategies which are associated with de­
viations to e =  (1,0) will result in sixteen constraints. To illustrate and for ease 
of reference, let us write out the constraints associated with these strategies 
explicitly.
The first row translates into the following four constraints.
( / c y  m  (i,o))
E* [in] — 2c
(1) >  w  (21)—c
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(2) > p2w (21)
+p(  1 - p ) w  (21)
4- (1 ~ p)p  [(1 — 7i )w (I) +7r_w(I + R)]
4- (1 — p)2 [(1 — 7r) w  (I) + 7Tw (I 4- R)] — c 
(3) > p2 [(1 — tt) w (I) 4- Ww (I 4- R)]
4-p (1 — p) [(1 — 7f)w (I) + nw ( I  + R)]
4- (1 — p)pw(2I)
4- (1 - p ) 2w (21) -  c
(4) > p2 [(1 — 7f )w (I) 4- 7fw (I 4- R)]
4-p (1 — p) [(1 — 7f)w (I) 4- Ifw (14- R)]
4- (1 -  p) p [(1 -  7r) w  (I) 4- 7riu (I  4- R)] 
4- (1 -  p)2 [(1 —7r)w (I) 4- ww (I 4- R)] — c
The constraints associated with the second row are
(JC.) ( e ^ ( l ,0 ) )
E* [w] — 2c
(5) > p2w (21)
4-p(l - p ) w ( 2 I )
4- (1 -  p) P [(1 - 7 f )w  (I) +Ww(I  + R)]
4- (1 — p)2 [(1 —7i )w (I) 4- 7vw (I  4- R)] — c
(6) > p2w (21)
+p(  1 - p ) w ( 2 I )
+  ( 1  -  p) p [ (1  -  7r) ( 1  -  7f) W  (0) 4- [ ( 1  -  7[) 7f 4 -  ( 1  -  7f)  7r] W (R )  4* 7T7TW (2R)]
4- ( 1  -  p)2 [ ( 1  — 7r)2 w (0) 4- 2 (1 — 7r) 7rw; (R) 4- 7r2it; (2R)] — c
(7) > p2 [(1 — n)w (I) 4- 7fw (I 4- R)] 
4-p (1 -  p) [(1 - W ) w  (I) 4- 7fw (14- R)] 
4- (1 — p)p  [(1 -  7f)w (I) 4- nw (I 4- R)] 
4- (1 -  p)2 [(1 - 7 r)w (I) 4- £w (I 4- R)] -  c
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(8) > p2 [(1 — 7f) W  (I) +  7Tw (I  +  R)]
+p (1 -  p) [(1 — W)w (I) 4- 7YW (I +  R)]
+ (1 — p)p  [(1 — 7[) (1 — W) w (0) +  [(1 — 7r) 7f 4- (1 — 7r) 7[] 1(7 (R) +  Wttw (2R)]
4- (1 — p)2 [(1 — 7r)2 w  (0) 4- 2 (1 — 7r) 7riy (R) +  7r2ic (2#)] — c
The constraints associated with the third row are 
{ICe) ( c ^  (1,0))
E* — 2c
(9) > p2 [(1 —lr)w (I) 4- 7fw (I +  R)]
4-p (1 -  p) [(1 -  7r) w  (I) 4-7r_w(I + R)]
+ ( l —p)pw (21)
4- (1 — p)2 w (21) — c
(10) > p2 [(1 — 7f )w (I) +  7fw (I 4- R)]
+p (1 -  p) [(1 -  7[) w  (I) 4 - ™  ( 1 4 -  R)}
4- (1 —p)p  [(1 — 7r) w (I) 4- 7tw (I 4- i2)]
4- (1 -  p)2 [(1 - 7 r)w (I) 4-7rw(I  + -R)] -  c
(11) > p2 [(1 — 7r)2 w  (0) +  2W (1 — 7f) w (R ) 4- 7f2w (2R)]
4-p (1 — p) [(1 — 7r) (1 — 7f) W  (0) 4- [(1 — 7[) 7f +  (1 — 7f) 7[] 1C (R) 4- W7TU] (2R)] 
4- (1 - p ) p w ( 2 I )
4- (1 - p ) 2w(2I) -  c
(12) > p2 [(1 — 7f)2 w (0) +  2?f (1 — 7f) w (R) +  t t 2w  (2R)]
4-p (1 — p) [(1 — 7r) (1 — 7f) w (0) 4- [(1 — 7r) 7f +  (1 — 7f) 7[] w (R) 4- Wttw (2R)] 
4- (1 — p) P [(1 -  7[) W  (I) +7[w(I + R)]
4- (1 -  p)2 [(1 - 7 r)w (I) 4-7rw(I + R)] -  c
Finally, there are four constraints associated with deviations to strategies 
given by the last row.
{ICe) (e ^  (1,0))
E* [w] — 2c
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(13) > p2 [(1 — W)w (I) 4- Ww (I +  R)]
+p (1 -  p) [(1 — 7t _)w (I) +7rw(I + R)]
4- (1 - p ) p  [(1 — 7f)w (I) 4- Ww (I 4- R)]
+ (1 — p)2 [(1 —n)w (I) + ttw (I +  R)] — c
(14) > p2 [(1 —Jf)w (I) +  7fw (I +  R)]
+P (1 -  p) [(1 -  7r) W (I) +  7T_w(I + R)]
+  (l —p)p  [(1 — 7r) (1 — 7f) W (0) +  [(1 — 7[) 7f +  (1 — 7f) 7r] W (R) +  7T7TW (2H)]
+  (1 — p)2 [(1 — 7r)2 w (0) +  2 (1 — 7r) 7ritf (i?) +  7t2k; (2i?)] — c
(15) > p2 [(1 — 7f)2 w (0) +  2?f (1 — 7f) w (R) +  7f2w (2R)]
4-p (1 — p) [(1 — 7r) (1 — 7f) w (0) +  [(1 — 7r) 7f +  (1 — 7f) 7r] 16? (i?) 4- Wnw (2R)]
+ (1 -  p) p [(1 -  7f) W (I) 4- 7TW ( / 4- -R)]
+ (1 — p)2 [(1 — 7r) W (I) + 7TIU (J 4- R)] — c
(16) > p2 [(1 — 7f)2 it; (0) 4- 27f (1 — W) w (R) 4- n2w (2R)]
4-p (1 — p) [(1 — 7r) (1 — 7f) w (0) 4- [(1 — 7r) 7T 4- (1 — 7f) 7r] w (R) 4~ 7T7rw; (2R)]
+  (1 — p)p  [(1 — 7r) (1 — W) W (0) +  [(1 — 7r) 7f +  (1 — 7f) 7r] W (R) +  7T7Tlt; (2R)]
4- (1 — p)2 [(1 — 7r)2 w (0) 4- 2 (1 — 7r) 7tk; (R) 4- 7r2u> (2R)] — c
To ensure that the manager accepts the contract, there will again be an (/R) 
constraint.
(.IR) :
E* [w] — 2c > 0
It remains to state the limited liability constraints 
( NNW)  :
w (0) > 0, w (I) > 0,w (R) > 0, w (21) > 0, w (I 4- R) > 0, w (2R) > 0
The optimal contract implementing the efficient strategy has six constraints 
binding. These are w (0) =  0, w (I) = 0, w (R) =  0 and (ICe) (e ^  (0,0)) (1), (2), 
and (3). Substituting the binding N N W —constraints into (ICe) (e ^  (0,0)) (1), (2), 
and (3) one has:
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p2n2w (2R) +  2p (1 — p) 7vw (I  4- R) +  (1 — p)2 w (21) — 2c 
= w (21)
= \pw +  (1 -  p) 7[] w  (I +  R)
=  [p27f2 +  2p (1 — p) 7f7T +  (1 — p)2 7T2] W  (2R)
which one can solve for the closed form solution of the remaining wages as
. . 2c
w(2R) = i— — ----- ; . l2\pn +  (1 — p) A] — A 2 
A2c
W{I + R) = [p7r +  (1 — p) A]2 — A2
w (21) = T—  A22° 12-------[p7T +  (1 — p) A] — A 2
where again, A = pit +  (1 — p) 7r.
For a formal proof of the optimality of this contract, the reader is referred to 
the proof of the general case, which is given in the appendix. Let us here give 
some intuition on how this contract works.
First, turning to the N N W —constraints, one can see why w (0) =  0, w (I) = 
0, w (R) =  0 at the optimum by noting that, whenever these wages are paid, 
the manager has returned a zero return on one of the projects. A return of 
zero is more likely to occur when the manager has deviated from the efficient 
strategy than under the efficient strategy. Therefore, if, say, w (0) > 0 one can 
decrease w (0) and at the same time increase w (2R) in such a way as to leave 
the manager’s equilibrium payoff unchanged, but making deviations from the 
efficient strategy less attractive. This can be achieved by reducing w (0) by some 
e < w (0) and increasing w (2R) by The reader can easily check that this
will leave all constraints satisfied, but will relax all those constraints, in which 
w (0) enters as multiplied by off-equilibrium conditional probabilities (1 — 7r)2or 
(1 — 7r) (1 — 7f). Likewise, if w (R) > 0 one can reduce w (R) by some e < w (R)
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and increase w (2R) by to leave all constraints satisfied, but relaxing
all constraints that contain w (R) premultiplied by off-equilibrium conditional 
probabilities of 2 (1 — 7r) 7r or [(1 — 7r) 7r + (1 — 7f) 7r]. Finally, if w (I) > 0  one 
can reduce w (I) by some e < w  (I) and at the same time increase w (I +  R) by 
Again, this operation will leave expected wages unchanged if the manager 
chooses the efficient strategy, but will make deviations less worthwhile, relaxing 
all constraints which contain w (I) as premultiplied by the off-equilibrium path 
probability (1 — 7r) on their RHS. Therefore w (0) =  0, w (I) =  0, w (R) =  0.
Turning to the remaining three binding constraints, note that since (ICe) 
(e 7^  (0,0)) (1), (2), and (3) all hold with equality, the manager is made indif­
ferent between not investing at all, blindly investing in one project, and blindly 
investing in both projects, when he did not investigate either of the two projects. 
Also, when w (0) =  0, w (I) =  0, w (R) =  0, and w (21) =  Aw (I +  R) = A 2 
w(2R),  as implied by the binding constraints, the manager is made indiffer­
ent as to whether to blindly invest or not, given that he investigated one of 
the two projects, but did not investigate the other, for any strategy he chooses 
to pursue on the project he did investigate; in terms of the matrix of possi­
ble investment strategies for e = (1,0), one can show that each investment 
strategy in the same column of that matrix; will give the manager the same 
expected wage. Thus, looking at the constraints associated with the first col­
umn, the RHSs of (ICe) (e ^  (1,0)) (1), (5), (9), and (13) all reduce to the 
same expected utility. Likewise the RHSs of (ICe) (e ^  (1,0)) (2), (6), (10), 
and (14) are the same, and the same is true for the third column and its as­
sociated constraints (ICe) (e ^  (1,0)) (3), (7), (11), and (15). Finally, all of 
(ICe) (e 7^  (1,0)) (4), (8), (12), and (16) share the same value on the RHS. 
Thus, whatever strategy the manager is planning to follow for the project he 
will become informed on, he is indifferent as to investing, or not investing, in 
the project he did not look at. Going on from there, one can see that in terms 
of the matrix of investment strategies, the strategies in the third column yield
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the highest payoff, which is intuitive, since those are the ones that specify ef­
ficient investment on the project the manager did investigate. By substituting 
the expressions for the positive wages, one can finally show that these strate­
gies, which have the manager investigate only one project, and subsequently 
invest efficiently on the one project he did investigate, leave the manager with a 
lower expected utility than if he does not investigate either of the two projects, 
e =  (0,0), and hence also with a lower ex ante expected utility than the manager 
could obtain if he followed the efficient strategy.
Lastly, one can check that the (ICd) constraints are satisfied when w (0) =  0, 
w (I) = 0 ,w (R) =  0, and w (21) =  Aw (I +  R) = A2 w (2R) as implied by the 
optimal contract.
Since (ICe) (e ^  (0,0)) (1) is binding, one can read off the rent accruing to 
the manager from its RHS. It is given by
A2 2crent  =  w (21) =  ——
\pW +  (1 — p) A]2 — A 2
One can show that
Ac Ac A 2 2c
+  n ---- r >pir+ (1 - p )  A -  A  p7T + ( l - p ) A - A  \pw +  (1 - p ) A ] 2 -  A2'
This means that the rent arising from employing two managers, one for each 
project, is higher than the rent arising from employing one manager for both 
projects. In fact, one can also show that6
Ac A22c
>
pir +  (1 -  p) A -  A  [p7f +  (1 -  p) A]2 -  A2 
which says that if one gives an additional project to the manager, his infor­
mational rent will decrease. Thus the financial investor can implement project 
investigation and efficient re-evaluation more cheaply by allocating two projects 
to one manager.
The intuition behind this result is that, given any wage contract, the manager 
faces a joint problem when he is given two projects. As is apparent from the
6 For a proof the reader is referred to the general case, which is discussed in the next section.
CHAPTER 4. FIRM-LEVEL DIVERSIFICATION 135
strategies available to the manager, the manager will not decide what to do 
on one project independently of what he does on the second project. Rather, 
these decisions are linked. Since the manager will make a joint decision on both 
projects, the wage contract should take account of this fact and condition not on 
each of the project returns separately, but on the whole vector of returns. The 
optimal contract does just that. Notice in particular, that under the optimal 
contract the manager receives a zero wage whenever the return on any one of 
the two projects is zero, that is whenever the vector ot returns contains a UT On 
the other hand, when the vector of returns does not contain a zero, wages are 
positive and increasing in the number of times the vector contains an R.
Thus the manager is punished and rewarded, not on the basis of his average 
performance, but using both return observations in a particular way. To see why 
this helps reducing the rent, recall that in the one-project case the manager was 
punished and received a wage of zero only if he returned a zero gross return on 
the project, but was paid positive wages for returns of I  or R. If the manager 
has two projects, he is rewarded more highly when the return vector does not 
contain a zero, but punished with a zero wage whenever he returns zero on 
any one of the two projects, even if on the other project he returns I  or R. 
Thus, with two projects one can push the manager’s wage down to the limited 
liability constraint more often. Another way of seeing this is to say that with two 
projects, since wages for a return vector containing a 0 are zero and wages for 
a vector containing I's and R's are pushed up to compensate, there is a greater 
spread between the positive wages and zero. Intuitively, since the manager has 
more to lose when he deviates, it becomes easier to provide incentives for the 
manager to choose the efficient strategy.
Even when the optimal contract is used to implement the efficient strategy, 
the manager still receives a positive rent, so that the financial investor may not 
find it in his interest to implement the efficient strategy on the two projects.
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This will be the case, if and only if
A2c
p W R + { l - p ) I - c -  < +  - p ) z . R }
To see this, notice that the financial investor will never implement the effi­
cient strategy on one project only and either blind investment or no investment 
on the other project. While both blind investment and no investment can be im­
plemented at a zero wage, if efficient investment is implemented on one project 
only, this is optimally done by using the contract for the one-project case. This 
will, however, involve an even larger rent than implementing efficient investment 
on both projects, since
Ac _______ 2A*c_______
pW +  (1 -  p) A -  A  > [p7f +  (1 -  p) A]2 -  A2
Thus efficient investment is implemented, either on both projects, or on 
none of them. In the latter case, either blind investment, or no investment, is 
implemented on both projects, depending on which is more profitable.
4.5 General Case, N  Projects per M anager
Let us now proceed to analyse the general problem of implementing the effi­
cient strategy when the manager is given N  projects. Recall that the financial 
investor’s problem can be written down as
max E [x — w (x) | s' =  7r, d =  d* (7r)]w()
s.t.
(ICd)
E[w(x)  | 5 =  7T, d = d* (7r)] >
E  [w (x) I S  =  7T, d = d (7r)] V7T, Vd (•)
(K7.)
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E[w(x)  | s = 7r, d = d* (7?)] — Nc >
E[w(x)  | s = s(e) ,d = d (s)] — ce% (*)
(IR):
E  [w (x) | 5 =  7r,d = d* (??)] — Nc > 0
( N N W )  :
w (x) > 0 Vx
Note first that since all projects are identical, the optimal contract will ex­
hibit symmetry in the following sense. For two return vectors x  and od, such 
that x  contains k times R, N  — k — J  times 0, and J  times I,  and x! also 
contains k times R, N  — k — J  times 0, and J  times / ,  wages will be equal, 
i.e. w (x) — w (x ' ) . For the general case it is useful to move to the notation 
w (x ) =  w (x') = w (k, J ) , where the first argument denotes the number of R's, 
the second argument the number of I's, and the number of 0's are being sup­
pressed. Given that the manager faces such a symmetric contract, the manager’s 
optimal strategy will also be symmetric, in the sense that, for any investment 
strategy d(-) and for any signal 5 (e) =  (s i,...s# ), any permutation of s will 
induce the same permutation on investment decisions d ( s ) . Using this, one can 
rewrite (ICd) and (ICe) in terms of the explicit distribution over wages induced 
by any strategy (these expressions are shown in Appendix 4.2 at the end of this 
chapter). Having spent effort on all projects and having received a signal s = 7r, 
the manager’s strategy decision can then be seen as equivalent to a sampling 
problem. He has to decide, in how many projects which he sees to have suc­
cess probability 7Tl =  7f to invest in, and in how many projects he sees to have 
success probability 7Tl = 7T he invests in. The financial investor wants the man­
ager to invest only in those projects, for which 7Tl =  7f, which gives rise to the 
set of (ICd) constraints. Also, the manager has to decide ex ante, how many 
projects he wants to become informed on. Denote the number of projects the
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manager does not investigate (is lazy on) by L. If the manager chooses not to 
become informed on some number of projects, he can still invest blindly into 
those projects, knowing only their expected success probability. The financial 
investor wants the manager to gain information on all projects, L =  0, and 
then to invest efficiently. The manager’s expected utility from this will there­
fore have to be greater than the utility from any other effort choice L = 1,.., N  
and any subsequent investment strategy, (ICe). Lastly, this expected utility 
must be greater than zero, ( IR) . and wages must never be negative, ( N N W ) . 
The wage contract that optimally implements the efficient strategy can then be 
characterised as follows.
Proposition 7 V7V, Vp, c, 7f, 7r, s.t. 7f > 7r, the following contract optimally im­
plements the efficient strategy:
a)
w ( k , N - K ) =  0 V/c < K, VA = 0,..,iV
b)
w (K, N  — K) = —  -  -  7- n? — V/f =  0
\p7T +  (1 — p) — AN 
where A = pW + (1 — p) 7r.
For a proof, see the appendix (Appendix 4.2).
Part a) of the proposition says that the manager optimally receives a zero 
wage whenever the return on any of the projects is zero. The intuition is 
that such an event is more likely to occur when the manager deviated, than 
when he invested efficiently. In particular, assume that the manager has de­
cided to invest on K  projects, but not to invest on N  — K  projects. On 
the equilibrium path, all of the K  projects will have had a conditional suc­
cess probability of 7f, that is the A —vector of success probabilities for those 
projects would have been n*K =  (W, ..., 7f). Off the equilibrium path, however, 
the manager may sometimes invest into K  projects, even though the vector
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of success probabilities for the K  projects is tt'k  ^  tt*k , that is when this vec­
tor contains one or more 7r's. This will occur when the manager invests into 
projects he knows to be bad, but also when the manager invests blindly into 
bad projects. Both on and off the equilibrium path the manager will receive 
a wage w e {w ( 0 ,  N  — K ) , w (1, N  — K) ...,w (K , N  — K )}  , depending on how 
many R's he returns. It is shown in the appendix, that
a* Pr [w = w (K , N  — K) \ 71^ ]  Pr [w =  w (K , N  — K) | tt'k ] a'
b* Pr [w = w (k, N  — K) \ 7r*K] > Pr [w = w (k, N  — K) \ 7ry V
for all k < K, for any such ir'K and for any fixed N  — K. Hence, one
can costlessly relax constraints by reducing w (k ,N  — K) by e and increasing 
w (K , N  — K) by £^7, since
b*
— b*£ -j--------CL*£ — 0 ,
a*
so that on-equilibrium path conditional expected wages are left unchanged, but
b* ,
—b£   a £  <  0 ,
a*
so that conditional expected wages from deviating from efficient investment 
are reduced.
Apart from the binding (N N W )  constraints given in part a), the solution 
has the set of constraints (IC e) (L =  N) binding. Incorporating the binding 
(N N W ) constraints, these constraints are given by
J 2  ( !  -  P)N ~K * K™ ( K ,  N  — K )  — N c
K= 0 '  '
> A bw (B ,N  — B)
V S  = 0 , 1 , . . , J V
For N  projects, this set comprises N  +  1 constraints: when the manager did 
not investigate any project, he still has the choice of investing blindly into any
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number B = 0,1, . . . ,  AT of projects. Under the optimal contract, all of these 
constraints hold with equality, so that, given that he did not investigate any 
project, the manager is made indifferent as to the number of projects he invests 
in blindly. That is, given L = N : for any B  the manager’s expected wage is the 
same. This expected wage from not investigating any project and then possibly 
investing blindly is equal to the wage, net of effort cost, from efficiently inves­
tigating all projects, L = 0 and then investing efficiently. Any other strategy, 
involving an interior number of projects being evaluated, L =  1 , N  — 1, and 
arbitrary subsequent investment strategies, can be shown to give the manager a 
lower expected utility.
Also, given part a) of the proposition, the (ICd) constraints reduce to
w (K, N  — K) > n w (K  + l , N - K - T )  VAT =  0 , .., iV -  1 
Ww(K:N - K )  > w ( K - l , N - K  + l) VAT =
where the first constraint discourages overinvestment, while the second forestalls 
underinvestment. Both are clearly met when
w (AT, N  -  K)  = Aw (K  + 1, N  -  K  -  1)
as under the schedule given in part b) of the proposition, so that the manager 
interim has an incentive to invest efficiently.
As a first observation on the optimal contract, let us make the following
R em ark  1 : For N  > 2, the optimal wage schedule will in general not be 
monotone and will thus be neither concave nor convex in aggregate (or average) 
returns.
Proof :w (N — 1,0) =  0 < w (0, N ) , but (N  — 1) R >  N I  for N large enough. 
Notice that this already pertains to the case of iV =  2, where we found 
w (R) =  0 and w (21) > 0, whereas it may well be that R  > 21. This is in contrast
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to the basic problem with N  =  1, where we found a monotone wage schedule, 
and is in contrast also to most results found in the literature (exceptions include 
Innes (1990)). Here, the non-monotonicity results from the interplay between 
parts a) and b) of the proposition. As long as the manager presents a vector that 
contains only I's  and R's, the wage is increasing more than proportionately in 
the number of R's. However, whenever the vector contains one or more 0's, the 
wage drops down to zero. While this scheme will provide the right incentives for 
any given number of projects, one can show that it works better as the number 
of projects rises.
Ftom the binding (ICe) constraints one can read off the size of the rent 
accruing to the manager. It is
ANNcrN =  w (0, N) = -------------------- 77--------
[p7r +  (1 — p) A] — AN
Let us define {Cn } ^ =1 to be the sequence of optimal contracts as specified 
in Proposition 1 and then define{rjv}^=1 as the sequence of associated rents. 
Analysing this sequence one arrives at the following
C orollary 2 : The sequence of rents {r^ } ^ =1 is
a) strictly decreasing, rN > r^+i and
b) converging to xero, lim rN = 0
N - *  00
Proof: To prove part a), one writes down the inequality in terms of its 
explicit expressions,
ANNc An+1(N  + 1) c
\pn +  (1 — p) A]n — AN \pn +  (1 — p) — A^ +1 ’
Letting D =  \pn +  (1 — p) A ], cancelling common terms and rearranging one 
gets
N  (Dn+1 -  AN+1) > (N  + l) (Dn  -  A N) A
or
K  (D) =  N  (DN+1 -  A^+1) - ( N  + l) (DN -  AN) A  > 0
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To see that this must hold, one needs to note only that K  (A) =  0 and that 
9Kq^  = ( N  + 1) N D N -  (N  + 1) N D N~ 'A  > 0
since D > A.
To prove part b) one proves lim — = oo, which is equivalent to lim =
N —>oo r N  N —yoo
0, since rN > 0 V./V. But since
1 D N - A N 1 / D \ n  1 / A \ "  
rN ~  ANN c  “  N c \ A J  N c VA,/
one immediately has lim — = oo +  0 =  oo, again using that D > A.
N —y oo r N
The result that the rent accruing to the manager is decreasing as he is as­
signed more and more projects and that it will vanish in the limit, can be taken 
to provide a rationale for firm-level diversification. Let us state one immediate 
implication of the fact that the rent is strictly decreasing with N  as the following
C orollary 3 There exists a smallest number of projects N_, such that for N  > 
N_, the financial investor will want to implement the efficient strategy on all 
projects. I f N_ > 1, then for all N  such that 0 < N  < N_ the financial investor 
either implements blind investment or no investment on all projects.
To see this, note that since
plfR  4- (1 — p) I  — c > max {/, pWR +  (1 — p) 7rR}
there exists a smallest number of projects N_, such that for all TV > N
ANc
pWR + (1 -  p) I  -  c -  DN _ AN > max {I,pWR +  (1 -  p) nR}
so that it will eventually become profitable to implement the efficient strategy, 
rather than no investment or blind investment on all projects. Notice that, 
for any N, either the efficient strategy, or no investment or blind investment 
is implemented on all projects. Given the manager has N  projects, the finan­
cial investor will never implement the efficient strategy on a subset of N ' < N
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projects and blind investment or no investment on the remaining projects, since 
this is optimally done by using the contract CN, for the projects on which the 
efficient strategy is to be implemented and by paying a zero wage on the re­
maining projects. This will involve a higher rent than implementing the efficient 
strategy on all projects using Cpj. Thus, for any AT,the efficient strategy will 
be implemented on all projects, or on none of them. For N  > N_ it will be 
implemented on all projects. If N_ > 1, then for N  < N_, either blind invest­
ment or no investment is implemented on all projects depending on which of 
pnR  +  (1 — p) 7TR  and I  is larger. Both can be implemented at a zero wage. Im­
plementing no investment is of course equivalent to not financing the projects. 
Notice, therefore, that it is possible in this model that small firms will not be 
financed, whereas large firms always will.
In fact, of course, since the rent from implementing the efficient strategy 
on all projects is decreasing and converging to zero, in this basic model the 
optimal firm size is infinite. This is due to the simplifying assumptions, that the 
manager’s effort endowment is unbounded and that effort costs increase linearly 
with the number of projects. These issues will be looked at more closely in the 
next section.
First, however, let us come back to the basic intuition for why firm-level 
diversification is beneficial in our set-up. It is not, as in Aron (1988) and Her- 
malin and Katz (1996), due to the fact that diversification provides additional 
independent signals of the manager’s single effort choice7. In our setup the 
projects are technologically unrelated. Unlike in Aron (1988) and Hermalin and
7Also, it should be noted that the intuition here is distinct from the rationale for diversi­
fication in the theory of banking, as in Diamond (1984) or Williamson (1986). In contrast to 
the analysis in this chapter, in these papers the contract between client and bank is a simple 
debt contract for any size of the bank. Expected bankruptcy costs decrease with the number 
of firms the bank takes on because of a diversification effect. The optimal size of the bank is 
infinite, since, if the bank exerts monitoring effort, the moneys received per firm cease to be 
stochastic as the bank takes on more and more firms.
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Katz (1996), decisions one project do not constrain the decisions on any other 
project. Projects become related only through the fact that, as is apparent from 
the description of the strategies available to the manager, the manager makes 
joint decisions on the full set of projects. The optimal contract takes this into 
account and conditions on the vector of project returns rather than on each re­
turn observation separately. In the model, it was assumed that limited liability 
is the source of the contracting problem, i.e. the fact that one cannot impose 
unbounded punishment on the manager to give him incentives. Thus, when the ^  
manager is given one project, he is punished with a zero wage only if he returns 
zero on the project and he is paid more than zero if he returns I  or R.. Looking 
back at this basic problem, one sees that the non-negative-wealth constraint is 
indeed responsible for the manager receiving a rent. Without it, one could find 
w (0) < 0, w (R ) > 0, and w (I) =  0 that satisfy all constraints and leave the 
manager with an expected wage equal to his effort cost. When the manager has 
more projects, he still is protected by the ( NNW)  constraint, so that a wage 
of zero is still the worst one can do to the manager. However, this punishment 
can now be used more and more often, as the manager gets zero whenever he 
returns zero on any one of the projects he supervises. This allows w (0, N)  to 
shrink down to zero as N  becomes large. Thus, one can think of the diversifica­
tion effect as coming about through ’’relaxing” the limited liability constraint. 
Another way of viewing it would be to say that diversification relaxes the as­
sumption that the manager is endowed with zero wealth. The incentive problem 
would not arise, if the manager could finance the project himself, and would be 
mitigated if he could put in at least some inside equity. When the manager has 
more projects, the manager’s expected compensation for his effort cost can act 
as a substitute for inside equity, since he stands to lose it if he deviates from 
efficient decisions..
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4.6 Extensions
4 .6 .1  B o u n d ed  effort en d ow m en t
The assumption made throughout in the analysis is that the manager has an 
unbounded effort endowment, so that one manager can handle any number of 
projects. This may be a rather bold assumption8. One might think that relaxing 
it will give us an upper bound on the firm size. Let any manager’s endowment 
be E.  Then, if one is constrained to employ one manager, the firm size will be 
bounded by N  < E.  However, one might also be able to offer a contract as 
specified above to a coalition of managers. Consider the extreme case where 
E = 1, so that one manager can at most handle one project. If one were 
to offer the wage contract for N  projects to a coalition of N  managers and 
the aggregate wage comes subsequently to be shared equally by all managers, 
then, if one assumes that each manager can costlessly monitor the effort choice, 
information and investment decision of one other manager, the coalition will 
accept the contract and enforce the efficient strategies on each of the N  projects. 
It is easy to see, then, that under this arrangement the optimal size of a firm 
is again infinite. Note, however, that while it was implicitly assumed that it is 
prohibitively costly for a financial investor to monitor a manager, the optimality 
of the arrangement described above relies on monitoring being costless inside 
the firm.
4 .6 .2  E ffort co st a  fu n ctio n  o f  N
A straightforward extension of the basic model is to make the effort cost per 
project a function of N.  Thus instead of a per project cost c, one now has c (TV). 
An assumption that c(N)  is increasing in N  may be justified by overheads 
increasing more than proportionately with N.  One may also think that, if there 
is a coalition of managers, as N  rises, it may become more and more costly to
8It has of course been made in the literature before, cf. e.g. Diamond (1984)
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enforce an internal monitoring scheme, as outlined in the previous subsection. 
For any of these reasons, let us assume that c (N ) is an increasing sequence 
which is unbounded above. Since the wage schedule offered in the main text 
is linear in c, for any N , the optimal wage schedule implementing e* =  1 and 
d1 (7r) =  0 and dl (7T) =  1 can be found by replacing c everywhere by c (N ). 
Assuming that the manager’s task of re-evaluating the project is necessary for 
the project to be profitable, the condition for it to be profitable to implement 
efficient investment is
ANr(N)
\PWR + ( 1 - p ) I ] - I - c ( N ) -  >0
Clearly then, under the assumptions made, the optimal firm size must be finite: 
even if ^ 5 ^ 1  were to converge to zero, the increasing costs ensure that the 
LHS will eventually become negative and stay negative for larger N.
4.7 Conclusion
In an environment which exhibits both moral hazard and adverse selection on 
the part of the manager, I have characterised the optimal contract implementing 
the efficient investment rule when the number of projects, with respect to which 
both information asymmetries pertain, is arbitrary.
The main result is that increasing the number of projects helps to allevi­
ate the incentive problem between financial investor and manager. With more 
projects, the financial investor is able to provide the right incentives more 
cheaply. The reason is that the optimal contract conditions on the vector of 
returns, rather than each return observation separately, exploiting the fact that 
the manager makes joint decisions on the full set of projects. Under the optimal 
remuneration scheme, when the manager is assigned more projects, he is more 
and more unlikely to receive larger and larger positive rewards and more and 
more likely to be punished with a zero wage. For any fixed N , the manager is 
rewarded highly when all projects turn out I  or R,  while he receives nothing
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when he returns a 0. The intuition is that assigning more projects relaxes the 
limited liability constraint, which limits the size of the punishment that can be 
imposed on the manager. With more projects the punishment of a zero wage 
can be applied more often. Alternatively, one can think of additional projects 
as acting as a substitute for inside equity. W ith more projects the manager has 
more to lose if one of the projects fails. This can be used to improve incen­
tives, so that the manager’s informational rent decreases as he supervises more 
projects.
The main other conclusion of this chapter is that the shape of the opti­
mal managerial remuneration scheme may look rather different depending on 
whether the manager is in charge of a single, or of more than one project.. I 
find that, in the case of a single project, the optimal remuneration scheme is 
monotone in observed return. This feature is not preserved, however, when one 
looks at the case of a manager supervising more than one project at the same 
time. Our results therefore suggests that, when managers are to provide effort 
as well as make investment decisions, optimal managerial wage contracts will 
in general not be monotone in aggregate returns. In general, the optimal con­
tract is such that the manager is rewarded highly when none of the projects 
he supervises fails. However, the manager has to take responsibility for project 
failure and optimally receives nothing when a single project in his portfolio fails 
to perform.
While this may seem a very stark prediction and may at first sight not seem 
to square with what one sees we in practice, one can argue that what the optimal 
contract is suggesting has some intuitive appeal. If a manager is in charge of 
project selection and his role is to spot bad projects, then one would expect the 
manager to receive relatively little when one project turns out badly, even though 
overall things are going fine. A similar idea can be found in the theory of teams, 
where team members are paid with reference to their relative performance, as
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compared with the average9. There, however, the result is predicated on the 
assumption that the noise is correlated across team members, whereas our result 
holds in a world of stochastically independent projects that become linked only 
because a decision is made on all of them jointly.
Our results also suggests that managers of large corporations ought to be 
rewarded more highly, not only because their job presumably takes more effort, 
but also because they bear more ’’responsibility” in choosing among a large 
number of potential projects. Then, however, if things go wrong with one of the 
selected projects, the manager ought also be forced to take that responsibility 
and be given little, if any, reward. Notice that shares and options may well 
come back into the picture when one tries to implement such a scheme. A 
package of shares and options can easily be used to generate a salary that is 
more than proportionately increasing in company returns. This package has, 
however, to be bundled with the threat of being sacked and losing all these 
benefits altogether when one of the manager’s projects goes wrong, to keep the 
manager from overinvesting into bad projects. One empirical implication of such 
a reinterpretation would be that one ought to observe large and diversified firms 
to have a higher turnover of chief executive officers than small and undiversified 
firms. This implication appears to be consistent with the available empirical 
evidence. Thus, in their study of determinants of board turnover, Pranks, Mayer 
and Renneboog (1997) find a positive relationship between size as measured by 
market capitalisation and board turnover rates for a sample of 250 publicly 
quoted UK companies. Another empirical implication would be that inside 
a hierarchical organisation, one should observe higher turnover rates at higher 
echelons of the organisation, since staff in the higher echelons typically supervise 
more projects than those at the bottom of the hierarchy.
9cf. Holmstrom (1982)
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Appendix 4.1
A  D irect R ev ela tio n  M echan ism
This part of the appendix will analyse a direct revelation mechanism imple­
menting efficient investment for N  = 1.
Let us assume that the manager can make an announcement about the signal 
he received, 7re {7T, 7r, 0} . Let us also view the investment decision as contractible, 
so that the contract can specify the investment decision to be made, given the 
announced signal. d(7r) : {W,7r, 0} —> {0,1}. Wages can then condition both 
on the realised return and on the announced signal, so that one needs to find 
w(x,  7r). It is clear that w (x, 0) =  0 for any function d (n) to be implemented, 
since if the manager claims not to have spent any effort, one will not reward
him. Since w (x, n) > 0, if one wants to implement e =  1 and some d (7?,) one
can therefore restrict attention to 7re {7T, 7r} ; the manager is never going to admit 
that he did not spend effort. Defining
W  (7r, 7T) — (l — d (n)) w (1,7?) -j- d (7f) (7rw (R , 7f) +  (1 — 7t) w  (0,7f))
the following constraints will have to be satisfied:
W  (W, W) > W  (W, 7r)
W  (7T,7r) >  W  (7T,7f)
p W  (7T, 7f) +  (1 — p) W  (7T, 7r) — C > 0
p W  (7T, 7f) +  (1 — p) W  (7T, 7r) — C > p W  (7T, 7r) +  (l — p) W  (7T, 7r) 
pW  (7T, 7f) +  (1 — p) W  (7T, 7r) — C > pW (7f, 7f) +  (1 — p) W  (7T, 7f)
W (x, 7 r ) >  0  V  ( x ,  7?)
When d (W) = 1 and d (n) = 0 these constraints reduce to
7fw (R,  7f) +  (1 — 7r) W (0 , 7f) >  W ( / ,  7f)
w (I,7L) >  2L^ (-R, 7f) +  (1 — 7r) u; ( 0 , 7f)
p  [7TL1; ( i? ,7 f) + (1 — 7f) tn (0 ,7 f)] +  (1 — p ) u; ( i ,7 r )  — c > 0
p  fWw (R,  7f) +  (1 — 7f) u; (0 ,7 f)] +  (1 — p ) W  ( / ,7 r )  — C >  W  ( / ,7 r )
p  [7fu; ( i? , 7f) +  (1 — 7f) iw (0 ,7 f)] +  (1 — p ) w  ( / ,  7r) — c >
P  [7fu; ( i ? , 7 f )  +  ( 1  — 7f)  W  ( 0 , 7 f ) ]  +  ( 1  — p )  [7TW ( R ,  7 f )  - f  ( 1  — 7l ) w  ( 0 ,  7f)]
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w(0,W) > 0, w (/, 7r) > 0,w(R,W) > 0
which are exactly the constraints for the programme given in the main text 
for N  = 1.
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Appendix 4.2
P r o o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  7
To prove that the contract specified in Proposition 7 is optimal, one needs to 
first introduce some further notation. Partition the set 31 of N  projects into two 
subsets, 31 =  {£, £} , where £ is the set of projects the manager investigates (is 
curious about), and £  is the subset of projects the manager does not investigate 
(is lazy on). Denote the number of projects in these sets by C and L, respectively, 
where C = N  — L. Introduce two partitions of £  : £ =  {3, .ft} and £ =  {3, ,
where 3 is the subset of projects with low success probability, .ft is the number of 
projects with high success probability, 3 is the subset of £ the manager invests 
into, and % is the subset of projects in £ the manager aborts. Denote the number 
of projects in these subsets by J  and K  for the first partition and I  and T  for the 
second. Next, partition the set of projects 3 into which the manager knowingly 
invests into two subsets, 3 = { 3 j , 3 k } , where e.g. 3j  =  30 3 is the set of 
projects the manager knowingly invests in, even though success probabilities are 
low. Next denote the number of elements in these sets by I  j  and I k , so that 
one has I j  +  I k  =  I-
Given the distributional assumptions made, one can then write down (ICd)
as
V k
k = 0
I  k
( / *  J -  (1 -  w ( k , N  — I)
k=  0  j= 0
v  (Ij, Ik)  s.t. 0 < I k < K ,  0 < I j < N - K  V K  s.L 0 <  K  < N  
(Note that by convention (“) =  0 for b > a) .
In order to be able to state the set of (ICe) constraints, one needs to introduce 
one more piece of notation. If the manager did not investigate L  projects, let
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C £  be the set of projects the manager invests in blindly and let B  be the number 
of these projects. Let K'  be the number of projects in 25 which, unknown to the 
manager, have high success probability and j '  be the number of projects in 05 
which, unknown to the manager, have low success probability. The set of (I Ce) 
constraints can then be written down as
£  (iV a - ? ) " ■ *  (TV a - * ) * - * » ( * ,  . o - t f c
K = 0 '  '  '  '
> E  ( N ~ Ly ^ - v f - L- K ±
K = 0  V J  K ' =  o  V J
E  E  C - )  ( k l  , V  -  n ),J- , *k-3 (1 -
k=0 j=0
£ £ (*  " / )  ( £ , ) *  a
k = 0  j  = 0
w (k +  k ', N  -  B -  I) -  (N  -  L) c 
VL =  1 , V AT i— > (Ij , I k ,B)  s . t . 0 < I K < K ,  0 < I j  < N - L - K ,  0 < B < L 
Proof of part a):
In order to prove that w (k , N — K)  =  0 V/c < K, \ /K =  0,.., N  as in a) is in­
deed optimal, fix some K  > 0 and look at the subset of wages {w ( k , N — K )}^Z ^  .
On the equilibrium path, whenever the manager invests in K  projects, but does 
not invest in N  — K  projects, the K —vector of success probabilities for those 
projects will be tt*k = , containing K  times W. Off the equilibrium path,
the manager invests in K  projects and does not invest in N  — K  projects when 
the vector of success probabilities for the K  projects he invests in is 71JK ^  7T*k , 
that is, when this vector contains one or more 7ds. Let the number of 7r's in 
this vector be I j  +  J' =  I y ,  and the number of 7^5 be I k  + K ' = i k ,, where 
I f  +  Ik ' 3 =  K  • On the equilibrium path one has
Pr [w = w (K , N -  K)  | I y  = 0, IK> =  K] =  W
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whereas for a given k < K
Pi[w = w ( k , N  -  K)  | I y  = 0  , I K' = K) = if)*-
Off the equilibrium path one has
Pr [w = w (K, N  — K) | Iy  > 0, IK< < K] — =  7rjj'Wk ~
whereas one can write
Pr[w = w ( k , N - K )  | I f  > 0 , I K< < K\
= Y' (,Ik' -V (1 - 7r)J^'-J'7ffc-J' (1 -^—/ \  j J \k  — i Jj=0 \  J  /  \
= E  ( / y )  / y ) -  (1 "  s ) 7' - '* * " ' 0- -  v f - ' y -<■>=-»
j=o \  I  /  \  J S
Given these expressions, we are now ready to establish that
Pr[iu =  iv ( K , N - K )  \ I j =  0 , I k  = K] 
Pr[tn = w ( k , N - K ) \ I j  = 0 , IK = K } 
^ P r [ w  = w ( K , N - K ) \  I y  > 0 ,IK, < K'] 
~ Pi[w = w ( k , N - K ) \ I y  > 0 , I K, <K' \
Substituting and rearranging one finds
CHAPTER 4. FIRM-LEVEL DIVERSIFICATION 154
E U  (V ) ( V - W  (* -  (i -  ify - ' s  i
e U  (V)(*~-/VWy a (i -*r/y
©
But
tt’-V (l-7r)V-J7fV ^(l-  w y - 1'  =  J 3 ^ 1
with strict inequality for j  < I f .  Also, as a straightforward application of 
Vandermond’s identity, one has Yl*j=o (V ) (^^V ) =  (^), which estabhshes the 
inequality. As explained in the main text, this result allows to set 
w (k , N — K) = QVk < K,  VK  =  1, ..,N .
Proof of part b):
Incorporating a) one can write down a simplified set of (ICe) constraints as
N  /  \
E  ( J V  (x ~ p ) N ~K * K w  ( K > N  — K) — N c
K = 0  '  '
> E  ( N ~k  % K  (1 -  p f - L- K  E  ( k ) p k ‘ (1 -  P ) B - K ' z - ^ « z B - K ' * K '
K = 0  '  '  K f=0  '  '
w (I  + B ,N  -  B -  I) -  (N  -  L)c  
V L =  1, ...,1V; V K  i— >(Ij , I k ,B)  s . t . 0 < I K < K ,  0 < I j < N - L - K ,  0 < B < L
N  /  \
E  ( \ ) \ p K {1- p)n ~k kk w {K, N  -  K ) ~  Nc
K = 0  '  '
/  7\r _  r \
> E  ( _  P)W“i_K 2L7-'W/kAbu) ( /  +  B , N  - 1 -  B)  -  (N -  L) c
K = 0  '  '
VL =  1 , . . . , N ; V K ^ ► (Ij , I k ,B)  s.t. 0 < IK < K, 0 < I j  < N - L - K ,  0 < B < L
The wage schedule stated under b) is derived from the subset of (I Ce) that has 
L = N  (so that 7 =  0), with B = 0 , 1 , N.  Writing these out one has
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N  /  \
( Z )  Pk ( 1 - p)N~K *k w ( K , N - K ) - N c
K = 0  '  '
> ABw (B , N - B )
V5 = 0 ,1 ,. . ,#
from which, after imposing the equality and substituting, the closed form 
schedule
A n ~ k N c
w ( K , N - K )  = -------------------- 77--------V # =  0, . .#
V ’ \ p W + { l - V)A)N - A N
is easily obtained. To prove that this wage schedule is optimal, one needs to 
show that (z) under this schedule all other constraints are satisfied and that (ii) 
the choice of binding constraints is optimal.
(z) Start with the (ICe) constraints. In a first step, one can show that under 
the proposed schedule, for any L and any (//, I k ) the manager is indifferent as 
regards the number of projects he invests into blindly. To see this, note that 
under the proposed schedule
w ( I  + B , N  -  I  -  B) = A N- ’- Bw (N, 0)
so that (ICe) further simplifies to
N  /  \
£  \ K )  pk (1 -  p)N~K *Kw CK >N  ~ K ) ~  Nc
K = 0  '  '
> ^  ( N 2  L) p K (x “  p)N~L~K1LIjk IkA bA n - i - bw (N, 0) — (N  — L)c
K —Q ^  '
V L =  1 , V /C i— ► (Ij, I k , B) s.t. 0 < IK < K, 0 < I j < N - L - K ,  0 < B < L
from which the claimed indifference of the manager regarding B  is immediate.
In the following analysis, one can therefore let B  =  0 without loss of generality 
and only consider
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N  /  \
£  [V\pk (1-p)n' k^Kw(K’N - k ) - Nc
K = 0  '  '
— K  ^  ~  p)N L~K n!JTflKAN_Iw (N , 0) — (N  — L)c
K = 0  '  '
V L =  1, V A i— >(Ij , IK) s.t. 0 < I k < K ,  0 < I j < N - L - K
Note next that since A > 7r, it cannot be optimal for the manager to have 
I j  > 0. Also, since 7f > A  it cannot be optimal to have IK < K,  so that optimally 
(/j, /# ) =  (0, K)  V A. Under the proposed wage schedule, given any L and any 
K,  the manager will have an incentive to invest efficiently as regards the projects 
he investigated. It remains to verify that the proposed wage schedule satisfies
^  ( k ) pK  (1~ p)N~Kl f K w  { K ' N ~ K ) ~ N c
K = 0  '  '
> ( N Z  L\ K C1 -  p f ~ L~K *KAN~Kw (N, 0) -  (N  -  L) c
K = 0  '  '
V L = l , . . . ,N
Substituting AN~Kw (N , 0) for w (K , N  — K)  on the LHS, defining
D = pW +  (1 — p) A
and then substituting
Nc Nc
W('N ,0) = ] p i f + { l - p ) A ) N - A »  = D N -  A N
on both sides one obtains
CHAPTER 4. FIRM-LEVEL DIVERSIFICATION 157
f - K - KAN- K_ N ^ _ _ N c
^  £  ( \  V (1  -  — ( N  — L ) c
K=0 '  7
V L  =  1 , . . . , 7 V  
This can be further simplified to read
£ ) w „ „ N c  ■ ■- N c >  D n ~lA l - - N- C t  - — ( N  — L ) c  V L  =  1 ,  . . . ,1 V£ ) 7 V  _  J ^ N  —  ] J N  _  v /  ’ ’
Rearranging one finally obtains
D n N  -  ( D N - A N) N -  D n ~lA l N  +  ( D n  -  An ) ( N - L ) >  0
V L  =  1 , J V
(AN -  D N~LAL) N  + ( D N -  A N) ( N - L ) >  0 
V L = 1 ,...,N
Note that for L = N  ( the manager does not investigate any project) one has
(AN - A n ) N +  (DN -  AN) (N -  N)  =  0
as one would expect given that L = N  is binding.
Next define
Hl (D) =  (AN -  D n ~lA l ) N + ( D n  -  AN) (N  -  L) 
and note that 
H l (A) =  (Aw -  AN~LA L) N + { A N -  A N) ( N - L ) =  0
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But
=  - ( N - L )  N D N~L- 1A L +  N (N  - L )  D n ~* >  0
VL =  1 , N  — 1. Hence, since D > A  the inequality will be strictly satisfied for 
L = I , N  — 1, so that the solution satisfies all (IC e) constraints.
Next one can verify that all ICd~constraints are satisfied. Incorporating a) 
these can be written down as
7fKw (K , N - K ) 
> tPjWIkw (I, N  — I) 
V { I j J K) s . t . I j  + IK = I,  0 < 1  < N  V K  s.t. 0 <  K < N
It is easily seen that these can more succinctly but equivalently be written 
down as
7rKw ( K , N - K ) > 7 n f Kw { K  + l , N - K - l )  VK = Q , . . , N - 1  
Wk w ( K , N - K )  ^ w X - ' w t K - l ' N - K  + l) VK = N ,..,1
The first set of constraints ensures that the manager does not overinvest, 
while the second set forestalls underinvestment. Both are clearly met when 
w (K , N  — K) =  Aw (K  + 1 ,N  — K  — l ) a s  under the schedule given in part b).
(ii) To establish optimality of the candidate wage schedule one has to show 
that the Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are satisfied. It is well known that, for a linear 
problem, these reduce to the requirement that the gradient of the objective lies 
inside the cone generated by the normals of the supposedly binding constraints. 
Given that w (k,J) = 0 VA; < N  — J, VJ =  0,.., N,  the minimand can be written 
as
£  C ) p K ( l - p f - K nKw ( K , N - K ) - N c
K = 0  '  '
The binding (I Ce) constraints are given by
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$ 3  (i - P)N~K *K™ ( K , N  — K)  — Nc > A Bw (B , N - B )
K = 0  '  '
VB =  0,1 , N
Defining
'AT n - k - k = G
K = X
and stacking the gradient vector and constraint matrix with the top element 
pertaining to w (0, N)  and the first column of the constraint matrix pertaining 
to B  = 0 , one has
(  G 0 )  
G,
@2
\ Gn /
Go — 1 G o  G o  G o
Gj G1 - A  Gx G1
G2 G2 G2 — A2 G2
VGat GN GN Gn — AN /
1  \ \
Ai
^2
\ Xn /
where for optimality one requires that A* > 0 for I — 0 , N.  
It is easily checked, that
(%)p k ( i - p ) n - k w k a n - k
K = l  _ GtAN-1
[p7T + (1 — p) A] — AN [p7T +  (1 — p) A]N — AN
so that one has A* > 0 for 1 = 0 , N,  q.e.d.
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